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ABSTRACT  
One of the most striking trends in individuals’ careers over the last decade has 
been the dramatic increase in the proportion of the labor force working beyond their 
employers’ physical boundaries because of the digital revolution in the gig economy. 
This trend has drawn much attention in the changing nature of work, workplace and 
careers. However, little empirical research has explored how and why individuals behave 
in the interface between online platforms and traditional organizations. In my 
dissertation, I explore these questions by studying medical professionals’ digital careers 
in the Chinese healthcare crowdsourcing industry, also known as “mobile doctors.”  
First, by analyzing approximately 240-hour observations and 43 interviews with 
Chinese physicians, I identify a key issue in this new career – time conflict between 
crowdsourcing and traditional work. The findings show that physicians respond to time 
conflict in a variety of ways, including time theft, an essential yet under-researched 
construct in the crowdsourcing literature which reflects the tension between traditional 
 
 
 x 
work and crowdsourcing. Second, by analyzing archival data of 4,034 doctors’ 3.1 
million time records on a Chinese healthcare platform across half a year, I show that time 
theft for crowdsourcing is related to the traditional work context, including hospitals’ 
boundary control and offline crowd worker social groups. Finally, I further explore, via 
interview data, why such seemingly costly and deviant time theft is adopted by mobile 
doctors. The findings reveal that medical professionals assume the extra burden of 
working for crowdsourcing with the hope of answering unfulfilled occupational callings 
in traditional work and adding meaning to their work. Overall, these findings contribute 
to a better understanding of the shifting nature of work and careers in the digital economy 
by documenting and explaining mobile doctors’ participation in this new world of work. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“China has nearly 700 million netizens and an enormous Internet market. 
Gathering collective wisdom will make great things happen.” 
- The Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, June 24, 2015,  
at an executive meeting of the State Council. 
 
1.1 Digital Revolution and the New Work Environment  
One of the most striking trends in individuals’ careers over the last decade has 
been the dramatic increase in the proportion of the labor force working beyond an 
employer’s physical boundaries because of the digital revolution in the gig economy 
(e.g., big data, apps and cloud computing) (Torpey & Hogan, 2016). The promotion of 
such a change is partly through crowdsourcing, which is defined as “the act of taking a 
job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and outsourcing 
it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call.” (Howe, 
2006). The typical forms of crowdsourcing include citizen science (e.g., Galaxy Zoo, 
OpenStreetMap), idea creation platforms (e.g., Threadless.com, Taskcn.com) and Human 
Intelligence Tasks (HITs) (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk). Crowd workers who work 
for crowdsourcing are heterogeneous, self-selected, and voluntary individuals engaging 
in temporary, decentralized problem-solving activities (Franke, Keinz, & Klausberger, 
2013). However, we are only beginning to understand why and how they do so.  
To answer these research questions, I study a type of crowdsourcing which 
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connects medical professionals with remote patients through online question and answer 
(Q&A) forums. Q&A crowdsourcing aims to fill a gap left by search engine algorithms 
by outsourcing questions (e.g., medical questions from patients) to the crowd (e.g., 
physicians), from which anyone who knows answers can take the questions and be a 
crowd worker anywhere anytime. The Q&A healthcare crowdsourcing shows features 
which are different from traditional organizations that (1) crowd tasks of providing 
medical advices are short-term and micro; (2) crowd workers are not formal employees 
of either platforms or task requesters, and the formation of work relationships is fully 
dependent on the willingness of participants; (3) platforms’ incentives provision goes 
beyond financial incentives that traditional employers typically use to motivate their 
employees and may include both social and entertainment incentives; and (4) crowd 
workers’ motivation goes beyond money and may include factors such as psychological 
satisfaction, self-esteem, personal skill development, knowledge sharing, and love of a 
community (Hosseini, Shahri, Phalp, Taylor, & Ali, 2015). Since crowdsourcing has 
deeply transformed the nature of work environment, these new features make 
crowdsourcing a setting different from traditional work, which commonly refers to work 
with standardized work schedule, full-time employment and no teleworking (e.g. 
Kalleberg, 2000; Morganson, Major, Oborn, Verive, & Heelan, 2010). 
A seemly paradoxical phenomenon of crowd workers’ engagement in Q&A 
crowdsourcing motivates this study. On the one hand, this type of crowdsourcing enables 
crowd workers to work across time and space boundaries, providing them a chance to 
pursue a desired career (e.g., protean career, Hall, 1976; boundaryless career, Arthur, 
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1994). For example, today, more and more professionals look like many medical 
professionals in Q&A healthcare communities, who follow career callings by providing 
affordable or free medical service to patients who have hard access to offline healthcare, 
or sharing medical information freely with junior doctors. On the other hand, however, 
the majority who work for crowdsourcing platforms are part-time contributors (Ipeirotis, 
2008, 2015). Even with the good intention of helping more people (e.g., patients or 
fellow doctors in healthcare crowdsourcing), such prosocial behavior may interrupt 
traditional work due to the boundarylessness feature of crowd tasks. Take those medical 
professionals or so called mobile doctors for example: they include physicians, nurse 
practitioners, nutritionists, medical technologists and psychologists. They are doing 
traditional medical work in local hospitals and taking on crowd tasks (e.g., answering 
patients’ questions online) through third-party platforms, commonly without asking for 
permission from their hospitals. For them, the time boundary between crowdsourcing and 
traditional work might be blurring. For example, remote patients’ requests through 
mobile devices can turn their offline workplace into virtual work fields, holding their 
scheduled work hours in hospitals and creating time conflict between crowdsourcing and 
hospitals.  
This rising phenomenon of performing two or more independent jobs within the 
same work hours through technology is far from unique. Many people in traditional work 
have utilized digital revolution and taken on a secondary job, such as starting small 
business as a part-time entrepreneur on e-commerce platforms such as Amazon.com, or 
writing novels on literature websites such as Jjwxc.net. In the healthcare industry, take 
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China, the empirical setting of this study for example: at least 480,000 doctors, around 
six percent of the whole medical professional population, has/had crowdsourcing work 
experiences1. Therefore, it is not only a phenomenon of theoretical importance, but also 
has urged practitioners to better understand and manage this recent trend. In particular, 
how does crowdsourcing impact and be impacted by traditional work in a traditional 
organization? Since more and more crowd workers are part-time contributors (Ipeirotis, 
2008, 2015), when time is limited (24/7) and crowd workers’ ability to control the timing 
of their work (or temporal flexibility, Briscoe, 2007) is weak, little is known about while 
people involving in traditional work participate in crowdsourcing, how this timing might 
create conflict between crowdsourcing and offline organizations, how people deal with 
such conflict, and why they respond to such conflict in a certain way.  
1.2 Research Purposes and Potential Contributions  
The purpose of this study is to fill the gaps mentioned above in crowdsourcing 
literature by exploring how crowdsourcing impacts and is impacted by traditional work. 
Specifically, I focus on crowd workers’ time use behavior for crowdsourcing in 
traditional organizations. After identifying time conflict between crowdsourcing and 
traditional work as a major issue in the use of time for crowdsourcing at the preliminary 
study stage, this dissertation aims to answer three sequential research questions:  
(1) How do doctors respond to time conflict between crowdsourcing and traditional 
work?  
                                                                            
1 This number is estimated by the author based on the self-reported data by healthcare 
crowdsourcing platforms. For details, see Chapter 2, Section 2.1 
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(2) What factors in traditional work are related to time theft for crowdsourcing?  
(3) Why do mobile doctors adopt such seemingly costly and deviant time theft for 
crowdsourcing?  
Though crowdsourcing has deeply transformed the nature of work and workplace, 
and has attracted much attention in both academia and practice, the crowdsourcing 
literature is dominated by studies on the design of platform systems (e.g., the design of an 
incentive mechanism on a website, crowd tasks, or technology issues) and the 
management of an undifferentiated population of either task requestors (e.g., the 
adoption, management, and evaluation of crowd workers and platforms by task 
requestors) or crowd workers (see details in Chapter 3: Literature Review. For other 
review articles, see Zhao & Zhu, 2014; Rechenberger, Jung, Schmidt, & Rosenkranz, 
2015). Less studied, however, is crowd workers’ individual behavior. As crowd workers 
are heterogeneous, self-selected, and voluntary individuals engaging in temporary, 
decentralized problem-solving activities (Franke et al., 2013), rather than being assigned 
a job or a task, they can enjoy the flexibility of choosing crowd tasks that fit their 
interests, schedules and skills (Deng & Joshi, 2013). Their behavior, especially how they 
allocate time and energy between traditional work and crowdsourcing may influence not 
only their own work, but also the functioning of platforms and traditional organizations. 
Therefore, the first contribution that this dissertation aims to make is to take a micro 
perspective, and explore participants’ individual behavior in this new world of work.  
Moreover, though crowdsourcing is a relatively new organizational form (Howe, 
2006), it does not operate in an isolated system, but interacts with offline organizations. 
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For those crowd workers who are doing traditional work in traditional organizations, their 
boundary management behavior across online and offline interface may significantly 
influence online platforms in terms of attracting and maintaining more voluntary and 
high-performance participants, and offline organizations in terms of managing the impact 
of digital economy on regular workforce. Therefore, the second contribution that this 
dissertation aims to make is to explore the interplay (and perhaps tension) between online 
platforms and traditional organizations, especially how the rising crowdsourcing would 
impact the existing system.   
Thirdly, though the theme of time use behavior is seldom addressed in 
crowdsourcing setting, it has been extensively studied in other types of boundary 
management studies in careers literature, such as work-family literature which focuses on 
boundary management between work and life with the core issue that how individuals 
deal with potential conflict or enrichment between work schedules and family needs (e.g., 
Evans, Kunda, & Barley, 2004; Golden, 2001; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004; Greenhaus & 
Beutell, 1985). The rise of flexible crowd work adds a third dimension – online work 
schedule into the work-life framework, providing a new lens for scholars to reexamine 
time use behavior. Therefore, this dissertation also aims to contribute to the literature on 
the impact of digital revolution on career boundary management by exploring the use of 
time in different work domains in the setting of crowdsourcing.   
Fourthly, this dissertation also contributes to research and practices on healthcare 
management, and specifically the effect of digital revolution on healthcare. Mobile 
healthcare is a new phenomenon in healthcare, in which a broad range of stakeholders, 
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such as leaders in healthcare delivery organizations (e.g., hospitals and clinics), 
healthcare government officers, medical professionals, patients, and high technology 
companies, all try to learn how to improve healthcare through digital revolution around a 
specific topic (e.g., improving healthcare quality, increasing physicians’ participation, 
and finding a profitable and sustainable business model). Recent academic studies show 
that healthcare crowdsourcing overcomes the inefficiency of medical service and the 
asymmetrical distribution of medical resources, thus appears to be an optimistic source 
for knowledge exchange, collaborative diagnoses, skills assessment, and knowledge 
discovery (Holst, et al., 2015; Choo et al., 2015; McComb & Bond, 2015; Celi, Ippolito, 
Montgomery, Moses, & Stone, 2014). Beyond these macro level themes, much remains 
unknown about micro level issues, such as medical professionals’ behavior in healthcare 
crowdsourcing, and cross level issues, such as how hospitals prohibit or promote medical 
professionals’ online behavior. Therefore, this dissertation also aims to shed light on the 
healthcare management by exploring healthcare crowdsourcing, crowd work, and mobile 
doctors from micro-level and cross-level perspectives.  
1.3 A Full-cycle Approach of Research Design 
To fulfill these purposes, I followed a full-cycle approach of research design 
which combined both qualitative and quantitative methods (Chatman & Flynn, 2005). A 
full-cycle approach of research design starts with field observations of interesting 
organizational phenomena. It harnesses the advantages of observational research, such as 
providing natural proof, determining the relevance of phenomenon, and identifying the 
complexity of the construct. Then it manipulates or controls the phenomenon by using 
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quantitative methods to enhance generalizability of the findings from observational 
research and specify boundary conditions. By traveling back and forth between 
qualitative and quantitative research, the full-cycle approach of research design has the 
advantages of “(1) Specifying comprehensive theoretical models … (2) Enabling 
consideration of both actual and ideal conditions… (3) Enabling understanding of 
complex phenomena … (4) Assessing reciprocal influence between people and 
situations … (5) Injecting flexibility into a research program … (6) Encouraging 
interdisciplinary integration.” (Chatman & Flynn, 2005, p. 438-440).     
Specifically, I designed three sequential steps with the purpose of using results 
from one method to help develop or inform the other (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 
1989). I first explored this new setting via observations and interviews with medical 
professionals from a broad range of hospitals about their interpretations of how time was 
used, and attitudes toward healthcare crowdsourcing (Chapter 4). This first phase 
revealed a critical time use behavior which has not been well captured in previous 
crowdsourcing literature to describe the tension between crowdsourcing and traditional 
work – time theft, which I defined as full-time employees’ use of scheduled work hours 
to work for a secondary job, typically through digital technology (e.g., digital platforms, 
emails, and social media mobile applications). Moreover, I identified key factors in 
offline traditional work context which were related to mobile doctors’ time theft for 
online crowdsourcing. One was boundary control (Perlow, 1998), which was a hospital’s 
ability to affect how medical professionals divided their time between their work and life 
outside of work. The other was the impact from a social group of mobile doctors in a 
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doctor’s local hospital.  
In the second phase, grounding the analysis in time disciplines and norm violation 
behavior, I developed and tested a moderating model of the use of time for 
crowdsourcing with six-month longitudinal quantitative data collected from one of the 
largest healthcare crowdsourcing platforms in China (Chapter 5). The emphasis of this 
model was on how key offline factors identified in the first phase would be related to 
mobile doctors’ actual daily time use behavior on a platform.  
After confirming the boundary conditions of the use of time for crowdsourcing, in 
the third phase, I went back to the interviews to identify the motivations behind mobile 
doctors’ use of office hours for crowdsourcing (Chapter 6). The findings revealed that 
medical professionals assumed the extra burden of working for crowdsourcing with the 
hope of answering unfulfilled occupational callings in traditional work and adding the 
meaning to their work.  
As a whole, such a full-cycle approach has clear advantages over single or 
multimethod approaches that it can specify theoretical models, establish “the power, 
generality, and conceptual underpinnings of the phenomenon” (Chatman & Flynn, 2005, 
p. 434). Thus, it is said to “make bigger impact on the practice of management because 
they are able to demonstrate relevance as well as rigor.” (Chatman & Flynn, 2005,          
p. 445).  
1.4 Research Setting 
My research setting is the Q&A healthcare crowdsourcing industry in China. The 
choice of the empirical setting is entirely intentional as healthcare is an industry where 
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medical professionals are required to have high credentials and ethics code, gain 
relatively high salary and reputation, work long hours, and may also have career callings 
and social responsibilities beyond the self and their hospitals (e.g., physicians take the 
Hippocratic Oath before being a physician). The healthcare environment in China is also 
unique in a way that it is experiencing reforms from being completely controlled by the 
state (a Soviet model and a collectively planned and managed system) to gradually 
embracing social drives such as private organizations to join the industry (a socialist 
market model) (Burns & Huang, 2017). It also gradually allows physicians to have 
certain freedom to hold multiple jobs at the same time (e.g., The Notice on Issues 
Concerning Multisite Practices by Doctors, Sept 2009) (For details, see Chapter 2: 
Research Context).  
This setting is ideal for exploring the impact of technology on traditional 
employees and organizations, because (1) medical professionals in China work in a local 
healthcare delivery institution, such as hospitals or clinics (Qin, Li, & Hsieh, 2013). They 
follow a traditional career that resignation of one’s position freely historically is not 
permitted (Burns, 2017) (See details in Section 2.3). The healthcare crowdsourcing 
platforms act as a gatekeeper to make sure every participant is a certified medical 
professional in an offline hospital. To the greatest extent, it can rule out the possibility of 
a mixed sample of full-time, freelancer, self-employed, contractor, and retired such as 
those in other crowdsourcing platforms including Amazon Mechanical Turk (Barnes, 
Green, & Hoyos, 2015), or mixed professions of professionals and non-professionals 
such as those in Q&A platforms like Stack Overflow. Thus, the dynamics between online 
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and offline employment relationships on time use behavior would be more visible than 
that in other settings; (2) it provides a setting where organization-driven careers co-exist 
with individual-driven careers, which is a typical example of new careers in the digital 
era, and may also shed light on other contemporary careers about the tension between 
individual driven and external constraints (Inkson, Gunz, Ganesh, & Roper, 2012), as 
well as the tension among different boundaries (Greenhaus & Kossek, 2014).  
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation Structure  
In the following chapters, Chapter 2 described healthcare environment, mobile 
healthcare industry, and medical professionals’ offline careers in China in detail, as 
research background for the empirical research that followed. In Chapter 3, I reviewed 
the literatures relevant to the three research questions, including crowdsourcing and 
careers especially boundary management and the use of time. This chapter served as the 
theoretical background of this dissertation. Next, in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I presented the 
three sequential phases mentioned above. In each chapter, I described the methodology 
and presented the results. Finally, Chapter 7 concluded the dissertation, by offering a 
discussion of major findings, theoretical and practical implications, and generalizability. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Chapter Summary  
The traditional healthcare system in China is described as “a pro-rich, top-heavy, 
urban-centric system” and faces lots of challenges and issues. The rising digital 
revolution in China, along with an economic national strategy called “Internet Plus”, 
fundamentally changes the way how healthcare is provided. With the hope of alleviating 
current problems in traditional healthcare and helping medical institutions to utilize their 
idle resources and workforce, mobile healthcare is booming in China. Moreover, the 
impact of crowdsourcing on medical professionals is far-reaching. Their traditional 
careers in local healthcare are parallelized by a new digital career that they can serve 
patients anytime anywhere. Though at least 480 thousand medical professionals (6% out 
of 8 million in total in China) have tasted such digital careers, little is known about their 
perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.  
In the following part of this chapter, Sections 2.1 and 2.2 described the healthcare 
environment in China, including the booming mobile healthcare industry (Section 2.1) 
and why it happened (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 described the traditional careers of 
medical professionals in local healthcare institutions and the offline Chinese healthcare 
career environment. Though not directly related to the main study that followed, this 
chapter provided background information for readers who are not familiar with either the 
digital revolution in China or specifically healthcare crowdsourcing.  
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2.1 Digital Revolution in China and the Booming Mobile Healthcare Industry 
In the recent five years, China has been experiencing a digital revolution. Its 
internet economy has already been larger than that of the United States, France, and 
Germany as a share of GDP (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014). The fast development of 
information and communication technologies is also changing the way firms do business, 
and the way people live (China Internet Network Information Center, 2016; Tang, 2017). 
As what described in a report by McKinsey Global Institute (2014):  
“During the course of 2013, the number of active smart devices grew from 
380 million to 700 million. On Singles Day, the e-commerce marketplaces 
Taobao and Tmall posted more than RMB 36 billion (almost $6 billion) in 
sales in just 24 hours. Some five billion daily searches are made through 
Baidu, and hundreds of millions communicate via WeChat, Tencent’s 
mobile messaging app. Now with 632 million users—and counting—the 
Internet is fundamentally altering the fabric of daily life in China.”       
Such a digital revolution is reinforced by the central government and communist 
party of China through an economic national strategy called “Internet Plus” - “to 
integrate mobile Internet, cloud computing big data, and the Internet of Things with 
modern manufacturing, to encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial 
networks, and Internet banking, and to get Internet-based companies to increase their 
presence in the international market” (Li, 2015). This concept was first proposed by 
internet entrepreneurs, such as Edward Yang Yu, the CEO and founder of Analysys 
International (2012), and Pony Huateng Ma, the CEO and founder of Tencent (2013), 
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based on their rich experiences in internet-based business and insights on the business 
environment in China. Later, Internet Plus developed from a loose business concept into 
a systematic national strategy when the Prime Minister Li Keqiang formalized it in his 
Government Work Report on March 5, 2015. It was expected that Internet Plus would 
create a new growth engine and promote the transformation and upgrading of the 
economy (The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, 2015). Ever since then, 
China has seen a massive surge in the number of newly established internet-based 
companies in a broad range of traditional industries, such as manufacturing, retail, 
transportation, agriculture, restaurant, tourism, education, and healthcare. “Internet Plus” 
has also become one of the buzzwords in China, and changed people’s mentality, which 
leads to the flourish of new internet-based concepts, such as crowdfunding or 
crowdsourcing (Tang, 2017).  
Take healthcare for example: Internet Plus is changing traditional healthcare 
industry. Though the empirical academic research is still limited, the emerging 
phenomenon has attracted lots of consulting companies and data analysis service 
providers to study on. For example, a recent report by Analysys International (2017) 
showed that market size in the mobile healthcare industry had increased dramatically in 
the past five years, reached RMB10.56 billion in 2016 and was expected to have 90.2% 
increase in 2017. McKinsey Global Institute (2014) also estimated that the internet would 
save RMB110 billion to 610 billion in annual healthcare expenditures, which was 2 to 13 
percent of the incremental growth in healthcare expenditures projected from 2013 to 
2025.  
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In this new mobile healthcare industry2, as Figure 1 showed, the number of newly 
established mobile healthcare start-up companies who were actively searching for venture 
capital rose significantly after 2010 and experienced a peak in 2015. The similar pattern 
also showed in the number of Q&A healthcare crowdsourcing companies.  
 
 
Figure 1  The Growth of Startups in Mobile Healthcare Industry 
 
                                                                            
2 Mobile healthcare is a broad field which is emerging because of the socioeconomic 
trends (e.g., sharing economy, crowdsourcing, gamification, and online Q&A 
communities) and technological trends (e.g., big data, application, and cloud computing). 
It takes multiple formats, such as providing digital diagnostics and therapies, developing 
management and administration tools for hospitals, coordinating of care for a patient 
across providers or other care givers, and facilitating healthcare big data analysis. Q&A 
crowdsourcing in this study is one form of mobile healthcare. 
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Moreover, the number of medical professionals who involve in mobile healthcare 
is tremendous. Take the dominant Q&A healthcare crowdsourcing platforms in China for 
example: according to the statistics reported by these companies on their own websites, 
there were over 400,000 registered medical professionals at chunyuyisheng.com, 480,000 
at Haodf.com, 260,000 at Guahao.com and 50,000 at 120ask.com. It means that, even 
after the possibility that medical professionals may work for multiple platforms 
simultaneously is considered, there are still at least 480 thousand medical professionals, 
6% out of 8 million in total in China (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016), have 
or had more or less experiences in the digital career as a crowd worker, not to say that 
there are many other medical professionals working for mobile healthcare platforms 
which focus on the diverse niche markets (e.g., dxy.cn, 120yibao.com).  
2.2 Why is Mobile Healthcare Booming in China? 
As the “Healthcare” part in “Internet plus Healthcare” (or mobile healthcare), the 
traditional healthcare system in China faces lots of challenges and issues, which provides 
room for the adoption of the digital revolution by healthcare institutions and medical 
professionals. Specifically, the Chinese healthcare industry has been criticized by 
professionals, researchers (e.g., Burns & Liu, 2017; Hsiao, 1995; Ramesh, Wu & He, 
2013) and ordinary Chinese citizens on its efficiency/cost containment, low quality care, 
and hard patient access, the so called “the iron triangle” which is used to evaluate a 
healthcare system across cultural contexts (Burns & Liu, 2017, p. 4).  
After several periods of development (i.e., a Soviet model, a collectively planned 
and managed system, and a socialist market model), the Chinese healthcare industry is 
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described as a “pro-rich, top-heavy, urban-centric system,” (Burns & Huang, 2017, p53) 
where medical resources (e.g., government spending, physicians and nurses, and medical 
technology) are centralized in urban hospitals. Though the government has issued many 
reforms to solve this problem (e.g., the New Cooperative Medical Scheme, 2003; 
National Healthcare Reform, 2009), the situation has not been improved much 
(Blumenthal & Hsiao, 2015; Burns & Huang, 2017). For example, statistics showed that 
in 2013, in total, urban medical institutions were only 14.6% of all medical institutions 
(e.g., hospitals, clinics, and community health center) in China, but they accounted for 
48% of all beds, and 51% of the healthcare workforce (National Health and Family 
Planning Commission of China, 2013). Moreover, market failure, which refers to “non-
competitive market conditions in the healthcare industry that inhibit the efficient 
operation of supply and demand,” (Burns & Liu, 2017, p. 3) causes issues such as a lack 
of price information and pricing transparency, asymmetric information between providers 
and consumers, and imperfect agency relationships between physicians and patients.  
Under these situations, patients put their trust in hospital reputation and rush into 
urban hospitals, especially Class  tertiary hospitals, which locate in the large cities, 
usually closely tie to the medical research facilities in universities, have larger power in 
resources control, and enjoy high status and prestige. For example, according to a report 
by National Health and Family Planning Commission of China (2017), 77.3% of China’s 
inpatient service was delivered in hospitals, and only 18.2% in community health centers 
or village clinics. Among these hospitals, roughly 49% of outpatient visits and 43.1% of 
inpatient service took place in tertiary hospitals, which only accounted for 7% of all 
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hospitals. Therefore, getting healthcare becomes difficult for patients. It’s common that 
patients wait for hours in a tertiary hospital for a less than five minutes face-to-face 
meeting with a physician, while physicians treat dozens of patients intensively every day. 
Yet lower level medical institutions often face the problem of high vacancy rate. For 
example, in 2016, the usage rate of beds in community health centers was only 55.9%, 
compared to 99.1% in tertiary hospitals (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission of China, 2017). 
Facing these challenges, the Chinese healthcare industry necessitates reforms and 
new driving forces to develop and change. Mobile Healthcare meets such needs. Mobile 
healthcare can alleviate the information asymmetry problem by providing an open 
platform for patients to search and evaluate medical professionals, and solve the patient 
access problem by either providing medical counseling beyond physical meetings or 
setting up an online appointment system. It also creates a platform that medical 
professionals can work across organizational and geographic boundaries. Especially, it 
can help those lower status medical institutions to utilize their idle resources and 
workforce (e.g., Wen & Wei, 2015; Tang, 2017). Therefore, mobile healthcare has been 
embraced by the pioneers (e.g., CEO and founders of platforms, some medical 
professionals) in the healthcare industry and rising in China.  
2.3 An Offline Career in Chinese Healthcare Industry 
The careers for medical professionals in hospitals in Chinese healthcare industry 
can be considered as a typical form of a traditional career which is driven by an 
organization’s bureaucratic system (Super, 1957).  
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Take physicians for example: they are primarily hospital-based specialists who 
work in the public sections and hierarchies, and are attached to one hospital (Burns, 
2017)3. Their careers in hospitals follow a strict vertical ladder that after medical school, 
they move upward from low level (i.e., intern, licensed intern, and resident), middle level 
(i.e., attending), to upper level (i.e., associate chief and chief), in a sequential order. To be 
promoted from one level to another, they have to meet certain criteria set up by the 
government. For example, to move from attending physician to associate chief, 
physicians are required to publish at least three provincial level papers, receive an A 
grade on specialty exams, and pass the English language exam.  
In such a traditional career, it is hard for physicians to either find an alternative 
job outside of the vertical ladder in a particular hospital, or establish a private practice by 
themselves, or freely move to another hospital, because of the regulations in the 
healthcare industry. Therefore, as Burns (2017) concluded: “Graduates might spend their 
entire career in one organization, encased within a steep hierarchy with few other 
prospects. Hospital physicians were thus stuck in environments where they were besieged 
by patient demands, heavy workloads, pressures to generate revenues, and stymied career 
advancement.” (p. 195).  
In terms of the control or regulation for physicians’ behavior, based on a literature 
review, Yip, Hsiao, Meng, Chen and Sun (2010) summarized factors that influenced 
                                                                            
3 As a comparison, physicians in the United States are community-based practitioners 
residing in the private sectors, working in solo practice or collegial small groups and 
consisting of a mix of generalists and specialists that are primarily office-based and 
affiliated with multiple hospitals (Burns, 2017). 
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physicians’ behavior, including education and training, external motivations (e.g., 
financial incentive, norms, reputation, feedback and profiling), internal motivation (e.g., 
professional ethics, altruism), regulation (e.g., guidelines, audit), and organizational 
context (e.g., practice setting and market conditions). However, the effectiveness of these 
factors on physicians’ behavior varied a lot in China (Burn, 2017). For example, in terms 
of education and training, only 0.8% of physicians received doctoral level of training 
(Burn, 2017). External motivations such as financial incentives to unethical behavior 
(e.g., over-utilizing drugs or accepting bribes for their services) were enormous due to the 
relatively low and unequal salary within or across hospitals. There were even a type of 
doctors who faced community persecution for not accepting bribes (Leonard, 2010). Due 
to the lack of a well-functioning association to promote professional doctor behavior, 
exercise self-regulation, and instill medical ethics, doctors’ behavior was little influenced 
by practice norms. Monitoring one another’s behavior and exerting peer pressure over 
one’s colleagues were also limited because of the lack of group medical practice (Burn, 
2017).  
Therefore, without the effective regulation from other institutions, such as 
education, self-regulation, professional associations, and colleagues, physicians’ behavior 
is controlled by the hierarchical system in a hospital. For example, within a hospital, 
there is a rigid hierarchy that physicians should be obedient to their superiors (Burn, 
2017). Within the industry, higher level of hospitals have greater control over employees 
in terms of better performance management (e.g., performance tracking, review, 
dialogue, consequence management) and talent management (e.g., rewarding high 
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performers, removing poor performers, managing, retaining and attracting talent) (Liu & 
Huang, 2014). Therefore, as mentioned later in the following Chapter 5, I used 
hierarchical level of a hospital in the healthcare industry as an indicator of hospitals’ 
boundary control, and hierarchical level of a doctor in the professional line in a hospital 
as an indicator of doctors’ individual power to violate norms (for details, see Section 
5.2.2).   
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter Summary 
In the following part of this chapter, based on a systematic literature review 
method, Sections 3.1 described the current state (Section 3.1.1) and the gaps in 
crowdsourcing literature (Section 3.1.2 and Section 3.1.3). Specifically, in response to the 
fast development of crowdsourcing platforms, literature on crowdsourcing emerges. Yet 
the current literature mainly takes a system’s or an organization’s perspective. Less 
studied is individual behavior and the interplay between crowdsourcing and traditional 
work. 
Moreover, the digital revolution such as crowdsourcing adds new features to 
contemporary careers, which I define as digital careers. Bounded digital careers, a 
unique format of digital careers in traditional organizations, show tensions between 
crowdsourcing and traditional work. Section 3.2 summarized the relevant literature in 
careers field. Specifically, Section 3.2.1 defined digital careers and described how a 
bounded digital career was similar to and different from other contemporary careers in 
literature. Section 3.2.2 reviewed current literature on career boundary management and 
identified two perspectives to explain the use of time in different domains.  
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3.1 Understanding Crowdsourcing in Traditional Organizations   
3.1.1 A Systematic Literature Review on Crowdsourcing Literature 
Crowdsourcing has deeply transformed the nature of work and workplace. It is 
considered as an essential format of the future of work, a buzzword which refers to work 
that has features related to automation, digital platforms, or other digital innovations 
(e.g., Manyika, 2017; Stiegler, 2017). Rather than being driven by the wage of a 
secondary job (Kingsley, Gray, & Suri, 2015) or strictly constrained by factors such as 
time and space traditionally associated with dual job holding (e.g., Shishko & Rostker, 
1976; Paxson & Sicherman, 1996), employees who are holding a full-time offline job 
face a new contingent online job market due to crowdsourcing, in which the blurry 
boundary of work time and space is so extreme that it potentially creates an opportunity 
for them to take a secondary job with more flexibility and variation: they voluntarily 
decide to take a crowd task which is usually short-term (e.g., a few seconds) and micro 
(e.g., a simple medical question) anytime anywhere, and they are not formal employees 
of platforms, whose incentives provision may include both social and entertainment 
incentives, but not necessarily financial incentives (e.g., wage) that traditional employers 
typically use to motivate their employees (Hosseini et al., 2015). Therefore, although the 
theoretical approaches to describing how time is allocated by multiple job holders are 
vast, given the unique characteristics of crowd work, we don’t know whether these 
results can be applied to understand the use of time by employees who are doing both 
crowdsourcing and traditional work, especially in traditional organizations.  
I drew on this relatively new area of crowdsourcing. After crowdsourcing was 
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first coined as a portmanteau of crowd and outsourcing in 2006 (Howe, 2006), it has 
attracted many scholars to study on this new phenomenon. To better understand the status 
of this emerging field, I conducted a systematic literature review with three steps 
(Webster & Watson, 2002) on the current literature reviews. First, I collected all papers 
on crowdsourcing literature reviews, including journal articles, conference papers and 
book chapters, based on a keyword search using the database Web of Science. I restricted 
the keywords to “crowdsourcing” and “literature review” in the topic. The timespan was 
set from the default year 1965 to June, 2017. It yielded 40 review papers in total. Second, 
by reading the abstract of each paper, I further excluded those papers which were not 
related to a literature review on crowdsourcing. The result yielded 7 papers left in the 
pool. Third, I conducted a backward and forward citation analysis on these 7 papers by 
using Google Scholar to track backward and forward the relevant literature reviews that 
were not in my paper pool. Through this process, I identified 11 more papers. Therefore, 
the final pool had a total of 18 review papers.  
Table 1 summarized these papers. They had taken different perspectives to review 
on either the whole field or a particular topic related to crowdsourcing (e.g., human 
resources management, ethics issues, definitions, categories, and success), and made 
great efforts to summarize this fragmented emerging research area. As a whole, they 
provided a relatively completed picture of the status of crowdsourcing literature.  
Following Zhao and Zhu’s (2014) way, I divided current research into three 
perspectives. A system’s perspective focuses on the platform itself, such as the design of 
an incentive mechanism on a website, crowd tasks, technology issues, or value of a 
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platform. An organization’s perspective focuses on task requestors. They could be 
individuals such as online patients in this dissertation or individual requestors on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, or companies such as Threadless.com, a Chicago-based T-shirt 
company who outsources T-shirt designs to the crowd (Franke et al., 2013). An example 
topic in this perspective is how task requestors respond to the design of a crowdsourcing 
platform, such as adoption, management, and evaluation of crowd workers and platforms. 
A participant’s perspective focuses on crowd workers. The typical topics include their 
motivations and behavior.  
Still in the process of developing theories and understanding phenomena 
(Morschheuser, Hamari, Koivisto, & Maedche, 2017), crowdsourcing is considered as an 
effective way to perform tasks which can benefit from distributed intellect (Brabham, 
2008; Leimeister, 2010) or tasks which cannot be handled without human efforts (Von 
Ahn, 2008). Q&A crowdsourcing platforms, for example, are to fill a gap left by search 
engine algorithms by outsourcing questions to human in the crowd. Because of its base in 
information system management, most research on crowdsourcing has taken the system’s 
and organization’s perspectives, and concerned the platform system design and task 
requestors. For example, Table 1 indicated that among 135 papers on crowdsourcing 
published between 2006 and 2013, a keywords analysis showed that only 17 keywords 
were related to participants, compared to 192 ones related to the system (Tarrell et al., 
2013). 
3.1.2 The Under-researched Individual Behavior   
Table 1 also showed that, the number of studies which were conducted from a 
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participant’s perspective was relatively small. For literature reviews with a topic focusing 
on the participant’s level (e.g., Aris, 2015; Durward, Blohm, & Leimeister, 2016), 
scholars could only identify less than 10 articles by using systematic literature review.  
Moreover, current articles with a participant focus usually explore participants’ 
motivations (e.g., Pedersen et al., 2013; Zhao & Zhu, 2014). For example, for the citizen 
science type of crowdsourcing (e.g., Galaxy Zoo, OpenStreetMap), the motivations are 
typically related to prosocial goals, such as a desire to contribute to scientific discovery 
or share their local knowledge, learning new things, advancing their careers, or having a 
sense of community (e.g., Budhathoki & Haythornthwaite, 2013; Raddick et al., 2013). 
For idea creation type of crowdsourcing (e.g., Threadless.com), the participation is 
typically driven by intrinsic and extrinsic factors such as feeling of pride and respect, 
fairness expectations, self-efficacy, and monetary reward (e.g., Boons, Stam, & Barkema, 
2015; Franke et al., 2013; Morais, Ramos, & Center, 2013; Shao, Shi, Xu, & Liu, 2012). 
For Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) type of crowdsourcing (e.g., Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, Taskcn.com), people are more likely to be motivated by extrinsic factors such as 
payment and a task’s meaningfulness (e.g., Kaufmann, Schulze, & Veit, 2011; Chandler 
& Kapelner, 2013).  
Less studied, however, is participants’ behavior in crowdsourcing. As shown in 
Table 1, within the limited number of studies on participants’ behavior, the major focus 
was on the crowd as an undifferentiated group, such as the number of participants or the 
quality of their contributions (e.g., Zhao & Zhu, 2014; Rechenberger, et al., 2015), rather 
than each individual’s behavior. However, as mentioned earlier, crowd workers are 
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heterogeneous (Franke et al., 2013). Their idiosyncratic individual behavior, such as how 
they allocate time and energy among traditional work and crowd work matters for both 
traditional organizations and crowdsourcing platforms. Therefore, a review of the status 
of crowdsourcing literature shows a research gap that more studies are needed to take a 
participant’s perspective, and explore individual behavior in this new world of work.  
3.1.3 The Neglected Interplay of Crowdsourcing and Traditional Organizations  
Table 1 also indicated that current literature on crowdsourcing focused mainly on 
crowdsourcing and direct parties associated with crowdsourcing (e.g., platform, task 
requestors, and participants). However, though crowdsourcing is a relatively new 
organizational form (Howe, 2006), it does not operate in an isolated system, but interacts 
with other offline organizations. For example, the participants are usually part-time 
contributors (Ipeirotis, 2015) who work in other organizations. Even if they are highly 
motivated by themselves to participate in crowdsourcing, whether the constraints from 
other domains of their work, especially offline full-time employers, don’t allow them to 
actively participate, is still lack of exploration. Therefore, knowing the interplay (and 
perhaps tension) between online platforms and traditional organizations can help us better 
understand this new phenomenon and how it would impact the existing system.     
In sum, to contribute to this group of research on crowdsourcing, in my 
dissertation, I take a participant’s perspective and explore individuals’ time use behavior. 
Such a perspective also highlights the impact of crowdsourcing on traditional work, as 
well as the potential impact of traditional work on crowdsourcing.   
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Table 1 A Summary of Literature Reviews on Crowdsourcing 
Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
Tarrell, et al. 
(2013) 
To provide a snapshot 
to understand key 
topics.  
135 
papers, 
2006-
Jan, 
2013 
(1) Problem (e.g., open 
innovation, knowledge 
management, design)  
(2) Process (e.g., creativity, 
collaboration, Mechanical 
Turk) 
(3) Outcome (performance) 
(4) Technology (web 2.0, 
social media, social 
computing) 
(5) Governance (e.g., user-
generated content, task 
decomposition, motivation, 
decision making) 
(keywords no. = 192) 
Absorptive capacity 
(n=2) 
(1) Crowd 
(communities, 
networks of practice, 
online communities, 
Tuangou) 
(2) Individual 
(participation, social 
capital, social network) 
(n= 17) 
Hetmank 
(2013) 
To gain a better 
understanding of what 
crowdsourcing 
systems are and what 
typical design aspects 
are considered in the 
development of such 
systems. 
72 
papers, 
2006 
till 
2013 
17 definitions of 
crowdsourcing systems 
were found and categorized 
into four perspectives: the 
organizational, the 
technical, the functional, 
and the humancentric. 
N/A N/A 
Pedersen et 
al. (2013) 
To review the 
conceptual model of 
crowdsourcing in 
75 
papers, 
2006-
(1) Problem 
(2) Process 
(3) Technology 
Problem owner (reasons 
to participate) 
(1) Individual 
motivations 
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Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
Information Systems 
field. 
Jan, 
2012 
(4) Governance (right 
incentive mechanism, 
managing submissions, loss 
of control, quality of ideas, 
creating trust) 
(5) Outcome 
(2) Crowd 
(collaboration, shared 
understanding, trust, 
privacy)  
Zhao & Zhu 
(2014) 
To provide an 
overview of the status 
of studies on 
crowdsourcing.  
55 
papers, 
2006-
2011 
(1) Incentive mechanism 
design for crowdsourcing 
systems 
(2) Technology issues in 
crowdsourcing systems 
design 
(1) Crowdsourcing 
adoption 
(2) Implementation and 
governance  
(3) Quality and 
evaluation issues 
(1) Motivations 
(2) Behaviors (the 
crowd’s effort and 
quantity of 
contribution; the 
processes of 
crowdsourcing 
(n=5) 
Aris (2014)  To review factors that 
influence mobile 
crowdsourcing 
participation. 
9 
papers, 
till 
March 
2013 
Task (number, reward, 
difficulty, duration); 
marketing; incentives; 
multiple channels; 
competition intensity. 
The companies’ 
transparency; quality of 
interaction; recognition 
of participants and 
ethics.  
(1) A list of intrinsic 
and extrinsic 
motivations 
(2) Preference 
(3) Nationality 
Thuan et al. 
(2014)  
To build a nexus 
model supporting the 
establishment of 
business process 
crowdsourcing. 
238 
papers, 
2008-
2013 
N/A (1) Decision to 
crowdsource 
(2) Design (task, 
workflow, crowd 
management, incentive 
mechanism, quality 
control)  
(3) Technical 
configuration 
N/A 
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Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
Tripathi et al. 
(2014)  
To understand which 
crowdsourcing type is 
prevalent in 
organizations and 
academic research. 
54 
papers, 
2006-
2013 
Crowd wisdom and crowd 
creation are the focus in 
literature. Crowd-voting 
and crowd funding are less 
studied.   
  
Rechenberger 
et al. (2015) 
What are relevant 
success factors for 
delivering successful 
crowdsourcing 
initiatives? 
41 
papers, 
till 
2014 
(1) Incentive Mechanism 
(encouragement of good 
faith; profiling options; 
access to knowledge.) 
(2) Technology Issues (ease 
of use, ranking tools; range 
of functions.)  
(paper no.=6) 
(1) Adoption (answer 
type; meaning of task; 
brand-strength; market 
maturity; specificity of 
task; tacitness.)  
(2) Quality and 
evaluation (evaluation 
criteria; fraud detection; 
experience-good 
orientation; crowd 
evaluation; quality of 
solution; quality 
management; 
verifiability.)   
(3) Governance 
(duration; task 
allocation; level of detail 
of contract; 
transparency; expenses; 
publicity of individual 
submissions; security; 
support through 
(1) Motivation (task 
variety; 
acknowledgment; 
autonomy; career 
options; intrinsic and 
extrinsic motives; 
monetary rewards; 
support through 
government or NGOs; 
trust; previous success 
stories.) 
(2) Behaviors (number 
of participants; 
existence of a reserve; 
diversity of crowd; 
know-how.) 
(n=13) 
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Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
organization; access 
restrictions.)  
(n=22) 
Hosseini et 
al. (2015) 
To define 
crowdsourcing. 
113 
papers, 
2006-
Jan, 
2014 
(1) Crowdsourced task 
features (traditional 
operation; outsourcing task; 
modularity; complexity; 
solvability; automation 
characteristics; user-driven; 
contribution type) 
(2) Platform features 
(crowd-related interactions; 
crowdsourcer-related 
interactions; task-related 
facilities; platform-related 
facilities) 
Crowdsourcer features 
(incentives provision; 
open call; ethicality 
provision; privacy 
provision) 
Crowd features 
(diversity; unknown-
ness; largeness; 
undefined-ness; 
suitability) 
Hossain 
(2015) 
To review 
crowdsourcing 
literature of the 
business and 
management 
disciplines and to 
know its relation with 
the open innovation 
concept.  
50 
papers, 
2008-
2013 
Sample topics: 
Design (e.g., a multi-level 
incentive model) 
 
Sample topics: 
Values (e.g., a new 
strategic possibility for 
R&D) 
Strategies and challenges  
Sample topics: 
Extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations 
Hossain and 
Kauranen 
(2015) 
To explore the 
development of 
346 
papers, 
(1) Scattered contents 
(quality, payment, 
N/A Motivations  
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Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
crowdsourcing 
literature. 
2007-
2012 
typology, the reliability of 
the data, value)  
(2) Applications (idea 
generation, microtasking, 
open source software, 
public participation, citizen 
science, citizen journalism, 
wikies) 
Buettner 
(2015) 
To review 
crowdsourcing 
research from a 
human resource 
management 
perspective 
109 
papers, 
2006-
March, 
2014 
N/A (1) Job design and 
analysis (complex and 
creative tasks, routine 
tasks, analysis-synthesis 
and coordination 
problem) 
(2) Workforce planning  
(3) Recruitment 
including selection 
(person-organization fit, 
person-group fit, person-
job fit) 
(4) Training and 
development  
(5) Performance 
management (measuring 
individual/group 
outcomes, measurement-
performance 
relationship) 
N/A 
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Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
(6) Leadership  
(7) Compensation 
(money and attention as 
extrinsic factors, 
altruism and fun as 
intrinsic factors, 
designing incentive 
systems) 
(8) Legal and ethical 
issues.   
Mahmud & 
Aris (2015) 
To identify the 
categories of mobile 
crowdsourcing 
applications. 
25 
papers, 
till 
March, 
2015 
Social networking, weather, 
dictionary, sounds 
recognition, traffic and 
navigation, 3D maker, 
translation, disaster report, 
utilities.  
N/A N/A 
Aris (2015)  To identify factors 
that influence solvers 
participation in non-
profit mobile 
crowdsourcing 
initiatives.  
Only 2 
papers 
in 2014 
and 
2015 
N/A N/A Trust, common goals, 
acknowledgement and 
attribution, 
mentorship, external 
relationship, 
enjoyment, altruism, 
non-financial rewards, 
publicity.  
Palacios, 
Martinez-
Corral, Nisar, 
To map out emerging 
research themes in the 
context of 
organizational 
43 
papers 
till May 
2015 
Crowdsourcing as a source 
of (1) problem solving; (2) 
learning paradigms; (3) 
open collaboration/open 
N/A N/A 
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Articles Research Focus Sample Major Findings 
   A system’s perspective An organization’s 
perspective 
An individual’s 
perspective 
and Grijalvo 
(2016) 
theories and 
constructs.  
innovation; (4) new product 
development; (5) 
organizational innovation; 
(6) collaborative initiatives 
and coordination tool.   
Durward et 
al. (2016) 
To review ethical 
dimensions in 
crowdsourcing 
9 
papers, 
2006-
2015 
N/A N/A Privacy, accuracy, 
property and 
accessibility 
Lenart-
gansiniec 
(2016) 
To review and seek 
the significance of 
crowdsourcing for 
organizational 
learning.  
30 
papers, 
2006-
2016 
N/A Crowdsourcing may be a 
new form of 
organizational learning. 
N/A 
Thuan, 
Antunes, and 
Johnstone 
(2016) 
What factors 
influence an 
organization’s 
decision to 
crowdsource? 
50 
papers, 
till May 
2013 
N/A Task, availability of the 
crowd to perform the 
task, risks, infrastructure, 
expertise to manage the 
crowdsourcing, small 
budget, lack of internal 
human resources to 
accomplish the task, lack 
of internal commitment, 
slow in technology 
adoption.   
N/A 
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3.2 Digital Careers, Boundary Management and Use of Time in Different Domains 
3.2.1 Digital Careers in Traditional Organizations 
A second literature that I drew on in this dissertation is careers literature.  
The digital revolution, such as crowdsourcing, adds new features to contemporary 
careers, which I called as “digital careers” in this dissertation. A digital career refers to a 
career in which an individual has work experiences typically through digital 
technology (e.g., digital platforms, emails, and social media mobile applications), such 
as mobile doctors, e-commerce dealers, online lecturers, blog writers, or Amazon 
Mechanical Turkers.  
In this dissertation, I’m interested in a special type of digital careers called 
“bounded digital career”, which is defined as a digital career in which an individual is 
bounded spatially and temporally by an offline job. For example, a physician who works 
in a local hospital and takes crowd tasks as a mobile doctor on independent 
crowdsourcing platforms such as Haodf.com, a secretary who works in an offline 
university and starts small business on e-commerce platforms such as Amazon.com, or an 
accountant who works in an accounting company and writes novels on literature websites 
such as Jjwxc.net. 
Bounded digital careers share commonalities with other contemporary career 
concepts in literature, yet also show the uniqueness. Due to the fast change of the world, 
which is described as volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA), the 
notion that careers are changing has been dominant in literature for decades (e.g., 
Greenhaus, & Kossek, 2014; Hall, & Chandler, 2005; Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Howard, 
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1995). Though scholars have different summaries about such changing nature of work 
and workplace, two broad dimensions stand out. One is the increase of autonomy at 
work. To better attract, retain and motivate employees, more and more organizations 
grant their employees autonomy and discretion in work, such as flexible work hour, work 
at home, employee engagement, voice, self-managed teams, job crafting, or idiosyncratic 
deals (e.g., Tims, Bakker, & Derks, 2012; Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2008; Macey & 
Schneider, 2008). While enjoying such flexibility and autonomy, individuals are required 
to take more responsibilities for their work and careers (Arthur, Inkson, & Pringle, 1999; 
Hall, 2004; Howard, 1995). Therefore, in contemporary careers, the nature of work is 
changing from organizational control to autonomy.  
The other is the decline of permanent employment in workplace. Organizations 
are experiencing merger, acquisition, reconstruction, or fast growth. Old jobs are phased 
out or changed and new jobs are invented. Individuals must look beyond a single 
organization or occupation and are required to be flexible and adaptable to deal with 
discontinuity and complexity in workplace (e.g., Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Howard, 
1995). Therefore, in contemporary careers, the nature of workplace is changing from 
being bounded to boundaryless, such as across different organizations, occupations, jobs, 
or the online-offline interface.  
Bounded digital careers can be considered as a new form of contemporary careers 
that careers unfold in both online and offline work settings and across physical and 
virtual interface. Yet different from other post-corporate careers (Peiperl & Baruch, 
 
 
 
37 
1997)4 such as freelancers and independent contractors, a bounded digital career is 
unique in a way that it’s a combination of two extreme career configurations: a traditional 
career which is driven by an organization’s bureaucratic system (Super, 1957) and a 
contemporary career which is driven by an individual’s values and interests (e.g., Arthur, 
1994; Hall, 2004). Therefore, in the “digital” part of a bounded digital career, careers 
show the autonomy and boundarylessness features that individuals take responsibilities in 
deciding what to do and how to do their work. They also meet different number of 
employers (e.g., different task requestors) and the workplace is beyond a single employer 
or location. At the same time, in the “bounded” part of a bounded digital career, careers 
show the organization control and boundedness features that individuals follow the 
corporate ladder, conform to organizational norms, have or are required to have a high 
level of work and organizational commitment, and maintain a relatively stable job with 
predictable salary. Such a tension between two seemly irreconcilable aspects of a single 
career makes bounded digital careers an especially interesting phenomenon to look at, 
which is fundamentally different from other contemporary careers in literature.    
3.2.2 Boundary Management and the Use of Time in Different Domains 
Career literature has a long tradition to study on the boundary management across 
different domains on time allocation, identity negotiation, conflict or enrichment (e.g., 
Greenhaus, & Kossek, 2014; Ramarajan & Reid, 2013; Perlow, 1998; Evans, et al., 2004;  
                                                                            
4 The post-corporate career (Peiperl & Baruch, 1997) represents a variety of career 
configurations that individuals move out of large organizations into smaller and more 
agile entrepreneurial employment modes, such as freelancers, external consultants, 
independent contractors, crowd worker, or other types of contingent workers. 
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Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985; Greenhaus & Powell, 2006; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004). A 
typical example is boundary management across work and family domains, where family 
is usually broadly defined, including non-work roles and settings such as family, 
friendship, community engagement, leisure and self-development activities (Greenhaus, 
& Kossek, 2014). Scholars have used multiple theories to explain time investment in 
work and family domains (for reviews, see Zedeck & Mosier, 1990; Wayne, Grzywacz, 
Carlson, & Kacmar, 2007). Table 2 provided a review on major theories used to explain 
boundary management. Based on different assumptions that work and life domains either 
had conflict, or enriched each other, or were neutral, scholars provided different 
perspectives on what would happen when people dealt with different domains.  
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Table 2 A Review of Major Theories Used to Explain Boundary Management 
Theory Assumption on 
Work-Life  
Content Reference 
Spillover theory Being similar Attitudes, emotions, or behaviors in one domain carry over to 
another.  
Staines (1980) 
Williams and 
Alliger (1994) 
Compensation 
theory 
Enrichment  There is an inverse relationship between work and family. 
Supplemental compensation occurs when desirable experiences are 
pursued in family because they are insufficient at work. Reactive 
compensation occurs when non-work activities are pursued because 
deprivations experienced in work.   
Staines (1980) 
Segmentation 
theory 
Being 
segmented 
Work and family are distinct and individuals can function 
successfully in one without any influence on the other.  
Piotrkowski (1978) 
Instrumental 
theory 
Enrichment One domain is a means by which things are obtained in other 
domain. 
Evans & Bartolome 
(1984) 
Conflict Theory Conflict Satisfaction or success in one domain entails sacrifices in the other. 
The two domains are incompatible because they have distinct norms 
and requirements 
Greenhaus & 
Beutell (1985) 
Ecological 
systems theory 
Being related The work-family experience is a joint function of process, person, 
context, and time characteristics.  
Bronfenbrenner 
(1979) 
Grzywacz and 
Marks (2000) 
Conservation of 
Resources 
Theory 
Conflict Individuals seek to acquire and maintain resources such as objects, 
conditions, personal characteristics, and energies. When there is the 
threat of a loss of resources, an actual loss in resources, or lack of an 
expected gain in resources, individuals may experience stress 
outcomes.  
Hobfoll (1989) 
Social identity 
theory 
Conflict  A person’s identification with a group is related to attitudes and 
behaviors characterizing role investment. Work-family balance can 
be achieved by appropriately managing work and family identities. 
Tajfel & Turner 
(1985) 
Lobel (1991) 
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Role theory Conflict Individuals seek to behave in ways that are consistent with the way 
that their roles are defined. Inter-role conflict happens in work and 
life as it becomes more difficult to perform each role successfully, 
due to conflicting demands on time, lack of energy, or incompatible 
behaviors among roles. 
Kahn, Wolfe, 
Quinn, Snoek, and 
Rosenthal (1964) 
Boundary theory Conflict Individuals create boundaries to cope with different domains. The 
permeable border between work and life makes the two domains be 
interrupted by each other.  
Ashforth, Kreiner, 
and Fugate (2000) 
Kossek, Lautsch, 
and Eaton (2006) 
Work/family 
border theory 
Conflict People are daily border-crossers between the domains of work and 
family.  
Borders must be managed appropriately to create and maintain 
work/family balance.  
(Clark, 2000) 
A theory of 
work-family 
enrichment  
Enrichment Experiences in one role improve the quality of life in the other role.   Greenhaus & 
Powell (2006) 
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This review doesn’t mean to comment on the cons and pros of each theory, rather, 
it argues that these theories, though focus on work and life domains, could provide a road 
map for us to better understand boundary management across crowdsourcing and 
traditional work domains. For example, are crowdsourcing and traditional work 
segmented and do crowd workers function successfully in one without any influence on 
the other, as what segmentation theory (Piotrkowski, 1978) indicates? Or are 
crowdsourcing and traditional work similar, so that individuals’ attitudes, emotions, or 
behavior in traditional work can carry over to crowdsourcing, as what spillover theory 
(e.g., Staines, 1980; Williams & Alliger, 1994) suggests? Does crowdsourcing enrich 
traditional work as the enrichment-oriented theories (e.g., compensation theory, 
instrumental theory, and a theory of work-family enrichment) assume? Or do 
crowdsourcing and traditional work conflict with each other as the conflict-oriented 
theories (e.g., conflict theory, conservation of resources theory, social identity theory, 
role theory, boundary theory, work/family border theory) suggest? Because work-life 
theories diverge based on the assumptions on work-life relationship (e.g., conflict, 
enrichment, and neutral), these assumptions also become the theoretical starting point of 
my study.  
Although there is potential for enrichment that the use of time in one domain 
would increase the quality of the use of time in another (Greenhaus, & Powell, 2006), as 
suggested in Study 1 in Chapter 4 below (for details, see Section 4.2.1), the preliminary 
study via observations and interviews showed that enrichment was not the case for 
mobile doctors in this setting. Instead, doctors experienced time conflict between their 
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traditional work and crowdsourcing. Therefore, in the rest part of this section, the key 
literature that I built on was work-family conflict.  
Based on the assumption that resources are limited and increasing commitment in 
one domain would deplete the finite resources in another (Rothbard, 2001), scholars have 
identified different types of conflict between work and family roles, such as time based, 
strain based, and behavior based conflict (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). Time conflict is 
said to be influenced by various work-domain variables (e.g., job involvement and time 
demands), family-domain variables (e.g., family stress and time demands) and 
demographic/individual variables (e.g., gender, income, coping style and skills) (for 
meta-analyses, see Byron, 2005; Michel, Mitchelson, Kotrba, Lebreton & Baltes, 2009), 
and has negative effects on performance, satisfaction, physical and psychological health, 
emotional exhaustion, absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover intentions (for a review, see 
Maertz, Jr., & Boyar, 2011). Though work-family conflict literature was argued to be that 
“few if any new types of studies or findings have emerged recently,” (Maertz, Jr., & 
Boyar, 2011, p. 72), this group of well-developed study demonstrated the importance of 
studying time in different domains. It led to the underlying question in my dissertation: 
when the rise of digital revolution adds flexible crowdsourcing into the current rigid 
traditional work, when do people work for crowdsourcing, how might this timing 
compete or complete traditional work and why?  
Scholars have identified two major mechanisms behind individuals’ cope with 
time conflict in different domains (Lobel, 1991). One is a utilitarian approach which 
focuses on the importance of rewards and costs in determining the levels of time 
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investment in a domain (e.g., conflict theory, conservation of resources theory, and 
work/family border theory). Different domains are considered as incompatible because 
they have distinct norms and requirements (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). Individuals 
usually create boundaries to cope with different domains. Yet the border is so permeable 
that different domains are likely to be interrupted by each other (Ashforth, et al., 2000; 
Kossek, et al., 2006). Therefore, as daily border-crossers, individuals must manage their 
time and energy appropriately to create and maintain work-family balance (Clark, 2000). 
In the utilitarian view, they do so by weighing the cost and benefits of spending time on 
one task versus another.  
Another approach to these competing demands is a social identity approach which 
focuses on the group membership of individuals and how identification influences the 
levels of time investment in a domain (e.g., social identity theory, role theory, and 
boundary theory). Specifically, because attitudes and behavior (e.g., time investment) in a 
domain are influenced by a person’s identification with that domain, work-family balance 
could be maintained by appropriately managing work and family identities (Tajfel, & 
Turner, 1985; Lobel, 1991). Conflict between different domains results from the 
conflicting demands on time, lack of energy, or incompatible behavior among roles 
which make individuals fail the expectations from a certain role in a certain group or 
domain (Kahn et al., 1964). For example, while some identities might enhance each 
other, others might conflict (Ladge, Clair, & Greenberg, 2012; Ramarajan, 2014). In the 
social identity view, individuals deal with such conflict by spending more time on in-
group tasks than out-group ones to favor and enhance in-group social identity.  
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In summary, technology such as crowdsourcing has deeply transformed modern 
life and created a new configuration of career called bounded digital career. Such a new 
career focuses on the interaction between crowdsourcing with autonomy and traditional 
work with organizational norms and controls. Though discussions on career boundary 
management, such as managing the tension between different employers or between 
individual autonomy and organizational control have been documented in careers 
literature, less studied is to what extent these existing theoretical perspectives can be used 
in describing individual behavior in bounded digital careers, and what are the unique 
individual behavior, perceptions and attitudes in bounded digital careers. The studies in 
the chapters that follow provide a start to exploring these issues.   
  
 
 
 
45 
CHAPTER 4: HOW DO DOCTORS RESPOND TO TIME CONFLICT 
BETWEEN CROWDSOURCING AND TRADITIONAL WORK? 
Chapter Summary 
As an exploratory study in the full-cycle research design, which aims to identify 
the complexity and relative importance of key theoretical constructs in a naturally 
occurring phenomenon (Chatman & Flynn, 2005), this chapter explores how doctors 
respond to time conflict between crowdsourcing and traditional work. By approximately 
spending 240-hour observations in ten medical organizations and 43 interviews with 
Chinese physicians, I find that (1) time conflict between traditional work and 
crowdsourcing is one of the major challenges that doctors face when they are doing 
crowdsourcing (Section 4.2.1); (2) mobile doctors respond to time conflict by either 
avoiding doing crowd tasks in workplace, juggling crowdsourcing and traditional work 
by actively managing their fragmented time, and/or stealing scheduled work hours for 
crowdsourcing (Section 4.2.2); (3) time theft is related to two factors in traditional work 
settings. One is hospitals’ boundary control over doctors, such as regulating doctors’ use 
of time through heavy workload, monitoring their behavior in workplace, and punishing 
time theft. The other is the influence from mobile doctor social groups, especially how 
deeply doctors involve in the socialization process of the offline social groups. (Section 
4.2.3). In the rest of this chapter, I presented the methods (Section 4.1), findings (Section 
4.2), and summary of this qualitative study, especially how it was related to the following 
study in Chapter 5 (Section 4.3).   
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4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Observations 
To develop a preliminary sense of doctors’ time use behavior in Chinese 
healthcare industry, I followed a participant-observation approach by entering an 
unfamiliar cultural domain (i.e., medical organizations) with a dual role of active 
participant (i.e., a patient or a physician assistant) and observer of doctors’ activities and 
their workplaces (Spradley, 1980). In this dissertation, doctors (“”) refer to 
medical professionals, including physicians, nurse practitioners, nutritionists, medical 
technologists and psychologists. Mobile doctors (“	
”, “”) refer to 
any medical professionals who have/had the healthcare crowdsourcing experiences. 
I spent at least eight hours daily in ten medical organizations in China for 29 days 
from March to May in 2017, totaling 240 observation hours. I chose these medical 
organizations according to purposeful sampling (Patton, 2002). The purpose was to have 
variation based on potentially significant factors: organizational type, ownership, 
location, and size. The final sample covered the distribution of medical organization 
population in the Chinese healthcare industry, including different organizational types 
(hospitals, clinics, and platforms), ownerships (public and private), locations (capital, 
county, and town), and sizes (between no bed and 2,400 beds in hospitals, and between 
2,000 and 260,000 mobile doctors in platforms). A full list of the details about these ten 
medical organizations can be found in Table 3.  
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Table 3 The Sample Medical Organizations 
ID Type Ownership Location Size Observation Time Author’s Role 
H1 Hospital Public A province capital 2400 beds Thursday afternoon; Monday 
morning  
Observer/ Interviewer 
H2 Hospital Public A district in a 
province capital 
1200 beds Friday morning Observer/Interviewer 
H3 Hospital Public County  1000 beds Wednesday morning and 
afternoon   
Observer/Patient 
H4 Hospital Public Small city in a 
county 
1500 beds Every day from Saturday to 
Friday 
Observer/Patient 
H5 Hospital Public Small city in a 
county 
500 beds Thursday night and Friday 
morning 
Observer/Patient 
H6 Hospital Public Town  Fewer than 100 
beds 
Saturday morning Interviewer/physician 
assistant 
H7 Hospital Private Small city in a 
county 
Fewer than 100 
beds 
Wednesday morning Observer/Interviewer 
H8 Clinic Private Small city in a 
county 
No bed Friday morning Observer/Patient 
F1 Platform 
firm 
Private A province capital 260,000 mobile 
doctors  
Friday afternoon Observer/Interviewer 
F2 Platform 
firm 
Private A province capital 2000 mobile 
doctors  
Monday afternoon Observer/Interviewer 
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My roles during the observations varied, depending on the accessibility of a 
setting. Specifically, compared to healthcare delivery organizations, platform firms were 
less accessible. Through personal connections, I visited these firms (F1 and F2) as a 
researcher and conducted formal interviews with partners in the firms. I was also 
introduced by these partners to their employees about my purpose of the visits. In each 
company, I was shown around by an employee and had informal conversations with 
employees (without recording) to familiarize myself with the operation and design of 
platforms, as well as the platforms’ opinions and concerns about doctors’ participation in 
healthcare crowdsourcing.  
In large public hospitals (H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5), most of the time, I sat in the 
open space (e.g., waiting area, registration area, stairs, and the chairs outside of a 
physician’s office) to observe people’s behavior, interactions and any scenes before me in 
a hospital as an outsider. These hospitals were reported to have over thousands of patient 
visits each day. During my visit, the open space was very crowded and noisy. Patients, 
visitors and doctors were almost everywhere. All the seats in the open space were 
occupied. People who were sitting around me were either chatting, watching TV that was 
on the wall, playing with phones, reading, or doing nothing but looking at strangers that 
were passing by. My role as an observer in such open space was merely a fly-on-the-wall 
and quite invisible to people in the setting. At H1 and H2, I was also shown around by a 
friend who was a pharmaceutical representative, knew many doctors personally in 
different hospitals, and was an outsider of the hospitals. This friend introduced me to 
many doctors through personal relationships and I was able to ask questions related to 
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their experiences about healthcare crowdsourcing.  
Moreover, during my site visit, I happened to be infected by pneumonia (now 
cured). This unexpected incident created a unique situation that I was able to observe and 
experience hospital services and the process of seeing a doctor. I visited four hospitals to 
experience the differences in patient-doctor interactions and hospital operations among 
different types of hospitals (H3, H4, H5 and H8) and was hospitalized in one of the 
hospitals (H4) for a whole week. I chose H4 because it was the best one among these four 
hospitals in terms of hospital ranking.  
In small hospitals where not many people visited (H6 and H7), considering that 
my presence as an outsider who was not seeing a doctor but taking notes whole day in a 
hospital would be quite visible to doctors and look even a little weird, I contacted a 
doctor in each hospital through personal connections. Instead of being a fly-on-the-wall 
in open areas, I sat in the doctors’ offices and observed their work more closely. The 
office at H6 was in an obstetrics and gynecology department. It was a private office. I 
was assigned a role as a physician assistant to pretend as a doctor, with the purpose of not 
impacting patients. I wore doctors’ white cloak and helped the physician with some basic 
work (e.g., asking the patients to lay on the bed, and passing the diagnosis cards (“
”) from the physician to the patients). The office at H7 was in a traditional Chinese 
medicine department. The office was crowded by many patients and visitors, making this 
setting similar to the open space mentioned above. With the permission from the 
physician, I was sitting at the corner of her office as an observer, surrounded by patients 
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who were waiting to see her. When there were no patients in both offices, I also 
conducted interviews as a researcher. In this way, compared to the way of sitting in the 
public areas in larger hospitals, I got to know how doctors interacted with patients in the 
workplace and what their own statements about their daily work are.  
In this intensive period of fieldwork, I observed daily activities of doctors (e.g., 
meeting minutes and diagnosis process), experienced the process of seeing a doctor (e.g., 
the logistics, the connection between different departments, and the interactions between 
myself as a patient and hospital staff), and had conversations with employees in platforms 
and doctors in medical institutions. After each observation, I drafted field notes according 
to ethnographic techniques (Emmerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995), usually no later than 24 
hours after entering the field, in a total of 348 pages of field notes in Chinese. These 
ethnographic field notes were used as background information, and to better understand 
doctor work context and how the traditional work connected to crowdsourcing.  
4.1.2 Interviews  
I conducted interviews with medical professionals, in order to reveal the 
important themes in healthcare crowdsourcing, as well as the variation in their 
perceptions, attitudes and behavior regarding crowdsourcing and traditional work. I 
conducted interviews in two stages.  
I began with a pilot study in which I conducted 17 semi-structured interviews on 
site. The interviewees included ten mobile doctors and seven doctors without 
crowdsourcing experience. A key question in the interview was “what do you think about 
being a doctor in online counseling.” The term “online counseling” (“	 ”) was a 
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slang used by these doctors to refer to healthcare crowdsourcing. Other key questions 
include: What are the benefits and challenges of doing online counseling (for those who 
were mobile doctors)? What prevented you from being a doctor in online counseling (for 
those who were not mobile doctors)? What do you think about mobile healthcare in 
general?  
At this stage, the interview was informal and conversational. The purpose was to 
get as much information as possible to make sense of this new phenomenon. Therefore, 
expect for the key questions mentioned above which were covered in every interview, the 
topics covered in the interviews were broad and varied, depending on how conversations 
went on. The interviews on average lasted 37 minutes (min = 10, max = 87, s.d. = 25.7) 
and were tape recorded and transcribed. Pilot study data suggested that time conflict 
between traditional work and crowdsourcing was the major concern when doctors 
worked for crowdsourcing (or chose not to work for crowdsourcing). Therefore, I decided 
to focus this research on how mobile doctors managed their time to do traditional work 
and crowdsourcing within the same time frame. 
In the second stage of interviews, I conducted 26 semi-structured formal 
interviews with mobile doctors by video call and phone. The interview sample was first 
constructed as a snowball sample starting with a personal friend and grew through 
advertisements in mobile doctor online communities posted by interviewees who 
voluntarily offered me help. The criterion for the sampling was that the medical 
professionals should have online counseling experience at the time of data collection, 
regardless of demographic information, such as profession, hospital, specialty, 
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hierarchical level, age, gender, and marriage status. On average, these interviewees had 
30.3-month experience of mobile healthcare (min = 3 months, max = 9 years and three 
months, s.d. = 28.5 months).  
The interview protocol at this stage covered three general themes, which included 
but expanded the key questions asked at the pilot study stage. A first set of questions 
asked doctors to share their crowdsourcing experiences (e.g., “When did you start to 
answer questions online? What happened at that time? What are the benefits and 
challenges of doing online counseling? Give me an example of the 
interesting/easy/difficult/impressive case that you met during your online counseling.”). 
A second set of questions asked about doctors’ experience in offline hospitals (e.g., 
“Please walk through a typical week you work in your hospitals. What is the good/bad 
aspect of being a doctor/nurse (or other specific professions) in the hospital?”). Finally, a 
third set of questions asked about the relationship between their traditional work and 
crowd work, as well as their opinions about mobile healthcare in general (e.g., “What are 
the differences/similarities between your online counseling work and traditional work? 
What do you think of mobile healthcare?”) (Cf. Appendix, for details of the interview 
protocol).  
The interviews on average lasted 45 minutes (min = 12; max = 75, s.d. = 13). 
They were conducted in mandarin, tape recorded and transcribed. The interviewees at this 
stage were paid for RMB100, which amounted to approximately 45.8% of their daily 
wage5. 
                                                                            
5 The number was not precise. The average daily wage for doctors varied among 
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4.1.3 Hospital Archival and Other Documents   
I also collected archival information on hospitals that I visited, such as 
organizational structures, work schedules, and the number of daily visits. Before the field 
visit, I collected information on Chinese healthcare industry, such as industry reports 
from both academic and practical articles, news, and statistics from the government. The 
archival information served as background information to help me learn about the 
industrial and organizational levels of context for mobile doctors and healthcare 
crowdsourcing in China.   
4.1.4 My Position  
In terms of my position in this field, though I was born and grew up in China, I 
never worked, was hospitalized, or spent time in Chinese hospitals before the research 
project started. It allowed me to approach this setting with a fresh eye, especially to 
notice things that later turned out to be very common in Chinese hospitals.  
Field Notes March 29, 2017 (originally in Chinese):  
It is my first time to visit a private Chinese hospital and my first site visit. I 
was told by the contact person, who is a house wife and a friend of Doctor A, that 
Doctor A’ office opens at 8am. Doctor A is a traditional Chinese medicine 
physician. This morning I was debating when I should arrive at her office and 
whether my presence would be too obvious if I arrived before 8am. I finally 
                                                                            
hospitals, specialties and hierarchical levels. I didn’t ask the interviewees their wage 
because it was confidential. According to a survey conducted by dxy.cn, a major 
healthcare crowdsourcing platform in China, the average daily wage in hospitals for 
mobile physicians is RMB218 ($34.4). More than 30,000 physicians were participated in 
this survey. (source: http://vote.dxy.cn/report/dxy/id/492740) 
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decided to arrive at 8:10am which I believed would not be too late to miss 
anything, or too early to be inappropriate. I meet my contact person outside of the 
hospital. The hospital looks small and old. It has a yard, surrounded by three 
four-floor buildings. That’s all. The paint starts to fall off the wall. The plaque of 
the hospital name looks rusty and dirty. An old couple who are wearing patients’ 
cloak are sitting in front of the left-side building, enjoying the sunshine. There’s 
no reception in the hall of the main building, nor any patients. [Maybe 8:10am is 
still too early?]  
My contact person takes me to Doctor A’s office on the first floor directly. 
Surprisingly, compared to the quiet hall, Doctor A’s office is crowded and 
bustling. Doctor A and her assistant are surrounded by five people. One person is 
sitting next to Doctor A and answering Doctor A’s questions. The rest four people 
are standing almost as a circle, listening to the conversation between Doctor A 
and the patient carefully. One of them makes a comment on the conversation, and 
the rest three are laughing after hearing this. I am hesitant to enter the office. 
[Maybe they are a family? Is it OK for me to enter the office directly? Would it 
break the patients’ privacy?] While I am still debating, my contact person enters 
the office directly without any hesitation. At the same time, Doctor A hears the 
footstep, looks through the five people and says hi to my contact person. My 
contact person explains why she and I are here. Doctor A asks me “are you 
learning medicine?” “No, I’m business major. I’m here to see what a doctor’s life 
looks like, for my dissertation.” “OK, be free to do anything.” After saying this, 
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Doctor A continues to talk to her patient. My contact person says goodbye to 
Doctor A and me, and leaves.  
The office has approximately 16 square meters large. In the center there is 
a square table. Doctor A and her assistant are sitting on two sides of the table. 
Doctor A is facing the door. The patient is sitting on the third side. The side 
against the door is empty. Now I notice that there are two young men sitting on 
the bench at the corner of the room, playing with iPhones. I decide to join them 
and sit quietly at the corner…  
[8:16am] The patient stands up, takes the diagnosis card, says goodbye to 
Doctor A and leaves. The person who told a joke before sits on the chair and 
Doctor A starts to ask her questions. [I am so shocked. So these five people are 
patients and strangers!!6] … Doctor A’s questions become more and more 
personal and private, some of which are gender specific. [I start to feel awkward 
and worry whether it is right to listen to such personal medical information. But 
other patients, even including the one who is being diagnosed, seem very used to 
it.] Among the patients who are standing around the table, a female patient makes 
a comment that she has the similar symptoms. Two male patients are so 
concentrated on listening [why wouldn’t they feel awkward to listen to a female 
stranger’s private medical information?!]…  
[8:19am] Two patients enter the office together. They directly run to 
                                                                            
6Different from medical systems in U.S., the medical systems in China don’t include 
group therapy. These patients were individual patients who were seeing the doctor 
separately.   
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Doctor A, and put their diagnosis cards on the top of the cards in front of Doctor 
A. It looks a little obvious that they are trying to put their own card on the top of 
the other’s. Doctor A doesn’t say anything but moves these two cards to the end of 
the stack of diagnosis cards [So that’s the patients’ line?]…  
[8:49am] A female patient says that she comes here for her son rather 
than herself, because her son is too busy on school work. Doctor A asks some 
questions about her son’s symptoms and writes a prescription… 
[Reflection at the end of the day] I literary felt “culture shock” today. I 
only spent the whole morning there because after 11am, there were no more 
patients. There were only two patients during 10am-11am. Doctor A told me that 
this was the normal situation in this hospital - people only came before 10am. 
Sometimes they arrived before her office opened. During 8am-10am, Doctor A 
handled 21 patients. Among those patients, at least three came for their children 
who didn't come, rather than themselves. They described their children's 
symptoms and Doctor A gave them prescriptions. It seems that like what 
happened on online Q&A platforms, no direct interaction between doctor and 
patients is needed… No appointment was needed. People were waiting according 
to the line of diagnosis cards and on average there were four patients around 
Doctor A. The conversation between Doctor A and a patient can be heard by 
all other patients (even some very private medical questions!), and other patients 
sometimes joined the conversation and discussed about similar symptoms or made 
suggestions and comments. - It’s like the offline version of online Q&A platform... 
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Field Notes April 5, 2017 (originally in Chinese): 
After visiting two hospitals for my pneumonia, I finally learn some lessons. 
The calling number is useless. If I choose to wait politely and quietly in the 
doctor’s office, hoping the doctor would notice me and call my number, then I 
would never get my chance to see the doctor. Today I should be strong and fight 
for my chance! I intentionally choose a black T-shirt which makes my face looks 
paler. I wear a mask to show how sick I am. Because of the pneumonia, my cough 
constantly interrupts my talking. To make myself clear, I go through once again 
what I should talk to the doctor. During an interview yesterday, a doctor told me 
that in China, patients should be well prepared before seeing a doctor because 
they only have three minutes to talk to the doctor. If their statements are not 
concise and accurate, it would impact the diagnosis results. I took this opinion 
seriously and did some research on pneumonia last night. But I also remember 
that another doctor told me that he hated mobile healthcare because patients 
searched the internet and showed off their knowledge as if they knew medicine 
better than the doctors. So I revise what I should say a little bit to make sure that I 
don’t look like a knowledgeable but silly patient. Suddenly I realize that I start to 
think about pleasing the doctor by adjusting what I say and do. It sounds so 
ridiculous. I am the patient, the customer of a hospital! But I quickly get rid of 
such thought and emotion. I don’t want to die of pneumonia in a research field!              
When I arrive at the doctor’s office, no surprise, there are seven people 
who are standing around the doctor in the room. The doctor is talking to a 
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patient. I take a deep breath, directly walk to the doctor, pass the diagnosis card 
right in front of the doctor’s face, interrupt the conversation between the doctor 
and that patient, and speak very quickly, “doctor, I get a serious pneumonia. This 
is receipt of my registration fee. I need IV treatment!” My heart beats very fast. I 
blush with shame. I never did such kind of rude thing before. I am waiting for the 
rebuke from either the doctor or the patient whom I interrupted. But surprisingly, 
the doctor says OK and puts my card on the top of other diagnosis cards and no 
other patients question what he did. I don’t know what’s going on and why he did 
so for me. But immediately I’m very excited. It feels like I win a battle today.     
Gradually, I learned the language used by doctors in hospitals and it helped me to 
talk to interviewees in a more informed way. Especially after I was hospitalized for a 
while, this experience helped me to draw closer to interviewees. As one interviewee 
mentioned when I asked him about his typical work process, “Have you ever seen a 
doctor in China? The opposite of what you experienced as a patient is what I did as a 
doctor.” 
Notably, confidentiality was the first and most important factor that I concerned 
in designing this field study. It was because in recent years, negative news about the 
tension between patients and doctors, and some doctors’ unethical or even illegal 
behavior frequently showed up and sometimes were exaggerated and distorted on TV or 
internet. Doctors were cautious about any interviews in the afraid of being misunderstood 
or misquoted by journalists. To protect their confidentiality, in addition to the IRB 
requirement, I intentionally did not ask for the identifiable information (e.g., name and 
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hospital name) of the interviewees. All the interviewees were contacted through Wechat, 
a twitter like Chinese social media application which allows people to hide their 
information if they prefer to, by providing nickname/pseudonym. My identity as a 
doctoral student who was doing dissertation in business major in a U.S. university also 
provided me both convenience and credibility in conducting this study as an outsider. 
Doctors were more willing to share the down side of Chinese healthcare and patiently 
explained what happened in the Chinese healthcare industry in their own words based on 
their own understanding, because as a person who was living in United States and didn’t 
have a medical background, I had the privilege to be legitimate to know nothing about 
Chinese healthcare. Moreover, given the choices among video call, phone call and face-
to-face meeting, some doctors preferred to have a phone call to keep a safe distance. 
Despite of these tactics, still some doctors who agreed to be interviewed changed their 
mind later because their hospital didn’t allow them to accept any format of interviews.    
4.1.5 Analytical Strategy  
Data analysis was based on 43 interviews from the two stages. The final sample 
included 36 mobile doctors and seven doctors without crowdsourcing experience. As an 
extreme case of no time theft, the latter group was only used as a comparison to reveal 
the potential interpretations behind mobile doctors’ time theft. It was not used for the 
analysis on mobile doctors’ responses to time conflict. Though without using the 
stratified sampling in the first place (Patton, 2002), the final sample covered a wide range 
of demographic backgrounds. Of the sample, 49 percent were male. In terms of 
profession and hierarchical level, 21 percent were resident physicians, 35 percent were 
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attending physicians, 23 percent were vice chief physicians, five percent were chief 
physicians, and 10 percent were primary psychologists (resident equivalent). Primary and 
chief nurse practitioners, as well as primary pharmacists were two percent respectively. 
In terms of hospital type and ownership, 51 percent were from tertiary public hospitals, 
14 percent from secondary ones, five percent from primary ones, 21 percent from private 
hospitals, two percent from public medical institutions, and 7% from healthcare 
platforms. They were from seven different provinces in China.  
I used open ended and inductive analytical approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1997) to 
analyze the interview data. The design of the interview aimed to let the informants 
provide rich, descriptive data on their perspectives, attitudes and behavior. By combing 
their interpretations, field notes and other archival materials, Study 1 provided the 
foundation for the development of a quantitative moderating model in Study 2 in Chapter 
5 (Greene et al., 1989).  
4.2 Findings  
4.2.1 Time Conflict: The Down Side of Crowdsourcing 
Study 1 showed that healthcare crowdsourcing was portrayed by 
founders/entrepreneurs of crowdsourcing platforms as “THE innovative way” that could 
“break the bureaucracy system and eliminate inefficiency in the Chinese healthcare 
industry,” and could provide a mean for doctors to “fulfil their true values as a doctor,” 
and “earn aboveboard income which is worthy of their time and competency.” This 
enrichment perspective, which indicates that spending time on healthcare crowdsourcing 
could help a doctor gain financial benefits beyond traditional medical work and better 
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utilize medical resources, is consistent with the dominant view in crowdsourcing 
literature that healthcare crowdsourcing overcomes the inefficiency of medical service 
and the asymmetrical distribution of medical resources, thus appears to be a promising 
source for knowledge exchange, collaborative diagnoses, skills assessment, and 
knowledge discovery (Celi et al., 2014; Holst et al., 2015; Choo et al., 2015; McComb & 
Bond, 2015).   
However, from the participant’s perspective, mobile doctors in hospitals reported 
that the enrichment in the use of time brought by crowdsourcing on traditional work was 
limited. Online medical questions were so “basic” that could not truly reflect or improve 
“a doctor’s medical competency.” Crowdsourcing was more for “public welfare (e.g., 
helping patients)” than for “individual interests (e.g., financial gain).” The income that 
doctors could earn from crowdsourcing was “limited or for free,” unless a doctor “spent 
most of time on crowdsourcing,” which was “barely possible.” Rather, as two forms of 
work which may happen within the same time frame, crowdsourcing and traditional work 
showed time conflict. It could be caused by the role expectation from crowdsourcing due 
to the flexible feature of crowd work which was determined by a particular healthcare 
platform’s system design, such as the requirement of doctors to “answer questions in 90 
seconds,” or granting patients the right to ask “400 follow-up questions in 48 hours, if 
you [the doctor] take their [patients] [initial] questions,” with the punishment that “If you 
don’t reply immediately, your reply index would decrease. Or if they send you seven or 
eight sentences and you don’t reply, they can give you bad evaluation.” 
More often, however, given the rigid nature of medical work which was often (not 
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always) a matter of life and death, the time conflict was caused by the role expectation 
from traditional work, because “compared to online counselling, your work at hand is 
more urgent, such as your offline patients, or relatively emergent medical issues.” 
Doctors considered that online counselling could not deal with emergent cases and by 
default they believed no patient would choose to ask questions online instead of going to 
the nearby emergency room in an emergent situation, because it was “a matter of illness” 
rather than time. As one doctor described time conflict that she met, 
It happened several times. When I was answering a patient’s question and he was 
still asking follow-up questions, the hospital paged me. I ran to the ward in a 
hurry, without bringing my phone. When I was back, the patient was furious at 
me. I had to explain what happened. Most patients can understand it…But some 
patients can’t. They gave me bad ratings. (Physician #203, Female, Attending) 
4.2.2 Mobile Doctors’ Responses to Time Conflict  
Mobile doctors’ responses to time conflict between crowdsourcing and traditional 
work varied, with some completely avoiding doing crowd tasks in workplace, some 
juggling crowdsourcing and traditional work by actively managing their fragmented time, 
and others stealing scheduled work hours for crowdsourcing.  
Avoiding. Mobile doctors who avoided doing crowd tasks in workplace had a 
very clear distinction between crowdsourcing and traditional work. They held a relatively 
negative view of crowdsourcing and denied that mobile healthcare was healthcare 
because “it hasn’t fulfilled the goal of healing diseases and saving lives.” They 
considered it as being “technologically immature,” “hardly accepted” by online patients, 
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and “difficult to solve medical problems.” Given their busy schedule set up by the 
hospitals, they would rather “take a rest,” “drink a cup of tea,” or “walk around for 
exercise” in spare time, than answering questions online which unlike traditional work, 
was not “a must do.” In some hospitals where regulation on the use of time was strong, 
they intentionally not did crowd tasks in the afraid of being caught and misunderstood by 
the hospitals.  
Juggling. Consistent with literature on time management (e.g., Covey, 1989; 
Covey, Merrill, & Merrill, 1994), some mobile doctors juggled crowdsourcing and 
traditional work, and actively managed their “fragmented time” (“”) in the 
workplace for crowdsourcing. By fragmented time, they meant the short break between 
two blocks of scheduled work hours, such as “lunch time” (“”) or “resting 
time.” (“”). In contrast to the previous group of avoiding, this group held a 
positive view toward crowdsourcing, thinking that though irreplaceable, crowdsourcing 
was a complement of traditional medicine in the form of “light diagnosis” for patients to 
get ailment cured without “visiting hospitals” or “travelling long distance to other cities 
to see a medical expert.” They also clearly claimed that traditional work was their 
priority, and didn’t consider working for crowdsourcing as a violation of hospitals’ 
regulation on the use of work time because “it’s your fragmented time. It doesn’t take up 
work time.”  
There are different motivations behind this type of time use behavior. Some 
juggled crowdsourcing and traditional work for public welfare because both types of 
work had the same goal of “helping patients.” Others considered juggling both as a way 
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to better use of individual time, as they were “not wasting spare time on doing nothing,” 
and at the same time “not adding extra stress on hospital work.” Crowd tasks, though 
required time and energy to do, were considered as taking a rest from heavy traditional 
work by some doctors because the online tasks were “less demanding and tiring” than 
traditional work. “Compared to offline cases, online cases are easier, require less 
energy… less responsibilities, and you don’t have to explain your diagnosis to patients so 
clearly. In hospitals, there are regulations on how doctors should write diagnosis, but not 
on the platforms.” 
Stealing. Surprisingly, the interview data showed that, among mobile doctors that 
I interviewed, those who utilized their scheduled work hours to work for crowdsourcing 
were the largest group (64%, n=23). In this dissertation, I defined this type of behavior as 
time theft, which referred to full-time employees’ use of scheduled work hours to work 
for a secondary job, typically through digital technology (e.g., digital platforms, emails, 
and social media mobile applications). Notably, the word “thief” was used here to refer 
to a status/fact that doctors used scheduled office hours to answer online questions 
without asking for the hospitals’ permission in advance and may potentially cause 
penalties, as an interviewee described “working here is like being a thief (“”). 
We are monitored.” It did not necessarily contain (un)ethical elements. The discussion on 
whether it is right or wrong to steal time from traditional work for crowdsourcing is out 
of the scope of this study. 
Compared to the other two groups, mobile doctors who utilized scheduled office 
hours for crowdsourcing had the richest experience on crowdsourcing, knowing the pros 
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and cons of crowdsourcing, playing with the rules on platforms, and witnessing the 
dramatic changes of the healthcare crowdsourcing industry in the past few years. They all 
considered crowdsourcing as an essential format of healthcare, rather than a complement 
to current traditional medicine as the group of juggling described. They thought crowd 
work as the future of work which deserved their current time, as well as full-time 
devotion in future. As one mobile doctor who had 13-year offline work experience as a 
urological surgeon said, 
I think the future market for internet is very huge…if I can completely transit to be 
a mobile doctor, that’s the best. The best situation is that I can have my own 
medical studio, providing diagnosis suggestions, or triage, or connecting 
hospitals and surgeries for patients through internet…But it’s impossible now. 
First of all, it’s not because we don’t want to be a full-time mobile doctor. You 
know, the healthcare platforms don’t allow it. They don’t need independent 
doctors. They say, if you no longer work in a hospital, you cannot work on our 
platforms. They don’t need full-time mobile doctors. That’s a mistake in the 
current healthcare in China. There should be full-time mobile doctors. Now the 
positioning for mobile doctors is part-time. (Physician #210, Male, Attending)     
 The intensity of their time theft varied a lot, from “always did it during office 
hour” to “at least five hours every day” to “at least one question every day” to “not do 
much.” The ways for time theft also varied, with some “hided in the duty room or 
restroom to answer questions,” some “did it secretly to hide from colleagues and 
leaders,” some “did whenever I like,” and others asked subordinates to do most of the 
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traditional work and “had abundant time, at least 5 hours every day” to answer questions 
through the phone.  
Because this group of mobile doctors revealed the rich interaction between 
crowdsourcing and traditional work, and time theft is also an emerging concept which 
showed the interplay between traditional work and crowdsourcing, which has not been 
adequately captured in existing crowdsourcing literature, in the rest of this chapter and 
following chapters, I explored the potential factors from traditional work context which 
were related to or could explain time theft for crowdsourcing.    
4.2.3 Explanations from Traditional Work Context  
In their desire to participate in crowdsourcing as much as possible, mobile doctors 
who utilized their scheduled work hours for crowdsourcing acknowledged two major 
offline factors which may impact the frequency and intensity of their actual 
crowdsourcing behavior in the workplace. One was the constraint from hospitals, which 
may impose regulations on their behavior in traditional work. The other was a social 
group which may motivate them to devote more or less time to crowdsourcing. To 
present a complete picture of these two influences, the following description included 
accounts from doctors who had different degrees of time theft and the rest doctors who 
represented the extreme case of no time theft, ethnographic field notes, as well as 
documents and literature on Chinese healthcare industry.     
4.2.3.1 Boundary Control in Traditional Work 
Boundary control is an employer’s ability to affect how employees divide their 
time between their work and life outside of work (Perlow, 1998). Though crowdsourcing 
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potentially created time conflict with traditional work, most hospitals “didn’t have formal 
regulations” on crowdsourcing and “neither encouraged nor discouraged” doctors to work 
for it, because it was a new phenomenon which had not been fully noticed and 
understood by the management who were usually “in their age of 50’s” and “knew 
nothing about this kind of high technology thing.” However, hospitals typically had 
techniques to regulate doctors’ use of time in workplace, especially prevented them from 
time theft via digital technology, or so called cyberloafing in literature, such as chatting 
on instant messenger programs via smart devices or computers, surfing the internet for 
personal issues, visiting investment-related websites, or shopping online (e.g., Lim, 2002; 
Liberman, Seidman, Mckenna, & Buffardi, 2011). Study 1 showed that though the actual 
execution varied a lot among hospitals, three general boundary control techniques were 
used by hospitals to manage doctors’ use of time, which impacted their time theft for 
crowdsourcing. Hospitals regulated doctors’ use of time through heavy workload, 
monitored it through digital technology and people, and punished time theft through 
financial, social and career penalties.  
Regulating the use of time through heavy workload. Consistent with others’ 
studies on time (e.g., Glennie, & Thrift, 1996, 2009; Weber, 2011; Snyder, 2013), 
hospitals were observed to use different time disciplines, such as density, routinization, 
coordination, and standardization to regulate doctors’ use of time in workplace. When 
walking through their typical week in a hospital, all doctors used “busy” to describe their 
daily life. Such busyness was caused by the heavy workload assigned by the hospitals, 
such as the large number of patient visits, or service doctors had to provide for the 
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hospitals (e.g., preparing materials for a hospital’s promotion in hospital ranking), or 
research and learning related activities.  
Interviews and field notes showed that in this setting, workload in treating 
patients, or so called “hospital work” (“	
”) by doctors, mattered most for 
time theft. Scheduling full-day appointments for doctors was a typical example of using 
heavy workload to regulate doctors’ time theft in traditional work. An interviewee who 
was an associate chief in a tertiary public hospital estimated that on average, he had more 
than 50 patients a day, and the maximum number could be 170. Field observations 
confirmed that in the outpatient departments that I visited, doctors on average spent less 
than five minutes on each patient because of the large amount of appointments. A chief 
doctor that I interviewed during the site visit mentioned that she avoided doing 
crowdsourcing in the hospital because there were too many patients. She illustrated that 
she intentionally did not drink much water at work because she even “[did] not have time 
to go to the restroom.”   
Such heavy workload is predictably related to the hierarchical level of a hospital 
and the type of work (e.g., specialty and profession) in that hospital. For example, 
according to a report by National Health and Family Planning Commission of China 
(2017), 77.3 percent of China’s inpatient service was delivered in hospitals, and only 18.2 
percent in community health centers or village clinics. Among these hospitals, roughly 49 
percent of outpatient visits and 43.1 percent of inpatient service took place in tertiary 
hospitals, which only accounted for seven percent of all hospitals. Within the same 
hospital, the amount of workload also varies. During my site visit in a tertiary hospital in 
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a morning, within 3.5 hours, there were 537 outpatients receiving medical service in 
internal medicine department (in a broad definition), compared to 324 in surgery 
department (in a broad definition), 100 in ENT department, and only 26 in Traditional 
Chinese Medicine department (see Table 4). When workload was high, doctors were 
forced to do crowdsourcing either during fragmented time or outside of the workplace. 
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Table 4 An Example of Different Levels of Busyness among Different Specialties in 
a Tertiary Hospital 
Specialty The Number of Outpatients 
Internal Medicine* (537) 
General Clinic  117 
Hematology Clinic 24 
Pulmonology Clinic 114 
Oncology Clinic 19 
Gastroenterology Clinic 130 
Neurology Clinic 103 
Nephrology Clinic 30 
Surgery* (324) 
General Surgery Clinic 55 
Head & Neck Surgical Clinic 101 
Cardiac Surgical Clinic 11 
Thoracic Surgical Clinic 36 
Surgical Oncology Clinic 23 
Colorectal Surgical Clinic 24 
Urology Surgical Clinic 74 
  
Traditional Chinese Medicine* 26 
Otolaryngology (ear, nose, and throat; ENT)* 100 
Wound & Ostomy Care 23 
Radiology Dept. 3 
Endocrinology  110 
Mental Health Clinic 25 
Family Practice Clinic 57 
Obstetrics/gynecology (OB-GYN)* N/A 
Pediatrics* N/A 
Dermatology* N/A 
Note: The data were from the author’s field notes in a tertiary hospital. The time period was from 
8:00am – 11:30am on a Monday morning in April.    
* are the specialties used in this study. This hospital doesn’t have obstetrics/gynecology (OB-
GYN), pediatrics, and dermatology 
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Monitoring the use of time in workplace. In addition to regulating the use of time 
through heavy workload, hospitals actively monitored doctors’ use of time through ways 
such as surveillance camera, IT technology, peer whistle-blowing, and reports from 
patients.  
During a site visit, an obstetrics and gynecology physician whose job was to do 
ultrasound tests explained how the hospital installed high technology to monitor their 
cyberloafing behavior in the workplace:  
Working here is very inflexible, not free. No matter playing with the phone or the 
computer, if the hospital finds out, you will be a dead meat…Offices like mine are 
better. Because of patients’ privacy, we don’t have cameras. But if you are 
working at the windows in the lobby, every move will be caught by the camera. 
Most of the offices, except ours, have cameras. It’s very inflexible and rigid…You 
can’t use the phone in the hospital. If you log into the internet on computers, the 
IT center would know immediately…Working here is like being a thief (“
”). We are monitored. (Physician #102, Female, Attending) 
But not every hospital had such a strict surveillance system with high technology, 
which to some extent explained the different degrees of time theft for different doctors. 
Some doctors who were working for crowdsourcing freely during office hours believed 
that the hospital “can’t forbid it anyway because all things happen on the phone…It’s for 
sure impossible for them [the hospital] to monitor whether you are answering questions 
online or not.” (Physician #204, Male, Associate chief)     
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Patient surveillance system was prevalent in hospitals. It was designed to provide 
voice channels for patients to improve their satisfaction. Doctors were cautious whether 
their crowdsourcing behavior in workplace would be misinterpreted by patients as 
neglect for the duty, thus would be “reported to the hospital.” As one doctor put it,  
If patients’ family come, it’s apparently inappropriate to play with the phone. 
They may not think that you are studying, or answering patients’ questions. Most 
likely their first reaction is that you are playing with the phone. The leaders will 
also think that you are playing with the phone. You are unable to give a 
convincing explanation for self-defense. (Physician #208, Male, Attending doctor) 
In contrast, peer surveillance system existed “in some top hospitals, but not 
common.” This statement was consistent with literature that monitoring one another’s 
behavior and exerting peer pressure over one’s colleagues were limited in Chinese 
hospitals because of the lack of group medical practice (Burn, 2017). Peer whistle-
blowing typically happened when “the competition for promotion was severe,” and 
doctors who were not doing crowdsourcing faced “the interest conflict in career 
advancement” with mobile doctors.  
Punishing time theft behavior. Doctors also mentioned the potential punishment 
from being caught in time theft. The most common way that they mentioned was 
financial penalty, which was “very effective” in inhibiting time theft. For example, in a 
secondary hospital where the salary was “only less than 5,000RMB a month,” and the 
income from working for a platform was “only several yuan [RMB],” the fine was 
“minimum 200RMB, and maximum 500RMB per time.”  
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Social penalty, especially penalty in reputation was frequently mentioned by 
interviewees too. They mentioned that hospital leaders, such as administrative managers 
or medical supervisors would rebuke them for using office hours to “do anything which 
was not related to the hospital work” either publicly or in person. It made them feel 
embarrassed.  
One interviewee also mentioned a type of career penalty which was “unusual,” 
but did happen sometimes,  
Once in my hospital, several doctors were visiting investment-related websites 
during the office hour. They were caught by the Healthcare Bureau [a 
government office] who happened to visit my hospital on that day…It was awful. 
The hospital had to seriously deal with this issue. They [hospital leaders] could 
not simply rebuke the doctor, but had to deal with it... They [her colleagues] were 
fired. (Physician #102, Female, Attending) 
4.2.3.2 Mobile Doctor Social Groups  
Besides hospitals’ boundary control, such as regulating the use of time through 
heavy workload, monitoring the use of time in workplace and punishing time theft 
behavior, mobile doctors also reported the influences from mobile doctor social groups 
which might impact their use of time for crowdsourcing. Specifically, three types of 
social groups were mentioned7.  
                                                                            
7 A fourth type of social group mentioned by interviewees was forum. During the pilot 
study stage, when I used mobile healthcare (“”) and mobile doctor (“
”) to refer to online counseling (“	”), two interviewees immediately described 
their experiences in this type of forum. Such online social group shaped doctors’ identity 
as a mobile doctor participating in mobile healthcare. However, it was not directly related 
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The first type was Wechat group (“
”), an online social group through 
social media platform Wechat chatroom. It was informally organized by individual 
doctors and grew by an invitation system that current members could invite other doctors 
into the group8. Wechat group was usually actively operated9. It was the place for doctors 
to chat, or discuss about online medical cases, offline cases and other information (e.g., 
training opportunities, online lectures, and research papers). Some doctors started to work 
for crowdsourcing after hearing about platforms in Wechat group. Others used the group 
to share information about unusual online cases. As one doctor told a story,  
Once there was a patient, he claimed to be an AIDS patient…Then the next day 
when he contacted me, this question was open for 48-hour, when he contacted me 
again, he changed. Suddenly I couldn’t recognize him. He became a female. He 
supposed to be a male the day before, but he became a female. She talked about 
things which were totally irrelevant to what he talked the day before. It was hard 
to tell that they were still the same person. Even the gender changed. I was so 
                                                                            
to doctors’ participation in healthcare Q&A crowdsourcing. It was the additional 
service/product provided by crowdsourcing platforms for doctors to share medical 
knowledge and information, and learn from others’ cases by reading how a medical 
expert analyzed a case (e.g., dxy.cn). 
8 Wechat groups were highly selective and strictly excluded potential patients. The 
founder of a chatroom usually had the absolute discretion on recruiting and dismissing a 
member. For example, some of my interviewees tried to help me enroll into some 
chatrooms but the applications were rejected by many founders because I was not a 
medical professional. The only chatroom that I was able to get in was a chatroom 
specialized in psychology and psychotherapy. I was enrolled at the expense of kicking a 
member out by the founder, because the maximum number of that group was 500, which 
was set up by the social media Wechat. 
9 For example, in the chatroom that I joined, over the past one year, members had been 
posting information every day. 
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confused. I talked to her based on her identity on that day…Several months later, 
he suddenly asked me again. Because I had records. I could see his online ID 
number. It was him. He started to talk, as a male, the same question, the same 
disease…then the next day, he changed again, changed into a female…I started to 
ask him, “are you the same person?” …I was thinking, “is it multiple personality 
disorder?”…I asked him. He said he didn’t know. He said sometimes he had two 
personalities, two identities, he didn’t know which one was himself…Then I 
started to think, maybe he had that disease [multiple personality disorder], or 
maybe he was just joking. Maybe he was just making fun of me. I didn’t know. I 
couldn’t ask him either. Because this kind of online counseling10 is very different 
from real counseling, right? I couldn’t conduct a survey on him. When he realized 
that I was questioning him, he disappeared. He never contacted me again…We 
have a chatroom X [pseudonym], a social group (“”). We can chat in that 
group. Everyone was talking about that patient, because he asked a lot of people. 
None of us knew what his purpose was… After that [after sharing the information 
in the chatroom], when he contacted me again, I stopped checking the updates on 
questions that he asked me before. Whatever he asked me this time, I answered. 
That was all. I stopped thinking whether he had multiple personality disorder, or 
he was making fun of me. How to say, I stopped trying to help him specifically. 
Whatever he asked, I answered. That’s it. (Psychologist #209, Female, Resident)                 
                                                                            
10 This online counseling was text-based communication. The doctor couldn’t see the 
patient, or hear his/her voice, but read the text messages sent by the patient.  
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The second type was learning group (“”), an offline community which was 
formed because of medical training programs provided by a third-party outside of the 
hospitals. The impact of this group on doctors’ participation in crowdsourcing was 
similar to that of Wechat group (i.e., information sharing), but the interaction among 
group members was weaker because they only gathered together when there were 
training programs.  
The third type which directly impacted mobile doctors’ actual time theft for 
crowdsourcing was a highly selective offline mobile doctor social group in doctors’ own 
hospitals. Mobile doctors’ level of devotion to crowdsourcing depended on how deeply 
they involved in the socialization process of this group.  
Onboarding. This mobile doctor social group was voluntarily formed by mobile 
doctors with similar values, backgrounds and interests. It started with a typical feature of 
crowdsourcing platforms that they provided money incentive for doctors who had worked 
for crowdsourcing to recommend the platforms to their friends. Doctors were very 
cautious about to whom in their own hospitals they should recommend because of the 
hospitals’ boundary control techniques mentioned above. For example, they wouldn’t 
recommend the platform to a colleague who seemed not trustworthy in the afraid of 
“being reported to the hospital,” or who might look down the professionalism of a mobile 
doctor and consider online diagnosis as “not rigorous,” or whose demographic 
backgrounds (e.g., age) they thought did not fit crowdsourcing.  
Rather, they typically recommended crowdsourcing to a colleague who fitted their 
stereotype of a person who might accept this kind of work. For example, the person 
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might belong to “the young generation,” possess “the necessary medical expertise and 
technological knowledge to answer questions online,” or in general “enjoy high 
technology or fancy new things.” They also recommended crowdsourcing to their friend 
colleagues, regardless of friends’ characteristics. The motivation behind their 
recommendation was mainly monetary incentive provided by the platforms, but also 
included “for fun,” or “sharing new things with friends,” or “introducing a better way to 
use time.”  
The level of interactions in each mobile doctor group varied, with some actively 
engaging in interpersonal interaction either offline or through social media such as 
Wechat, while others keeping a loose relationship. Such differences impacted doctors’ 
use of time for crowdsourcing. For example, for those who actively maintained the social 
group, they “discussed difficult online cases offline” or “showed off their online 
performance to each other for fun.” Many of them also had the in-group and out-group 
differentiation (Tajfel & Turner, 1985) by referring their colleagues as “we” (who did 
crowd tasks) and “they” (who didn’t do crowd tasks). 
Through this onboarding process, certain doctors in the same hospital acquired or 
possessed the necessary skills, attitudes and behavior to become a member of a mobile 
doctor. As a result, consistent with findings in previous literature (e.g., Tajfel, 1978), this 
highly selective mobile doctor group was by nature different from the rest of doctors in a 
hospital, and shared some common values, interests, interpersonal interaction, emotions, 
or attachment.  
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Metamorphosis. At this metamorphosis stage, the voluntarily formed informal 
social groups grew and developed into part of the organization’s bureaucratic system. 
However, not every mobile doctor social group moved beyond onboarding stage to the 
metamorphosis stage. Among 43 interviewees that I interviewed, only one chief doctor, 
who was the director of a psychiatry department in a secondary hospital described how 
after he found the advantages of online counseling, he integrated the healthcare 
crowdsourcing system into his department’s formal performance evaluation system and 
how such transformation improved employees’ income and the department’s overall 
performance, 
In in very beginning, I joined two online counselling platforms, because many 
psychiatry patients are not willing to counsel a psychiatrist with their real 
names… My department has its uniqueness. Patients can accept it [online 
counselling], except someone who doesn’t know how to use Wechat or internet. 
It’s easy for young patients to accept it. Especially because the hospitalization 
period is very short in my department. Patients have to be discharged in 10 days, 
before many medicines starting to work. This is a huge challenge. So we use 
internet to follow them… because I’m the policy maker in my department, in the 
beginning, I didn’t think too much. It was not so complicated. I just wanted to 
increase patients’ satisfaction after the [offline] treatment. That was the initial 
purpose…After we used this format [online counseling], we had endless patients. 
First, it achieves our goal of patients’ number. Second, doctors themselves can 
get extra pay. Our fee is very low. We set up different fees for different patients. 
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At first, our department had a common account for online counseling. All the 
money earned through online counseling went into that account. Later they 
[doctors in this department] can set up their own accounts. The money that they 
earned belonged to themselves. In addition, their [online] performance was 
reflected in the department’s performance evaluation. How much they earned in a 
month. The quantity was reflected in the hospital’s performance evaluation. What 
I can control is the quantity of [online] patients…Every Friday afternoon, our 
department has a meeting to discuss about questions related to this [online 
counseling]. Every morning we have a meeting. They [doctors] don’t want to talk 
a lot. So I can only take 30-mins of their time. Every morning at 8am, after the 
shift, they report the issues they had online, in the lecture like format. So that 
every medical professional can know [the issues]… There are 25 people in my 
department. We have to make sure that there is always a person online, otherwise 
there would be a gap… I arrange the shift, just like what I do offline. We have 
psychiatrists and psychologists. If our physicians [psychiatrists] are too busy, 
then the psychologists would be online… For my department, after using online 
counseling, even if our outpatient department is closed, like today is the state 
holiday, the holiday lasts five days, usually our outpatient department is closed. 
In previous years, if the outpatient department was closed, then it was impossible 
to have inpatient patients. But this year is different, without seeing patients face to 
face, we have already had enough patients. (Physician #217, Male, Chief) 
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Dissolution. Mobile doctor social groups were not stable. Doctors could freely 
join or leave the platforms. They could stop answering questions online because of any 
idiosyncratic reasons. For example, during the interview, some interviewees mentioned 
that they were “too busy.” Compared to the first time that they heard about mobile 
healthcare, answering online question was “no longer attractive.” They “didn’t like the 
changed policy of the platform. The policy changed so frequently. It was confusing.” Or 
they “couldn’t provide precise diagnosis for patients through online diagnosis.” In this 
kind of anecdotal situations, doctors reported that the leaving of any individual colleague 
would not impact their participation in crowdsourcing, because crowdsourcing work was 
“independent” and answering questions was “personal behavior.”  
However, in other situations where a relatively large group of colleagues stopped 
doing crowdsourcing because the hospitals enhanced time boundary control, such as “our 
hospital was trying to apply for higher ranking as a tertiary hospital. They [the managers] 
put more work on everyone, and we were too busy to do online diagnosis,” (i.e., 
regulating the use of time through heavy workload) or “the hospital found out that we 
were doing this kind of things [online diagnosis]. They didn’t allow us to use phones and 
computers in the workplace anymore,” (i.e., publishing time theft behavior), doctors 
reported that the leaving of colleagues had made them either stop doing crowdsourcing or 
reduce the frequency of doing it during office hours in the workplace.     
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4.3 Summary  
Study 1 explored how mobile doctors responded to time conflict between 
traditional work and crowdsourcing. The inductive findings suggested a few extensions to 
the existing theory.  
Firstly, rather than enrichment proclaimed by many healthcare crowdsourcing 
scholars or start-up company founders and entrepreneurs, mobile doctors who were the 
actual performers of crowdsourcing claimed that they experienced time conflict between 
traditional work and crowdsourcing. They held different views of crowdsourcing, with 
some devaluating crowdsourcing, some considering it as a complement to traditional 
healthcare, while others advocating it as the future of work. Moreover, they had different 
reactions to time conflict, either avoiding it by not doing crowd work in workplace, 
juggling crowdsourcing and traditional work by managing fragmented time, or stealing 
time from traditional work for crowdsourcing. Utilizing office hours for crowdsourcing 
appeared to be a common reaction among the sample interviewees. Experienced mobile 
doctors with time theft believed that as a new format of work, healthcare crowdsourcing 
deserved their full-time devotion, yet the current healthcare system prevented them from 
doing so because platforms only recruited doctors who worked full time in offline 
hospitals. In respond to such constraint, they created diverse ways to escape from 
hospitals’ boundary control, utilizing the boundaryless nature of crowd work and fully 
expecting the potential consequences.  
Secondly, I further examined what kind of traditional work context was more 
likely to see time theft behavior. The findings revealed two potential forces behind 
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individual reactions. When individuals faced time conflict, they actively evaluated 
hospitals’ boundary control on their use of time in traditional work. Whether the 
boundary control was strict or not? Whether the consequences of being potentially caught 
and punished were severe? At the same time, they actively formed a mobile doctor social 
group in their hospitals. Desired attitudes and behavior as a mobile doctor emerged 
during early socialization at the onboarding stage. Some groups (only one in my sample) 
may move forward and experience the metamorphosis stage at which their members’ 
voluntary behavior was formalized by the hospital’s policy and the informal social group 
was integrated into the hospital’s formal bureaucratic system. Moreover, mobile doctor 
social group was not stable. The dissolution of the social group also impacted mobile 
doctors’ continuation in engaging in healthcare crowdsourcing.   
In conclusion, Study 1 was based on a comparison of doctors’ own accounts of 
their opinions and attitudes toward healthcare crowdsourcing. The purpose was to get 
rich and thick information based on doctors’ own language and understanding. However, 
because time theft to some extent violated time norms in traditional work, mobile doctors 
may not truthfully report their time use behavior due to factors such as retrospective 
sensemaking, social desirability or faulty memory. Therefore, to examine to what extent 
the qualitative findings on time theft can be generalized to a broader mobile doctor 
population, in Study 2, by using quantitative methods, I tested that these two above-
mentioned forces in traditional work - hospitals’ boundary control and offline mobile 
doctor social groups - would be related to mobile doctors’ time theft for crowdsourcing.    
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CHAPTER 5: WHAT FACTORS IN TRADITIONAL WORK ARE RELATED TO 
TIME THEFT FOR CROWDSOURCING            
Chapter Summary 
As a follow-up quantitative study in the full-cycle research design, which aims to 
enhance the generalizability of the observed relationships in a naturally occurring 
phenomenon and specify boundary conditions (Chatman & Flynn, 2005), this chapter 
tests whether Study 1 doctors’ statements about their responses to time conflict are 
reflected in mobile doctors’ actual daily participation in crowdsourcing. Specifically, 
after controlling for personal, job and crowdsourcing contextual factors, whether the 
response of time theft for crowdsourcing would be related to traditional work including 
hospitals’ boundary control and a mobile doctor social group? 
By using a daily record study with 4,034 doctors’ 3.1 million answering time 
records on a Chinese healthcare platform across half a year, I find that as norm violation 
behavior, time theft is related to the interaction between traditional organizations’ 
boundary control and individuals’ power to violate time norms. The use of time for 
crowdsourcing is also related to the characteristics (i.e., size, stability, homogeneity) of 
an offline crowd worker social group.   
In the rest of this chapter, I presented theoretical background (Section 5.1), 
hypotheses (Section 5.2), methods (Section 5.3), results (Section 5.4), and discussion, 
including study-specific limitations, strengths and future directions (Section 5.5).  
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5.1 Theoretical Background  
As showed in Study 1, time conflict between traditional work and crowdsourcing 
was the major concern that mobile doctors had when they were doing crowdsourcing. To 
understand how traditional work may influence doctors’ allocation of time for 
crowdsourcing, in this section, I briefly reviewed studies on time and introduced the 
different time disciplines in traditional work and crowdsourcing. By doing so, I argued 
that time theft contained moral meanings and showed as norm violation behavior in 
traditional organizations.  
5.1.1 Time  
As the basic element of social life, time is one of the oldest topics in human 
history. Time is not only a linear, absolute and mathematical concept which consists of 
past, present, and future as what Newton (1687) proposed more than three hundred years 
ago, but also a socially constructed concept which could shape individual behavior and be 
a source of emotional and physical strain (e.g., Bianchi & Raley, 2005; Jacobs & Gerson, 
2004). 
The widespread busyness of post-industrial revolution life has ignited a surge of 
research on how and why people used time differently. One stream of early research took 
a “structural determinism” approach (Blair-Loy, 2010) and theorized time as a 
mechanism of economic power relations that reinforced social domination (e.g., Marx, 
1955; Thompson, 1967). Instead of passing, time was argued to be spent (Thompson, 
1967), according to the economic structure, to increase productivity and efficiency 
(Moore, 1963). Examples were scientific management (Taylor, 1918) and just-in-time 
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system in Toyota. The metaphor of “time is money” also indicated that time could be 
quantified, invested, budgeted and profited. The other stream of research, in contrast, 
took a “narrow rational action” approach (Blair-Loy, 2010) and theorized time as a 
resource that facilitated individual market-oriented actions (e.g., Adam, 1994; Bluedorn 
& Denhardt, 1988). For example, the boundary between different social domains, such as 
work and life, or work and leisure, created a tension of time use behavior across 
interfaces. It could cause organizations to proactively apply different time management 
tactics such as flexible working time or the reduction of working hours (Hewitt, 1993), 
and trigger individuals to manage work-life balance (e.g., Evans, et al., 2004; Golden, 
2001; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004). Therefore, this approach highlighted the important role of 
agency in coping with time scarcity.   
Recent development in time theories criticized that these two streams, which 
originated from an economic perspective, overly emphasized on either structural 
constraint or instrumental action (Blair-Loy, 2010), and “sidestepped the non-economic 
institutions that influenced the social construction of clock time” (Snyder, 2013, p. 247). 
Take the healthcare crowdsourcing for example: Though crowdsourcing provides 
opportunities for doctors to make extra money, compared to full-time medical jobs in 
hospitals, crowd tasks are small, simple, extremely short-time (Hosseini et al., 2015) and 
under paid ($0.03 per question in this study). Whether performing these tasks can 
maximize doctors’ instrumental utility (e.g., making money, and increasing productivity) 
remains open to question. Moreover, volunteering and spatial diversity, the major 
features of crowd (Hosseini et al., 2015), give crowd workers enough freedom to choose 
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when to perform a crowd task. However, in reality, whether doctors can freely set their 
hours is still unknown. For example, to increase credibility and gain positive evaluation 
from online patients, doctors typically publish their personal information (e.g., hospital, 
specialty, and name). The lack of anonymity exposes doctors to both online patients and 
their offline hospitals. It may increase the chance of doctors being caught by hospitals. 
These potential risks may influence doctors’ allocation of time between hospitals and 
crowdsourcing.  
To find a middle path between these two positions (i.e., structural determinism 
and narrow rational action), building on Weber’s (2011) work, Snyder (2013) proposed a 
new-Weberian approach which considered time as a moral institution that facilitated the 
construction of meaningful actions in time-space. Clock time carried symbolic meanings 
in a way that by allocating time to different activities (e.g., working in hospitals, and 
participating in crowdsourcing), individuals may claim and fulfil their identities and 
values, thus find meanings (Weber, 2011).  
5.1.2 Time Disciplines 
According to the new-Weberian approach of time (Snyder, 2013; Weber, 2011), 
to function well in the modern society, people’s use of time intentionally or 
unconsciously follows certain rules or disciplines in a given institution. Scholars have 
identified many time disciplines in different institutions. There are four general ones: (1) 
standardization, the degree to which people’s time-space paths are disciplined to be the 
same as one another’s; (2) coordination, the degree to which people’s time-space paths 
are disciplined to smoothly connect with one another’s; (3) regularity, the degree to 
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which people’s time-space paths involve repetitive routine; (4) density, the degree to 
which people’s time-space paths are disciplined to be full of activity (Weber, 2011; 
Snyder, 2013; Glennie & Thrift, 1996, 2009). Through these four disciplines, clock time 
shapes individual behavior, enabling them to “creatively negotiate basic questions of 
social action: when, for how long, with what frequency, variety, intensity, and so on, one 
should dedicate one’s mental and physical energy… [which is] directed “toward” or 
“away” from visions of the good life, the contours of which are shaped by moral 
authorities, such as religious, educational, and other cultural institutions.” (Snyder, 2013, 
p. 251).  
Specifically, workplace and crowdsourcing communities may impose different 
levels of strictness on these four time disciplines and shape different meanings of the use 
of time in different domains. As depicted in Figure 2, time allocation among work and 
crowdsourcing is a behavioral construct which is driven by two forces (i.e., physical 
organizations and virtual communities) with the opposite time disciplines. 
 
Figure 2 Time Disciplines in Physical Organizations and Virtual Communities 
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For example, hospitals in China have strict requirements of time disciplines on 
standardization, coordination, regularity, and density. Doctors are typically required to 
keep a schedule set up by hospitals. Unlike other professional jobs such as freelance or IT 
contractors, they cannot freely set their own working hours (i.e., standardization 
discipline). Healthcare service in hospitals is a result of teamwork which needs the 
synchronization of energy from different roles (e.g., nurses, physicians, and medical 
technologists) (e.g., Valentine & Edmondson, 2014). It requires the coordination of time 
among doctors (i.e., coordination discipline). The regularity discipline in hospitals may 
vary among different tasks. An emergency room emphasizes more on flexibility to deal 
with unpredictability (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006), yet other departments, such 
as internal medicine and surgery, focus more on repetitive routine and standardized 
medical protocols to minimize medical accidents. In my sample, all doctors worked in 
outpatient departments which emphasized on predictability and routine. Therefore, this 
physical setting placed a high regularity discipline on doctors. In China, the supply of 
doctors is far less than the demand (Qin et al., 2013). Doctors are required to fill time 
with lots of patients (i.e., density discipline). Given the life and death nature of medical 
work in hospitals, the consequences of breaking time disciplines could be (not always) 
severe. Doctors are morally obligated to follow the strict time disciplines in hospitals. 
Institutional norms and rituals, such as Hippocratic Oath and regulations, also reinforce 
the meaning of obeying time disciplines in hospitals.   
As a new dimension of modern life for mobile doctors, healthcare crowdsourcing 
also contains moral meanings of helping online patients. For example, most of the 
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healthcare crowdsourcing platforms in China claim that they are dedicated to provide 
accessible and affordable medical services to patients, with the purpose of alleviating 
current problems in traditional healthcare, such as low efficiency, high cost containment, 
low quality care, and hard patient access (e.g., Burns & Liu, 2017; Hsiao, 1995; Ramesh, 
et al., 2014). However, the obligation is not as strong as that in hospitals because of the 
voluntary nature of crowd work. Mobile doctors can freely set their working hours for 
crowdsourcing (i.e., low standardization), have the autonomy to work on their own tasks 
either independently of others on the same website or coordinate with others to have 
collaborative diagnoses (i.e., low coordination), have the flexibility to finish a task in 
their own ways, for example, either with repetitive routine or with creative solutions (i.e., 
low regularity), and have the freedom to either fill time with lots of online patients or not 
(i.e., low density).  
5.1.3 Time Theft as Norm Violation Behavior in Traditional Organizations 
When individuals’ fixed hours of 24/7 must be filled with tasks and expectations 
from different domains (e.g., traditional work and crowdsourcing), they must negotiate 
when to do these tasks (Weber, 2011; Snyder, 2013). Traditional work and 
crowdsourcing are competing for the limited time resource. With strict time disciplines in 
traditional work (Glennie & Thrift, 1996, 2009; Weber, 2011; Snyder, 2013), using office 
hours for crowdsourcing is considered as depleting time resource from traditional 
organizations, thus violating their time disciplines (Snyder, 2013). Therefore, based on 
the time scarcity assumption, time theft is a type of norm violation behavior in traditional 
organizations. 
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5.2 Hypotheses Development  
5.2.1 Time Theft and Individual Power to Violate Time Norms in a Traditional 
Organization 
An individual’s likelihood of violating time norms to some extent indicates one’s 
certain power to negotiate with the boundary control imposed by traditional organizations 
(Perlow, 1998). Therefore, compared to weak-power employees, strong-power ones may 
have more control over valued resources (e.g., time) in an employer-employee 
relationship in a traditional organization (Emerson, 1962). A typical source of power in a 
doctor-hospital employment relationship is expert power that a doctor has special 
expertise which is indispensable for his/her hospital (French, Raven & Cartwright, 1959). 
Such power is reflected in the hierarchical positions in the professional line (vs. the 
administrative line) in a hospital (e.g., resident, attending, associated chief and chief)11. 
As a result, a strong-power doctor’s time violation behavior might be more likely to be 
tolerated by the hospital. For example, a physician interviewee in Study 1 mentioned that 
only for “small doctors” (“	”), meaning the low level doctors such as residents or 
attending doctors, the consequences of being caught in doing non-hospital-work in 
hospitals were severe. But for “masters” (“”), meaning the medical experts, hospitals 
                                                                            
11 In Chinese hospitals, there are two lines in the hierarchical system. One is a 
professional/clinical line which is for medical professionals to get promotion based on 
their medical expertise (See Section 2.3 An offline career in Chinese healthcare industry). 
The other is an administrative/management line which is for hospital managers or 
administrators to get promotion.  
 
 
 
91 
would “turn a blind eye to their behavior.” (“”) Therefore, the 
baseline hypothesis in Study 2 is that: 
Hypothesis 1a: individual power to violate time norms in a traditional organization is 
positively related to the odds of time theft for crowdsourcing. 
To demonstrate that time theft is different from other responses to time conflict 
identified in Study 1, such as juggling traditional work and crowdsourcing, or avoiding 
time conflict, a set of comparable hypotheses on duration is proposed. Duration is the 
total number of hours one spent on crowdsourcing, including time within and outside of 
office hours. Therefore, time theft is a subset of duration.  
Hypothesis 1b: individual power to violate time norms in a traditional organization is 
positively related to duration. 
However, I expect a fail to reject the null hypothesis that individual power to 
violate time norms is not related to duration. This is because as suggested in Study 1, 
doctors may take on crowd tasks outside of the workplace (e.g., family time) or during 
the break (e.g., fragmented time such as lunch break or resting time). Under such 
circumstances, crowdsourcing does not take up office hours nor violate time norms in a 
hospital. Whether doctors have powers to violate time norms in a hospital or not would 
not impact their crowdsourcing behavior outside of the hospital.   
5.2.2 The Moderating Effect of Traditional Organization’s Boundary Control  
However, not everyone who has the discretion to violate time norms would 
actually perform norm violation behavior in an organization. The decision of violating 
time disciplines may depend on other factors. As indicated in Study 1, traditional 
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organizations’ boundary control may play an essential role in doctors’ actual engagement 
in crowdsourcing during office hours. It suggested a potential moderating model of 
traditional organizations’ boundary control on the relationship between individual power 
to violate time norms and time theft behavior.    
As described in the literature review in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2), a common way 
to explain norm violation behavior in career boundary management literature is to use a 
utilitarian approach (e.g., Hechter, 1987; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993; Bendor & Swistak 
2001; Piskorski & Gorbatai, 2017) that such behavior would be encouraged by rewards 
and discouraged by punishment. For example, exchange theory (Homans, 1976) indicated 
that the more often certain social behavior was rewarded, and the more valuable the 
reward was to an individual, the more likely that an individual would have that social 
behavior. In contrast, when the social behavior was punished and became more costly, 
the less likely that an individual would perform that social behavior. 
Study 1 suggested that hospitals imposed boundary control on doctors’ time use in 
traditional work, such as regulating doctors’ use of time through heavy workload, 
monitoring time use behavior in workplace, and punishing time theft behavior. I argue 
that when hospitals’ boundary control is weak and doctors’ individual power to violate 
time norms is strong, doctors are most likely to use office hours to work for 
crowdsourcing, compared to other combinations.  
Specifically, in a traditional organization, as what Study 1 and other studies 
suggested (e.g., Perlow, 1998), the employer is likely to impose boundary control 
techniques to increase the cost of employees’ time violation behavior, and employees 
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have different reactions to these boundary control techniques (e.g., accept or reject). 
When the employer’s boundary control is strong, employees may anticipate a strong 
coercive power that their employer would punish their norm violation behavior (French et 
al., 1959), thus are less likely to use office hours for crowd work. Even for individuals 
with strong power to violate time norms in hospitals, resisting employers’ boundary 
control, though doable, adds costs to their crowd tasks. Based on the utilitarian approach 
that the guidance of an action is to maximize benefits and minimize costs, compared to 
those in organizations with weak boundary control, individuals in organizations with 
strong boundary control are less likely to allocate more office hours for crowd work. 
When the employer’s boundary control is weak and individual power to violate time 
norms is strong, individuals may think even if they break time norms, it would not be a 
big deal, thus are more likely to have time theft.  
Following this above logic, I proposed that the positive relationship between 
individual power to violate time norms and time theft would be inhibited by traditional 
organizations’ strong boundary control and enhanced by their weak boundary control. 
Specifically in this setting of Chinese mobile healthcare industry, as described in the 
research context in Chapter 2, without the effective regulation from other institutions, 
such as education, self-regulation, professional associations and colleagues, physicians’ 
behavior was controlled by the hierarchical system in the Chinese medical system (see 
Section 2.3). Within the industry, higher level of hospitals had greater control over 
employees in terms of better performance management (e.g., performance tracking, 
review, dialogue, consequence management) and talent management (e.g., rewarding 
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high performers, removing poor performers, managing talent, retaining talent, and 
attracting talent) (Liu & Huang, 2014). Therefore, though boundary control may have 
vast and idiosyncratic formats in different organizations, to explore the general 
relationship, in operationalizing the proposed moderating effect, I used hierarchical level 
of a hospital in the healthcare industry as an indicator of hospitals’ boundary control.  
Hypothesis 2a: the positive relationship between individual power to violate time 
norms and the odds of time theft for crowdsourcing is enhanced by traditional 
organizations’ weak boundary control, and inhibited by their strong boundary control.    
Similar to Hypothesis 1b, Hypothesis 2b is proposed as a comparison between 
duration and time theft. But I expect that there would be a fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the proposed relationship below doesn’t exist.    
Hypothesis 2b: the positive relationship between individual power to violate time 
norms and duration is enhanced by traditional organizations’ weak boundary control, 
and inhibited by their strong boundary control. 
5.2.3 Time Theft and a Mobile Doctor Social Group  
As Study 1 suggested, doctors with similar values, backgrounds and interests 
actively and voluntarily formed a mobile doctor social group (usually small) in the 
local hospital where they worked through the platforms’ recommendation system. 
Social identity as a mobile doctor emerged during early socialization at the onboarding 
stage. For example, many of them had the in-group and out-group differentiation 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1985) by referring their colleagues as “we” (who did crowd tasks) 
and “they” (who didn’t do crowd tasks) (see Section 4.2.3). Such findings were 
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consistent with what social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985) defined a social 
group and the potential influence of an emerging social group on individuals.  
As reviewed in Chapter 3, in contrast to the utilitarian approach, another 
typical approach to explain the use of time in different domains (typically work and 
life) and cross-boundary behavior in career boundary management literature on time 
conflict is a social identity approach (e.g., Lobel, 1991; Ashforth et al., 2000) (See 
Section 3.2.2). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985), people 
tend to classify themselves and others into various social categories. Social identity of 
an in-group category would become salient if this in-group’s values and practices are 
distinctive, compared to those of comparable out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). The 
findings in Study 1 indicate that many mobile doctors hold a salient social identity as a 
member of a mobile doctor social group because of the similarity, distinctive values, 
shared goals and threat, and interpersonal interaction among group members (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1985), as well as the emotional significance attached to this membership 
(Tajfel, 1978).   
Following social identity theory, I argue that characteristics of such a mobile 
doctor social group would have an effect on the use of time for crowdsourcing (both 
duration and the odds of time theft). For example, strong relationships within a primary 
group may shape similar values or behavior (Homans, 1950) and enhance group 
identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Homogeneous group may facilitate homogeneous 
information, attitudes and interaction in a group (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001), while weak, diverse and unstable group may influence them in the opposite way 
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(e.g., Ibarra, 1995; Burt, 1995; Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, & Schippers, 2010).   
In the mobile doctor social groups that mentioned by interviewees in Study 1, 
after comparing the characteristics of the social groups between those who frequently 
utilized office hours to work for crowdsourcing and those who did not do so, and 
connecting them with the existing literature, I identified that three characteristics of this 
social group may be related to mobile doctors’ engagement in crowdsourcing: size, 
homogeneity and stability. When the social group was smaller, members had more 
similar demographic backgrounds, and the configuration of the group was more stable, 
mobile doctors showed closer relationship with each other. The close relationship was 
formed either before the formation of this social group as doctors invited their close 
friends, or colleagues with similar backgrounds to join the crowdsourcing group (see 
Section 4.2.3), or after the formation of this social group as doctors were easier to interact 
with each other frequently and shared their online experience within a smaller, more 
homogeneous and stable group (e.g., discussed difficult online cases offline; showed off 
their online performance to each other for fun; a topic for chatting in spare time at the 
hospital. See Section 4.2.3).     
Moreover, time has symbolic meanings (Weber, 2011). By allocating time for 
crowdsourcing, individuals may claim and fulfill their identities as a mobile doctor. 
Therefore, if a person is highly involved in the mobile doctor group, they tend to choose 
to allocate more time for crowd work (no matter of when), an activity which is congruent 
with salient aspects of their identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). In doing so, they may 
enhance their nascent mobile doctor occupational identity (Anteby, 2008; Anteby, Chan, 
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& DiBenigno, 2016). At the same time, by social interaction and exposure to others’ 
similar behavior, thoughts and feelings in this group, they may shape and enhance each 
other’s behavior and spend more time on crowdsourcing through this socially contagious 
process (Degoey, 2000). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3a1: The size of a mobile doctor group is negatively related to the odds of 
time theft for crowdsourcing.  
Hypothesis 3a2: The homogeneity of a mobile doctor group is positively related to the 
odds of time theft for crowdsourcing. 
Hypothesis 3a3: The stability of a mobile doctor group is positively related to the odds 
of time theft for crowdsourcing. 
Hypothesis 3b1: The size of a mobile doctor group is negatively related to duration.  
Hypothesis 3b2: The homogeneity of a mobile doctor group is positively related to 
duration. 
Hypothesis 3b3: The stability of a mobile doctor group is positively related to duration. 
5.2.4 The Moderating Effect of Traditional Organization’s Boundary Control 
The findings in Study 1 also showed the impact of traditional organization’s 
boundary control on the onboarding, metamorphosis and/or dissolution of a mobile 
doctor social group, which indicated a potential moderating effect model of traditional 
organization’s boundary control on the relationship between the characteristics of a 
mobile doctor social group and time theft.  
Specifically, one of the reasons why doctors were very cautious about to whom 
they should invite into this social group was that hospitals imposed boundary control 
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on doctors’ use of time in workplace and doctors were afraid of being caught. 
Hospitals’ boundary control in turn formed a common potential threat for social 
groups who had not moved into the metamorphosis stage. Different from utilitarian 
theory (e.g., Hechter, 1987; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993; Bendor & Swistak 2001; 
Piskorski & Gorbatai, 2017) that individuals’ actions are determined by the net 
rewards they can get from those actions, social identity theory indicates that social 
identify may be enhanced more by the costs, such as conflicts with out-groups, or 
constraints from outsiders, than rewards associated with group membership (Turner, 
1987; Tajfel & Turner, 1985). When an organization’s boundary control is strong, 
employees who anticipate a strong coercive power from their employer to punish their 
time violation behavior may form a strong social identity, and see themselves as a 
group of mobile doctors who are different from other employees in the organization. 
Because of the differentiation between in-group and out-group, people are more likely 
to favor their in-group members and conform to their behavior than out-group 
members (Tajfel & Turner, 1985). They are more likely to behave like the group 
members, even when the behavior is breaking the rules in an organization.  
Therefore, I propose that, 
Hypothesis 4a1: the negative relationship between the size of a mobile doctor social 
group and the odds of time theft for crowdsourcing would be enhanced when 
traditional organizations’ boundary control is strong. 
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Hypothesis 4a2: the positive relationship between the homogeneity of a mobile doctor 
social group and the odds of time theft for crowdsourcing would be enhanced when 
traditional organizations’ boundary control is strong. 
Moreover, as showed in Study 1, when the traditional organizations’ boundary 
control was strong enough to cause a large amount of people to stop doing 
crowdsourcing, it impacted the crowdsourcing behavior for the rest group members. 
They may also stop doing so in the afraid of the regulation and punishment from their 
organizations. Under this situation, the impact of social identity on time theft would be 
inhibited. Therefore, I propose that,    
Hypothesis 4a3: the positive relationship between the stability of a mobile doctor social 
group and the odds of time theft for crowdsourcing would be inhibited when traditional 
organizations’ boundary control is strong. 
Similar to H1b and H2b, I propose a set of comparable hypotheses on duration, 
Hypothesis 4b1: the negative relationship between the size of a mobile doctor social 
group and duration would be enhanced when traditional organizations’ boundary 
control is strong. 
Hypothesis 4b2: the positive relationship between the homogeneity of a mobile doctor 
social group and duration would be enhanced when traditional organizations’ 
boundary control is strong. 
Hypothesis 4b3: the positive relationship between the stability of a mobile doctor social 
group and duration would be inhibited when traditional organizations’ boundary 
control is strong. 
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However, as mentioned earlier, doctors may answer questions outside of the 
workplace, which may not be constrained or managed by hospitals’ boundary control. In 
such situation, hospitals’ boundary control would not form a common threat from 
outsiders to reinforce the very antecedents of social identification, such as the 
distinctiveness of the in-group’s values and practices, group prestige, salience and 
competition with out-groups, and other traditional causes of group formation (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1985). Therefore, I would expect a fail to reject the null hypotheses that the 
proposed relationships in Hypothesis 4b1, 4b2 and 4b3 above don’t exist. 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Research Setting and Data Collection 
I collected the data from one of the largest healthcare platforms in China. This 
platform was founded in 2004. It invites virtually any certified doctors in China to answer 
patients’ questions and provides some monetary compensation (RMB0.2 ($0.03) per 
question). According to its website, it “dedicates to providing an online community for 
patients to get medical advice from doctors efficiently, comprehensively, accurately, and 
at a low cost. It also aims to allocate the available medical resources to provide 24/7 
online service in the form of family doctors.” It promises that each question would be 
answered in five minutes. My data showed that, on average, each question was answered 
in 6.9 minutes, which was pretty close to its mission. By the end of 2016, this platform 
had attracted more than 50 thousand doctors to provide medical advices for over 1 
million patients. 
In order for doctors to work at this platform, the platform has a strict selection 
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process to make sure that only certified doctors can answer questions. As mentioned 
earlier in the research context in Chapter 2 (See section 2.3), in the Chinese healthcare 
system, all certified doctors work in local healthcare delivery organizations (e.g., 
hospitals or clinics) with a “traditional career” configuration (Sullivan, 1999; Super, 
1957). This screening process, though the purpose of which is to guarantee the quality 
and accountability of online medical service, provides an ideal setting for studying a 
digital career in a traditional organization that all crowd workers have a full-time 
traditional job. A manual check on all doctors’ hospitals and departments in the sample 
verified this point. 
 To use this platform, patients can ask any questions without registration and for 
free, by providing self-description of symptoms, gender, age, and specific help they ask 
for. Their questions are grouped automatically into 23 broad categories based on 
keywords related to specialty, such as surgery, internal medicine, obstetrics and 
gynecology, psychology, traditional Chinese medicine, rehabilitation, and so on. If 
patients would like to consult with a particular doctor rather than any doctors from the 
crowd, one way is to pay extra service fee in the form of online counselling through text 
messages. To differentiate it from the online crowdsourcing counselling through which 
patients may randomly receive diagnosis from any doctor, I called it paid online 
counselling12. In my sample, the range of paid online counselling service fee was 
                                                                            
12 I called it paid online counselling only from the patients’ perspective that they don’t 
need to pay for crowdsourcing service. Doctors can receive some monetary compensation 
from crowdsourcing service, such as RMB0.2 ($0.03) per question in this sample 
platform. This compensation is paid by platforms.  
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between RMB5 ($0.72) and RMB300 ($43.14), with a mean of RMB17.2 ($2.46), and 
priced by the doctors. The other way for patients to receive medical treatment from a 
particular doctor is through phone counselling. However, only about 26% doctors in the 
sample provided telephone service. For the initial encounter between a doctor and a 
patient through both paid online counselling and phone counselling, instead of contacting 
the doctor directly, the patient can only submit the requests and/or his/her phone number 
to the platform and wait for the doctor to reach back. Therefore, similar to crowdsourcing 
where doctors could choose to answer any question that they like in the patients’ question 
pool anytime, in these two types of services, doctors also have the autonomy to decide 
when to work for virtual patients.  
For doctors, they can freely choose to answer any questions. Each question is 
answered by one or multiple doctors. There is no rule on how many doctors can answer a 
particular question and how doctors should provide answers (as a comparison to 
traditional medical work where doctors should follow the protocol to write diagnosis). 
Doctors can also read others’ answers for a same question. When a question is answered 
by multiple doctors, the platform has a patient-centered evaluation system in which the 
patient who asks this question can freely choose one (and only one) doctor’s advice and 
give the doctor an “accept” stamp. Though patients’ judgement of diagnosis is subjective 
and sometimes can even be “unfair” and “ridiculous” according to one of the 
interviewees that I interviewed (for more information and discussion on doctors’ 
reactions to patients’ feedback, see Section 6.2.1), receiving this stamp can give doctors 
performance feedback, virtual recognition, a sense of being appreciated by patients and 
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monetary compensation (RMB0.1 ($0.01) per stamp). Thus, doctors, such as interviewees 
in Study 1, do care about receiving positive feedback from patients.    
This sample platform is far from unique. Take China for example, till Dec 31, 
2016, there had been 204 mobile healthcare companies providing dynamic (e.g., Q&A, 
telephone counselling) and static (e.g., advertisement of hospitals and doctors, medical 
articles) health information content designated for patients (Itjuzi, 2016). Even in US 
where the proportion of doctors to patients is not as small as that in China, there are at 
least 10 companies provided such consumer health information service (e.g., HealthTap, 
Health Guru, HealthJoy) (Rock Health, 2016). Therefore, as one of the earliest and 
largest mobile healthcare information crowdsourcing platforms, the sample platform is 
likely to serve as a broadly useful model for exploring healthcare crowdsourcing efforts. 
First, I collected all Q&A items and doctors’ answering time records from the 
platform within a half-a-year time window from Nov 1, 2015 to April 30, 2016. The time 
window was chosen purposely based on the development stage of healthcare 
crowdsourcing industry in China (for more information, see Section 7.4.1). Then I 
manually collected doctors’ personal information, including hierarchical position, 
hospital (e.g., name, public or private, hierarchical level, and geographical location), 
profession, department, specialty, gender, paid online counselling fee, and telephone 
service from their webpages on the platform and other public sources including their 
hospitals’ websites and google.  
To explore whether findings in Study 1 showed among mobile doctors with 
relatively regular participation in crowdsourcing, I eliminated 15,469 (69%) one-time 
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users. These one-time tries may only happen out of a doctor’s curiosity about what this 
particular crowdsourcing platform is doing, or in response to a friend’s invitation. It 
doesn’t constitute a digital career. This manipulation of data could also be found in other 
studies on regular user behavior in online communities (e.g., Mollick, 2014). I also 
eliminated 2,909 (41.9%) doctors who didn’t provide their names because there were too 
many unpredictable noises in this group of people (e.g., they may be platform employees 
rather than doctors according to one of my interviewees’ claim, or they didn’t disclose 
their hospital and personal information which led to missing data in the key variables in 
this study). ANOVA analysis with Tukey’s test showed that, compared with these people, 
doctors disclosing information answered more online questions every week (difference = 
29.34 answers, p<.001) and at a higher response speed (difference = 3,075 seconds, 
p<.01). However, in terms of answering time, two groups of people behaved similarly.  
The final sample included 4,034 active doctors who worked in 18 outpatient 
departments in 2,509 healthcare delivery organizations, answered approximately 1.3 
million questions from 1.2 million online patients, and provided 3.1 million answers. As 
Figure 3 showed, the geographic work locations covered all provinces in China. Figure 4 
showed that the answering time covered 24/7. These indicated the boundarylessness of 
space and time in crowdsourcing. 
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Figure 3 The Geographic Distribution of Doctors on the Sample Healthcare 
Platform 
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Figure 4 The Timing that Mobile Doctors Work for Crowdsourcing on the Sample 
Healthcare Platform 
5.3.2 Variables  
The odds of time theft was measured as the frequency of time theft divided by the 
frequency of no time theft. Here, time theft was measured by the clock time when a 
doctor answered a question, compared with the work schedule in his/her department 
reported by his/her hospital13. Answering time which fell into the work schedule in 
                                                                            
13 Fifty-nine doctors (1.4%) who worked in private medical institutions such as private 
clinics and pharmacies were deleted from the sample because of the potential flexible 
work hour in those organizations, which didn’t align with the definition of traditional 
work in this study. Other type of medical institutions (i.e., tertiary, secondary, primary, 
private hospitals and public medical institutions) have fixed office hours in outpatient 
departments in this study, which are called clinic time (“”) by hospitals. A 
typical schedule was 8am to 11:30am and 1pm to 6pm, but the office hours varied among 
different type of hospitals. Field observations and informal interviews with doctors in 
 
Note:  
(1) Red is the asking time, black is the answering time.  
(2) Every minute is divided by 60. For example, 21.6 means 21:36 or 9:36pm. 
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hospitals was defined as time theft (1=yes, 0=no). The frequency of time theft in half a 
year was used.  
Duration was measured by the number of hours a doctor answered questions 
during the sampling half a year. Because the platform didn’t provide information on the 
log-in and log-off time for doctors, I used an indicator to estimate duration. Specifically, 
because the platform has the design feature of requiring doctors to response to questions 
within 90 seconds if they are online, my analysis proceeded on the assumption that when 
a doctor answered a question, he/she was online for no longer than 0.025 hours (i.e., 90 
seconds). If the interval of two answers was less than 90 seconds, then the doctor was 
assumed to answer two questions continuously during this 90 seconds. The formula used 
for calculating duration was as follows:  
 
where A was the final answers used to calculate duration. a was the actual answers in the 
data. i was the order of an answer based on answering time. Therefore, though duration 
was highly correlated with the number of questions one answered, the number of 
questions used for calculating duration was smaller than the number of questions 
answered in a week.  
                                                                            
hospitals showed that it was common that many doctors in outpatient departments 
worked over time due to the large number of patient appointments on that day or other 
medical emergency. However, it was almost “impossible” for doctors to extend their 
office hours if they didn’t have medical work at hand, because “we don’t get paid for 
over work” and “it has already been a long day.” In this setting, it means that though it’s 
common to see doctors in their offices after their office hours, at these after-work hours, 
doctors are most likely too busy on unfinished medical work to work for crowdsourcing.    
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Individual power to violate time norms was measured by the hierarchical position 
in a hospital’s professional line (vs. administrative line), which represented the expert 
power in a doctor-hospital employment relationship that doctors with stronger power had 
more control over valued resources such as time (Emerson, 1962; French et al., 1959). It 
was a categorical variable based on four hierarchical levels in the medical promotion 
system in China (i.e., resident, attending, associate chief and chief). These levels are 
equivalent across different professions and hospitals in terms of the criteria and status14. 
Because H1 proposed a positive relationship between individual power and outcomes, 
reverse Helmert coding was used to code this categorical variable in which each level of 
individual power was compared with the mean of the previous lower levels.  
Organizations’ boundary control. As mentioned earlier, boundary control may 
show various formats in different organizations, some of which might even be 
idiosyncratic. To explore the general relationship, I used one indicator of boundary 
control which was common in Chinese healthcare industry (see Section 2.3 for more 
information): the hierarchical status of a hospital in this special healthcare system 
determined by the Chinese government, which was referred as a “pro-rich, top-heavy, 
urban-centric system” (Burns & Huang, 2017, p53). Higher status hospitals have greater 
control over employees such as better performance management and talent management 
(Liu & Huang, 2014) and heavier workload (see Section 4.2.3). Specifically, tertiary 
                                                                            
14 To be promoted from one level to another, doctors need to spend enough time (usually 
at least five years) at each level, take national level exams (e.g., the National Medical 
Licensing Examination), and meet standardized criteria (e.g., the recipient of state level 
medical awards, publications) (Burns, 2017) (for details, see Section 2.3). 
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hospitals are the top hospital with most resources. They are typically large hospitals at 
the city, provincial or national level with more than 500 beds. They provide 
comprehensive services, have advanced technologies, and serve as medical hubs 
providing care to multiple regions. Secondary hospitals are medium-sized hospitals with 
100-500 beds, and provide secondary services in a medium size city, county or district. 
Primary hospitals are smaller hospitals with less than 100 beds. They are typically 
located in towns or villages, and provide preventive care, minimal health care and 
rehabilitation services. Private hospitals in general have less control over valued 
resources than public hospitals15. Finally, public medical institutions other than hospitals 
(short for public medical institutions in this paper), such as Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Planned Parenthood, or clinics in public schools or companies, generally 
control less valued resources than hospitals. Therefore, the level of organizations’ 
boundary control used (from lowest to highest) was: public medical institutions (L1), 
private hospitals (L2), primary (L3), secondary (L4), and tertiary hospitals (L5). Because 
H2 expected a weaker moderating effect of organizations’ boundary control on the use of 
time, and H4 expected a stronger one on the use of time, Helmert coding was used in H2 
to code organizations’ boundary control in which each level was compared with the mean 
of the subsequent higher levels, while reverse Helmert coding was used in H4 in which 
each level was compared with the mean of the previous lower levels. 
                                                                            
15 For example, according to the China Health Statistics Year Book (2014), though the 
total number of public hospitals was not so different from that of private ones (54.2% vs. 
45.8%), they possessed most of beds (84.4% vs 15.6% in private ones) and healthcare 
professionals (85.8% vs 14.2%), delivered most of inpatient and outpatient services (90% 
vs 10%) and accounted for about 70% of hospital expenditures. 
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Characteristics of a mobile doctor social group. I used size, diversity and churn to 
tested H3. Size was the number of people in a mobile doctor group in the same hospital. 
The average size of a social group in a hospital in my sample was 4.97 (min = 1; max = 
46; s.d. = 8.62). It was small.   
Diversity within a social group was measured by the diversity in demographic 
backgrounds, including specialty, profession, and hierarchical level. Specialty was a 
categorical variable based on 18 medical concentrations reported by the sample. Ten 
specialties which had less than three percent (n= 121) sample were coded as others. The 
final eight categories included obstetrics/gynecology (OB-GYN), internal medicine, 
surgery, pediatrics, traditional Chinese medicine, otolaryngology (ear, nose, and throat; 
ENT), dermatology, and others16. Profession was a categorical variable based on six 
professional categories as a doctor - physician, pharmacist, medical technologist, nurse 
practitioner, nutritionist, and psychologist. Hierarchical level, as mentioned previously, 
was a categorical variable based on four hierarchical levels (i.e., resident, attending, 
associate chief and chief). However, because of the possibility that people in the same 
profession have the superior-subordinate offline relationship and the subordinate is more 
likely to be monitored by the superior, 24 categories (four levels × six professions) were 
used to measure level diversity.  
Diversity was computed using the entropy-based index (Teachman, 1980). The 
formula is 
                                                                            
16 Others include prevention and health, infection control, diagnostic imaging, 
orthopaedics, pain management, medication, mental health, general practice, 
rehabilitation, and interventional medicine.  
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where p is the proportion of i category among mobile doctors in a hospital. A higher 
index score indicates larger diversity in either level, specialty, or profession. Based on the 
standardized way to treat demographic diversity (e.g.,  Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; 
Van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003), the mean of level, specialty and profession diversity was 
used to indicate one demographic diversity score.   
Churn was measured as the number of people who left a mobile doctor social 
group (Sasovova et al., 2010). The information of mobile doctors who worked in the 
same hospitals as the sample doctors, yet had stopped doing crowdsourcing from the 
platform’s inception in 2004 to the sampling period was collected. It led to 4,755 inactive 
users. Churn was measured by the number of people from this group of inactive users in 
each hospital.  
Control Variables. Other controlled information about a mobile doctor included 
profession (six categories mentioned above), gender (1= male, 0 = female), specialty 
(eight categories as mentioned above), whether he/she provided a video of self-
introduction (1= yes, 0 = no), and answering speed, which was measured by the 
answering time minus a question’s asking time. The larger the difference between 
answering time and asking time, the slower the speed was. Information on whether a 
mobile doctor provided telephone service (1= yes, 0 = no) and paid online counselling fee 
priced by the doctor was also collected. As mentioned earlier, these two types of 
additional service worked in a way that by paying extra fee, patients can consult with a 
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known doctor instead of any doctors from the crowd. 
For questions, question title length and question content length were controlled. 
They were measured by the average number of words used to describe question titles and 
symptoms. For answers, answer length was measured as the average number of words a 
doctor answered questions.  
Table 5 summarizes all the variables in this study, including definition and 
operationalization. 
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Table 5 Variables Used in Study 2 
 Definition Operationalization 
Dependent Variables  
Duration The duration of time one spends 
on crowdsourcing 
 
   
The odds of time 
theft  
The likelihood of using 
scheduled hours to work for 
crowdsourcing among all types 
of time use for crowdsourcing 
The frequency of time theft divided by the frequency of no time 
theft 
   
Time theft Crowd workers use scheduled 
work hours to work for 
crowdsourcing 
The clock time when a doctor answered a question, compared with 
the work schedule in his/her department reported by his/her 
hospital (1=yes, 0=no) 
  
Independent Variables and Moderators   
Individual power 
to violate time 
norms 
Expert power that a crowd 
worker has special expertise 
which is indispensable for his/her 
traditional employer 
The four hierarchical levels in the medical professionals’ 
promotion system in China, including resident, attending, vice 
chief and chief 
 
   
Organizations’ 
boundary control 
A traditional organization’s 
power to execute boundary 
control techniques over 
employees 
The five levels of status in a special healthcare system determined 
by the Chinese government, including public medical institution 
(L1), private hospitals (L2), primary public hospitals (L3), 
secondary public hospitals (L4), and tertiary public hospitals (L5) 
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Characteristics of a Mobile Doctor Social Group  
Size Size of a crowd worker social 
group in a traditional 
organization  
The number of doctors in a mobile doctor group in a given hospital 
   
Churn The stability of a crowd worker 
social group in a traditional 
organization 
The number of people who left a mobile doctor group in a given 
hospital since the platform’s inception in 2004 
   
Diversity The demographic diversity of a 
crowd worker social group in a 
traditional organization  
 
The mean of level, specialty, and profession diversity was used to 
indicate one demographic diversity score 
  
Control Variables   
Specialty Medical concentrations The final eight categories include obstetrics/gynecology (OB-
GYN), internal medicine, surgery, pediatrics, traditional Chinese 
medicine, otolaryngology (ear, nose, and throat; ENT), 
dermatology, and others 
   
Gender  Gender  1= male, 0= female 
   
Profession Different professions as a 
medical professional 
Six categories including physician, pharmacist, medical 
technologist, nurse practitioner, nutritionist, and psychologist 
   
Video Whether a doctor provided a 
video of self-introduction online  
1= yes, 0 = no 
   
Answering speed How fast a doctor responds to a 
patient’s question 
answering time – a question’s posting time 
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Paid online 
counselling fee 
The price of paid online 
counselling service 
The fee priced by a doctor to provide one-on-one online 
counselling 
   
Telephone service Whether a doctor provides 
telephone service 
1= yes, 0 = no 
  
Question title 
length 
The length of a medical question 
described by a patient 
The average number of words used to describe the question title  
   
Question content 
length 
The length of a symptom 
described by a patient 
The average number of words used to describe the symptoms  
   
Answer length The length of an answer provided 
by a doctor 
The average number of words a doctor answered questions  
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5.3.3 Analytic Strategy 
To clean the data, I used Tukey’s test (Tukey, 1977) to detect and delete outliers. 
Outliers were defined as observations that fell below (Q1 − 1.5 IQR) or above (Q3 + 1.5 
IQR), where Q1 was the first quartile, Q3 was the third quartile and IQR was interquartile 
range. General linear model (GLM) with a fixed effect on hospitals was used for 
hypotheses testing. For the testing related to the odds of time theft, GLM with binomial 
family and logit link function was used, while for the testing related to duration, GLM 
with Gaussian family and identity link, or ordinary least squares model (OLS) was used. I 
also used variance inflation factors (VIFs) to test multicollinearity. The range of VIFs 
was from 1.02 to 8.72, which indicated that multicollinearity was not an issue in this 
case. The Breush-Pagan test showed the existence of heteroscedasticity (p<.001). 
Therefore, I used a sandwich function for robust standard error estimators (Zeileis, 2006).  
5.4 Results 
The descriptive analysis on demographic background showed that mobile doctors 
encompassed a wide range of individuals. For hierarchical levels, 83.8 percent of the 
sample were resident, 12.6 percent attending, 2.9 percent associate chief and 0.7 percent 
chief. For hospital status, 15 percent were from tertiary hospitals, 29.5 percent secondary 
hospitals, 34.7 percent primary hospitals, 11.2 percent private hospitals and 9.6 percent 
public medical institutions (e.g., Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Planned 
Parenthood, or clinics in public schools or companies). For profession, the majority were 
physicians (70.7%), compared to 24.7 percent nurse practitioners, 1.9 percent 
pharmacists, 1.8 percent medical technologists, 0.6 percent psychologists, and 0.3 percent 
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nutritionists. For specialty, the largest group was internal medicine (27.5%), followed by 
OB-GYN (26.6%), surgery (14.3%), others (10.3%), pediatrics (6.5%), traditional 
Chinese medicine (6.4%), ENT (4.3%) and dermatology (4%).   
Table 6 provided means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for all 
continuance and dummy variables in Study 2.   
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Table 6 Descriptive Analysis in Study 2 
 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Duration (hours) 52.94 101.86             
2. Odds of Time Theft .35 .23 .07***            
3. Size 4.97 8.62 .05*** -.05**           
4. Diversity .25 .31 .04** -.02 .67***          
5. Churn 8.03 23.88 -.04* -.07*** .65*** .36***         
6. Gender (1=Male) .44 .5 -.01 -.03* -.17*** -.21*** -.04**        
7. Q. Title Length 16.43 1.18 .01 -.09*** .04* .06*** 0 -.07***       
8. Q. Content Length 81.6 21.92 -.1*** .06*** -.06*** -.07*** .02 .12*** -.1***      
9. A. Length 139.89 41.93 -.08*** .05** -.06*** -.09*** -.04* .07*** -.21*** .15***     
10. Tel. Service (1=yes) .21 .41 .04* .03 -.11*** -.13*** -.01 .29*** -.01 .04** .04**    
11. Fee (RMB) 16.44 22.81 .03* .03 0 .03 -.02 .08*** -.02 .02 0 .1***   
12. Video (1=yes) .27 .45 .08*** .06*** -.04* -.01 .02 .08*** .03 0 -.08*** .35*** .02 
 
13. Speed (seconds) 15269.27 43851.46 -.05** .04** -.05*** -.06*** -.01 .06*** -.08*** .06*** .1*** .08*** .03 .07*** 
N= 4034 
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p<.001 
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In Table 7, OLS was used to test the log-transformed duration, which 
approximately conformed to normality, while GLM with binomial family and logit link 
function was used to test the odds of time theft. Models 1a and 2a were control models. 
The results showed that doctors who responded to shorter question titles (β = -0.26, 
p<.001), worked as nutritionists (β = 1.04, p<.01), pharmacists (β = 0.51, p<.01) or 
psychologists (β = 0.76, p<.001) (reference group: physicians), and provided self-
introduction videos (β = 0.19, p<.001) were more likely to use office hours for 
crowdsourcing (see Model 1a). Doctors who responded to shorter symptom description 
(β = -0.21, p<.001), provided shorter answers (β = -0.16, p<.001), responded at a faster 
speed (β = -0.07, p<.01), and had telephone service (β = 0.27, p<.001) spent more time 
on crowdsourcing (see Model 2a).  
Models 1b and 2b tested the main effect of individual power to violate time norms 
in H1. The results showed that after control variables were entered, compared to lower-
level doctors, chief doctors were more likely to use office hours for crowdsourcing (β = 
0.58, p<.01) (see Model 1b), and attending spent more time on crowdsourcing (β = 0.20, 
p<.01) (see Model 2b), but the rest levels were not significant. Compared to the control 
models, the Chi-square test showed that Model 1b was significantly improved but not 
Model 2b, indicating that individual power did not add much interpretation power into 
duration. Therefore, as expected in H1, compared to doctors with less power to violate 
time norms (i.e., resident, attending, and associate chief), chief doctors were more likely 
to use office hours to work for crowdsourcing. There was no significant evidence to 
support that individual power to violate time norms was related to the total number of 
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hours one spent on crowdsourcing.  
Models 1c and 2c tested the moderating effect of organizations’ boundary control 
in H2 that a combination of strong individual power to violate time norms and weak 
organizations’ boundary control was related to the largest odds of time theft and duration. 
The results showed that for the odds of time theft, compared to weaker-power doctors in 
hospitals with stronger boundary control, attending doctors in both public medical 
institution/L1 (β = -0.61, p<.001) and secondary hospitals/L4 (β = -0.66, p<.001) were 
less likely to use office hours to work for crowdsourcing, and chief doctors in primary 
hospitals/L3 were more likely to use office hours to work for crowdsourcing (β = 1.20, 
p<.001) (see Model 1c). For duration, only the interaction between attending doctor and 
public medical institution/L1 was significant (β = 0.55, p<.01) (see Model 2c).  
Models 3a and 4a tested the main effect of the size, homogeneity and stability of a 
mobile doctor social group in H3, after the main effect of individual power to violate time 
norms was controlled. The results showed that doctors who had a larger size of mobile 
doctor group spent more time on crowdsourcing (β = 0.94, p<.001), but not necessarily 
spent more office hours on crowdsourcing (p>.05). Doctors who experienced a larger 
churn in mobile doctor group spent less time on crowdsourcing (β = -0.70, p<.001) (see 
Model 4a) and were less likely to use office hours for crowdsourcing (β = -0.31, p<.01) 
(see Model 3a). These models were significantly improved compared to either the control 
models, or models of individual power, indicating that even after individual power was 
controlled, size and stability of a mobile doctor social group still had a relationship with 
time theft or duration. However, there was no significant evidence to support that the 
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homogeneity of a social group was related to either time theft or duration.  
Models 3b and 4b tested a moderating effect of organizations’ boundary control in 
H4. The results showed that compared to public medical institutions/L1, private 
hospitals/L2 saw a stronger negative relationship between size/churn and the odds of time 
theft (size: β = -1.26, p<.01; churn: β = -3.32, p<.01) (see Model 3b), but the moderating 
effect of organizations’ boundary control on duration was not found (see Model 4b).   
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Table 7 General Linear Model (GLM) Estimating Duration and Odds of Time Theft 
 Duration (log) Odds of Time Theft  Duration (log) Odds of Time Theft 
Variables M1a M1b M1c M2a M2b M2c Variables M3a M3b M4a M4b 
Constant 1.81*** 
(.10) 
1.81*** 
(.14) 
1.88*** 
(.14) 
-.47*** 
(.12) 
-.34** 
(.15) 
-.32** 
(.13) 
Constant 1.98*** 
(.15) 
1.97*** 
(.19) 
-.40*** 
(.15) 
-.43** 
(.17) 
Gender -.13 (.07) -.14 (.07) -.14 (.07) -.08 (.08) -.09 (.08) -.10 (.07) Gender -.13 (.07) -.13 (.07) -.08 (.08) -.10 (.07) 
Q. Title 
Length 
-.05 (.03) -.06 (.03) -.06 (.03) -.26*** 
(.06) 
-.27*** 
(.06) 
-.28*** 
(.06) 
Q. Title 
Length 
-.05 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.26*** 
(.06) 
-.28*** 
(.06) 
Q. Content 
Length 
-.21*** 
(.03) 
-.21*** 
(.03) 
-.21*** 
(.03) 
.11 (.06) .11 (.06) .10 (.06) Q. Content 
Length 
-.21*** 
(.03) 
-.21*** 
(.03) 
.11 (.06) .10 (.06) 
A. Length -.16*** 
(.03) 
-.16*** 
(.03) 
-.16*** 
(.03) 
.02 (.05) .01 (.05) .00 (.05) A. Length -.15*** 
(.03) 
-.15*** 
(.03) 
.01 (.05) .00 (.04) 
Tel. Service .27*** 
(.08) 
.26*** 
(.08) 
.24*** 
(.08) 
.05 (.07) .04 (.07) .06 (.07) Tel. Service .28*** 
(.08) 
.26*** 
(.08) 
.04 (.07) .05 (.06) 
Fee -.01 (.03) -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) .03 (.02) .01 (.02) .02 (.02) Fee -.01 (.04) -.01 (.04) .01 (.02) .03 (.02) 
Video .10 (.07) .10 (.07) .10 (.07) .19*** 
(.07) 
.20*** 
(.07) 
.18** 
(.07) 
Video .11 (.07) .14** (.07) .21*** 
(.06) 
.15** 
(.06) 
Speed -.07*** 
(.03) 
-.07*** 
(.03) 
-.07*** 
(.03) 
-.07 (.06) -.06 (.06) -.06 (.06) Speed -.07*** 
(.03) 
-.07*** 
(.03) 
-.07 (.06) -.06 (.06) 
Specialty (reference: surgery) Specialty (reference: surgery) 
Chinese M. .24 (.13) .25 (.13) .21 (.13) -.15 (.11) -.14 (.11) -.17 (.10) Chinese M. .23 (.13) .21 (.13) -.15 (.11) -.14 (.11) 
Dermatology -.09 (.16) -.10 (.16) -.20 (.16) .09 (.20) .09 (.19) -.03 (.19) Dermatology -.08 (.16) -.15 (.16) .07 (.19) -.03 (.17) 
ENT -.13 (.15) -.13 (.15) -.14 (.15) -.12 (.15) -.11 (.15) -.17 (.15) ENT -.10 (.15) -.07 (.15) -.12 (.14) -.18 (.15) 
Internal M. .17 (.09) .17 (.09) .13 (.09) -.09 (.10) -.08 (.10) -.12 (.11) Internal M. .16 (.09) .13 (.09) -.08 (.10) -.09 (.11) 
OB-GYN .04 (.10) .03 (.10) -.01 (.10) .09 (.13) .10 (.13) .06 (.13) OB-GYN .00 (.10) -.01 (.10) .09 (.12) .07 (.13) 
Pediatrics -.07 (.13) -.08 (.13) -.11 (.13) -.13 (.14) -.14 (.12) -.21 (.13) Pediatrics -.08 (.13) -.09 (.13) -.14 (.12) -.16 (.13) 
Other .13 (.12) .13 (.12) .11 (.12) -.17 (.14) -.16 (.14) -.21 (.14) Other .13 (.12) .10 (.12) -.16 (.14) -.18 (.14) 
Profession (reference: physician) Profession (reference: physician) 
Nurse .15 (.08) .16** 
(.08) 
.17** 
(.08) 
-.12 (.08) -.11 (.08) -.15* 
(.08) 
Nurse .13 (.08) .15 (.08) -.13 (.08) -.16**(.07) 
Nutritionist .40 (.49) .40 (.51) .33 (.56) 1.04** 
(.47) 
1.10** 
(.52) 
1.49* 
 (.77) 
Nutritionist .40 (.51) .36 (.51) 1.08** 
(.52) 
1.15** 
(.52) 
Pharmacist .19 (.21) .19 (.21) .15 (.21) .51** 
(.23) 
.50** 
(.24) 
.51** 
(.23) 
Pharmacist .14 (.20) .14 (.21) .49** (.24) .43 (.24) 
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Psychologist -.46  
(.33) 
-.60 
 (.34) 
-.90*** 
(.35) 
.76*** 
(.17) 
.64*** 
(.18) 
.57**  
(.26) 
Psychologist -.61 (.34) -.69**(.34) .63*** 
(.18) 
.74*** 
(.20) 
Technologist .29 (.22) .29 (.22) .29 (.22) .21 (.20) .20 (.21) .22 (.20) Technologist .21 (.21) .21 (.21) .18 (.21) .19 (.20) 
Individual Power to Violate Norms (reference: mean of lower level doctors) Individual Power to Violate Norms (reference: mean of lower 
level doctors) 
Attending  .20** 
(.09) 
.25** 
(.11) 
 .13 (.07) .19** 
(.08) 
Attending .19** 
(.09) 
.21** (.09) .13 (.07) .09 (.07) 
Assoc. Chief  -.12 (.22) -.06 (.23)  -.14 (.19) -.33 (.18) Assoc. Chief -.10 (.22) -.09 (.22) -.13 (.19) -.20 (.18) 
Chief  -.17 (.28) -.24 (.26)  .58** 
 (.30) 
.67*** 
(.19) 
Chief -.13 (.28) -.13 (.28) .55 (.30) .48 (.30) 
Hospital Boundary Control (reference: mean of higher level hospitals) Hospital Boundary Control (reference: mean of lower level 
hospitals) 
L1   .58** 
(.24) 
  .11 (.18) L2  -.27 (.57)  -1.43*** 
(.42) 
L2   .14 (.20)   .30 (.16) L3  .03 (.30)  -.16 (.23) 
L3   -.12 (.19)   .08 (.18) L4  -.51**(.24)  -.03 (.18) 
L4   .49 (.25)   .16 (.15) L5  -.11 (.22)  -.53**(.24) 
Individual Power * Hospital Boundary Control 
(reference: mean of lower level doctors* mean of higher level hospitals) 
Social Embeddedness 
Attending * 
L1 
  .55** 
(.28) 
  -.61*** 
(.20) 
Size .94*** 
(.24) 
.87*** 
(.33) 
-.03 (.27) -.35 (.21) 
Assoc. * L1   -.03 (.55)   .57 (.29) Diversity -.03 (.07) -.02 (.10) .05 (.08) .15*** 
(.06) 
Chief * L1   .48 (.72)   -.26 (.62) Churn -.70*** 
(.12) 
-.74  
(.40) 
-.31**(.16) -.10 (.33) 
Attending * 
L2 
  .16 (.37)   .03 (.25) Social Embeddedness * Hospital Boundary Control 
(reference: mean of lower level hospitals) 
Assoc. * L2   .86 (.58)   .13 (.40) Size * L2  1.43 (1.41)  -1.26** 
(.64) 
Chief * L2   -.57 (.50)   .84 (.47) Size * L3  .54 (.80)  -.52 (.44) 
Attending * 
L3 
  -.01 (.22)   -.25 (.17) Size * L4  -1.30(.67)  .37 (.49) 
Assoc. * L3   -.13 (.44)   -.68 (.61) Size * L5  -.86 (.68)  -1.01 (.73) 
Chief * L3   -.94 (.60)   1.20*** 
(.39) 
Diversity * 
L2 
 -.56 (.45)  .37 (.19) 
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Attending * 
L4 
  .42 (.31)   -.66*** 
(.25) 
Diversity * 
L3 
 -.04 (.25)  -.13 (.13) 
Assoc. * L4   .67 (.48)   .68 (.37) Diversity * 
L4 
 .37 (.20)  -.16 (.13) 
Chief * L4   1.01 
(.87) 
  -.07 (.43) Diversity * 
L5 
 .04 (.20)  .20 (.16) 
       Churn * L2  -.81 (1.94)  -3.32** 
(1.52) 
       Churn * L3  -.41 (.99)  .52 (.80) 
       Churn * L4  .02 (.69)  -.23 (.62) 
       Churn * L5  .66 (.54)  .07 (.50) 
            
Observations 3526 3526 3526 4017 4017 4017  3526 3526 4017 4017 
ANOVA test  M1a vs. 
M1b: 
p=.15 
M1b vs. 
M1c: 
p=.038 
 M2a vs. 
M2b: 
p=.000 
M2b vs. 
M2c: 
p=.000 
 M1b vs. 
M3a: 
p=.000 
M3a vs. 
M3b: 
p=.007 
M2b vs. 
M4a: 
p=.000 
M4a vs. 
M4b: 
p=.000 
Note:  Hospital is fixed but not reported due to the limited space.  Robust Standardized Errors were reported in the parentheses. The 
sample size for duration is different from that for the probability of time theft because outliers were deleted according to Tukey’s test.  
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p<.001 
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5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Summary  
Study 2 provided a confirmation of Study 1 that doctors’ statements about their 
responses to time conflict between crowdsourcing and traditional work may differ among 
hospitals and mobile doctor social groups. It also showed that duration and the odds of 
time theft were related to two different sets of factors in traditional work context, 
indicating that the group of people who used office hours for crowdsourcing were likely 
to concern about things in their traditional work context differently than what people who 
worked for crowdsourcing at any available time concerned about.  
Specifically, duration was mainly related to the size and stability of a mobile 
doctor social group. When the size of the group was relatively big and the group was 
relatively stable, doctors were more likely to spend more time on crowdsourcing. In 
contrast, the odds of time theft was related to individual power to violate time norms, 
organizations’ boundary control, and the stability of a social group, as expected. Mobile 
doctors were most likely to use office hours for crowdsourcing when they had the highest 
individual power to violate time norms (chief), or stable mobile doctor group (low 
churn).  
Moreover, compared to lower level hospitals, private hospitals saw a stronger 
negative relationship between social group size and the odds of time theft. The report 
from an attending doctor (Physician #205, Male, Attending) who heavily used office 
hours for crowdsourcing in a private hospital provided some interpretations. He 
mentioned that the time he had to spend in the private hospital was “long” but “not 
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intense” because his hospital required them to be “at” the hospital from 7am to 11:30am, 
and 2pm to 5pm every weekday. Even though most of time his hospital “didn’t have 
many patients,” he was not supposed to “freely arrange the time” and couldn’t do 
crowdsourcing “publicly.” He worked for crowdsourcing “almost every day” and only 
“during office hours.” Time boundary control for crowdsourcing in his hospital was weak 
because the hospital “didn’t know the existence of crowdsourcing” and if it had known, 
“definitely it would ban this kind of behavior” because crowdsourcing “would interrupt 
the real work.” Therefore, when he recommended the platform to some of his colleagues, 
they refused to participate, in the afraid of being reported by others to the hospital. This 
account was consistent with ethics literature that adding additional people into a network 
constrained workplace deviance through the consideration of surveillance (i.e., the 
possibility of being observed by other members of the organization) and the loss of 
reputation (McCabe & Trevino, 1993; Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998).  
5.5.2 Study-Specific Limitations, Strengths and Future Directions  
This study has several limitations, which suggest directions for future research. 
First, although the data were collected daily and across 26 weeks, this longitudinal design 
cannot rule out endogeneity problems which might affect the robustness of the results. 
Thus this study cannot make causality argument that either individual power to violate 
time norms, or organizations’ boundary control, or characteristics (e.g., size, 
homogeneity and stability) of a mobile doctor social group are the reasons for time theft. 
In fact, these findings in Study 2 suggest that in what kind of traditional work context, 
time theft is more likely to show up. To explain why people allocate time differently 
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between traditional work and crowd work in a digital career in a traditional organization, 
future studies could use other types of quantitative research, such experimental designs to 
make solid conclusion on causality. The follow-up study in Chapter 6 also tried to 
provide some reasons from qualitative data.  
Moreover, measuring time theft objectively, especially for a large sample is not an 
easy task. Though most of the doctors in the sample were working under the work hours 
reported by their hospitals, it is still possible that some doctors may have shift work hours 
or absence on a specific day during the sampling half a year. Future studies could either 
triangulate the results by doing survey, or replicating the results in a setting where 
professionals’ work hours are strictly fixed.  
Furthermore, this study focused on one of the largest healthcare crowdsourcing 
platforms in China. Though such kind of crowdsourcing platforms are not unique, we 
should be cautious when applying the results to crowdsourcing settings other than 
healthcare, or platforms without patients’ evaluation systems. First is the uniqueness of 
healthcare platforms. For example, healthcare is a highly specialized industry which 
requires specialized knowledge and years of medical training. By nature, all mobile 
doctors in my sample were doctors in traditional organizations. However, in other types 
of digital careers in traditional organizations, the digital occupation may be different from 
the offline one, such as being an offline accountant and an online writer, or being an 
offline secretary and online e-commerce entrepreneur. In these cases, the influence of a 
crowd worker social group on people’s behavior may limit to certain ways. For example, 
not every accountant has the skills of writing novels online, thus may limiting the offline 
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interaction of sharing and recommending digital careers, or the formation of social 
identity. Therefore, replication and generalization to other settings await future research.  
Second is the uniqueness of having digital careers in traditional organizations. 
The choice of this empirical setting is entirely intentional because I am interested in the 
impact of crowdsourcing on traditional organizations. The healthcare system in China 
and the screening requirement of the sample crowdsourcing platform naturally provide 
such a setting which only consists of crowd workers who work as full-time employees in 
traditional organizations. However, such a choice also limited the generalizability to 
other careers caused by the digital revolution. For example, the rise of Turkers or Uber 
drivers due to crowdsourcing shows a career configuration that is different from a digital 
career in traditional organizations. Turkers are a mixed sample of full-time, freelancer, 
self-employed, contractor, and retired (Barnes et al., 2015). They may not have a full-
time job in a traditional organization nor follow a traditional organizational ladder. In 
such case, they may have a high level of autonomy and not necessarily experience the 
tension between two worlds of traditional work and crowdsourcing. Therefore, as 
mentioned earlier, what makes my study interesting and important is the tension between 
flexible digital careers and offline rigid careers. Other interesting flexible careers such as 
Turkers and Uber drivers await future research.     
This study also has several strengths. First, this study included data collected 
across half a year, from different sources and determined by different systems. For 
example, individual power to violate time norms was identified by hospitals, 
organizations’ boundary control was rated by the independent institution in an industry 
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(i.e., government), social groups were collected based on offline objective data, and time 
use behavior was the track of actual daily behavior. Such multi-source data reduced the 
likelihood of common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and 
enhanced the robustness of the results. Second, this study is one of the first to study the 
effect of digital revolution and crowdsourcing on individual careers. By providing the 
strong empirical results from a large set of longitudinal data on the relationship between 
traditional work and crowdsourcing, it demonstrates the new career configuration – 
bounded digital careers, and showcases both methods and theories for future studies on 
this new career. 
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CHAPTER 6: WHY DO DOCTORS USE OFFICE HOURS FOR 
CROWDSOURCING  
Chapter Summary 
As a follow-up step, this chapter aims to provide additional explanations on the 
findings from Chapters 4 and 5. Specifically, by further analyzing the interview data from 
Study 1, I explore why such seemingly costly and deviant time theft is adopted by many 
mobile doctors. The findings reveal that medical professionals assume the extra burden of 
working for crowdsourcing with the hope of answering unfulfilled occupational callings 
in traditional work and adding the meaning to their work.  
Specifically, working for crowdsourcing puts extra burden on mobile doctors, 
such as emotional exhaustion with the so called low quality online patients, a stigmatized 
identity of being a mobile doctor, and technological frustration associated with the 
development of healthcare crowdsourcing (Section 6.2.1). Mobile doctors are willing to 
work for crowdsourcing because of the occupational calling as a medical professional to 
help patients, which to them means a way to achieve a sense of fulfillment, carry out a 
moral duty, and/or follow a life destiny (Section 6.2.2). In addition, when facing time 
conflict, many mobile doctors choose to use office hours for crowdsourcing to answer the 
unfulfilled calling as a medical professional in traditional work when they perceive that 
traditional work lacks patient-centered care, workplace equity, and/or patients’ trust 
(Section 6.2.3). In the rest of this chapter, I presented a follow-up exploratory research 
question (Section 6.1), findings (Section 6.2), and summary (Section 6.3).  
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6.1 A Follow-up Exploratory Research Question 
The full-cycle research design (Chatman & Flynn, 2005) is an iterative and 
cyclical process that goes back and forth between qualitative and quantitative studies to 
better understand naturally occurring phenomena. In this dissertation, the qualitative 
findings in Chapter 4 showed that among interviewees, mobile doctors who had the 
richest experience in crowdsourcing most likely utilized scheduled office hours for 
crowdsourcing. Their time theft behavior to some extent was constrained by hospitals’ 
boundary control (e.g., regulating time theft through heavy workload, monitoring or 
punishing time theft behavior). They actively formed certain mobile doctor social groups 
in their local hospitals to share online information and support each other. However, the 
development and maintenance of these groups were also influenced by hospitals’ 
boundary control. By using a large set of quantitative archival data, the following study in 
Chapter 5 confirmed that the odds of time theft was related to factors in traditional work 
context, including hospitals’ boundary control and the mobile doctor social group 
identified in Chapter 4. Moreover, the effect of mobile doctor social groups on the odds 
of time theft was moderated by hospitals’ boundary control, as expected in Chapter 4.  
These findings in Chapters 4 and 5 together suggested that time theft represented 
a type of norm violation behavior in traditional organizations that hospitals tried to 
impose boundary control regulations on doctors’ use of time for crowdsourcing in the 
workplace and even punish time theft behavior with financial, social or career penalties. 
Therefore, it seemed that time theft was costly for these mobile doctors. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, from the participant’s perspective, mobile doctors in 
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hospitals reported that the enrichment in the use of time brought by crowdsourcing on 
traditional work was limited. Compared to the intensive, professional and relatively high-
paying traditional work in hospitals, according to the interviewees, the spontaneous, 
simple and almost free crowdsourcing was less likely to bring financial benefits for them. 
These claims were also in the opposite of what crowdsourcing scholars (e.g., Celi et al., 
2014; Holst et al., 2015; Choo et al., 2015; McComb & Bond, 2015) and practitioners 
(e.g., founders of crowdsourcing platforms) usually hoped for.  
With these findings, from a utilitarian perspective that individuals’ behavior 
would be determined by the net rewards they can get from those actions (e.g., Hechter, 
1987; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993; Bendor & Swistak 2001; Piskorski & Gorbatai, 2017), it 
seems puzzling that many medical professionals still chose to use office hours to work for 
crowdsourcing. For example, in the qualitative data in Chapter 4, 23 out of 36 mobile 
doctors (64%) had time theft behavior, while in the quantitative data in Chapter 5, among 
4,034 doctors’ 3.1 million answering time records on a Chinese healthcare platform 
across half a year, 35% of the answers (approximately 1 million) were provided during 
scheduled work hours. Therefore, in this chapter, I asked a follow-up exploratory 
question: if time theft seems costly and violates time norms in traditional organizations, 
then why do many mobile doctors still do it?  
To answer this question, I went back to the interview data collected in Study 1 in 
Chapter 4. Similar to Study 1, I used open ended and inductive analytical approach 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1997) to analyze the interview data. The purpose of this chapter was 
to provide rich, descriptive data on mobile doctors’ interpretations of healthcare 
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crowdsourcing and their own behavior, in order to provide explanations on the seemingly 
puzzling findings from Chapters 4 and 5 (Greene et al., 1989).  
6.2 Findings  
In the following part, I first described the extra burden that these experienced 
mobile doctors carried when they worked for crowdsourcing. Such burden went beyond 
the hospitals’ boundary control but was associated with crowd work itself. Then I 
presented the motivation behind such seemingly irrational behavior of working for 
crowdsourcing, with a focus on occupational calling and the meaning of helping patients. 
Finally, I revealed the reasons in traditional work context why mobile doctors chose to 
use office hours to work for crowdsourcing.     
6.2.1 The Extra Burden of Working for Crowdsourcing  
Further analysis on the interview data collected in Study 1 showed that besides 
dealing with the organizations’ boundary control in traditional workplace, mobile doctors 
carried the extra burden of crowdsourcing which was caused by crowd work itself, 
especially for those who had the richest experiences in crowdsourcing (i.e., time thieves 
in my interviewee sample). Though time thieves held a positive view toward healthcare 
crowdsourcing and considered crowd work as an essential format of the so called future 
of work, which deserved their time and devotion (for details, see Section 4.2.2), they 
experienced the emotional exhaustion with the so called low quality online patients, wore 
a stigmatized identity of a mobile doctor, and endured the technological frustration 
associated with the development of healthcare crowdsourcing.     
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Emotional Exhaustion. When asked about the examples of crowd tasks (i.e., 
give me an example of the interesting/easy/difficult/impressive case that you met during 
your online counseling.), many mobile doctors mentioned the bad experiences that they 
encountered with some “low quality patients” (“	”) on the platform, 
which made them feel frustrated. Low quality patients typically referred to two types of 
patients. One was those who had inappropriate attitude and behavior toward doctors. For 
example, they “posted abusive expressions on our [doctors’] websites,” “easily got angry 
at us [doctors],” “passed their negative emotion on to others by giving us impenetrable 
bad rating,” and “didn’t show any appreciation to our help.” The other was those who had 
inappropriate attitude and misunderstanding toward healthcare crowdsourcing. For 
example, they “didn’t have real medical needs. They asked questions out of boredom.” 
“Some patients were funny. You explained the right knowledge to them. But they only 
wanted you to tell them a folk prescription (“”), so that they may get cured of this 
disease [AIDS].” “Many patients thought they could get cured on the internet without 
visiting hospitals. They may say, I come here [the platform] to ask you questions. If you 
ask me to go to the hospital, then why do I bother to ask you? Such thinking is very 
ridiculous, because they didn’t understand the positioning of the online counseling. The 
internet is mainly for chronic diseases, guidance on diagnosis in a hospital, or medical 
suggestions. But to get the diseases cured, patients should go to the hospital.” 
To handle emotional exhaustion caused by these low-quality patients, mobile 
doctors believed that what they could do was limited, because crowdsourcing platforms 
had the design that “patients had initiative and could give doctors bad rating without any 
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reason.” As one physician mentioned,  
You cannot reject [continuing answering this patient’s question]. Otherwise, the 
platform has regulations. In addition, the most horrible part is, he [the patient] 
disguised his medical problem in the very beginning. In the beginning, he asked 
you other [medical] questions. Then suddenly he changed his topic to ask you this 
question17. Then what can you do? You can’t appeal to the platform. You can only 
rewire the conversation and change to another topic, right?... He [the patient] 
said, he couldn’t understand what I was talking about. Then he wrote [on my 
webpage], “this doctor was hard to understand. He was impatient. He had a bad 
attitude toward patients”… Irrational patients. A lot of irrational patients. They 
were looking for psychological comfort. Anyway it’s free for them to ask 
questions. They would think, “doctor, please chat with me, listen to me.” How 
come I have so much time to listen to your bitterness? (Physician #205, Male, 
Attending) 
Some experienced mobile doctors gradually learned that “treating online patients 
was very different from treating offline patients in the hospital.” They tried to learn how 
to select the so called high quality patients and avoid low quality ones. For example, one 
psychologist mentioned,  
 To answer questions online, first you should learn to protect yourself. Don’t pick 
up a question if you feel the patient is very dangerous, like a bomb. He will give 
                                                                            
17 Here the physician was talking about AIDS that was actually in the imagination of 
many patients that he met online.  
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you bad evaluation afterwards. Then it’s unworthy answering the question. You 
waste your time. It feels like being bit by a dog. It’s disgusting, right? So when 
you answer a question, first you should judge if the patient is hard to get along 
with, or if asking questions is merely a cathartic experience for him. This is the 
general rule. (Psychologist #209, Female, Resident) 
A Stigmatized Identity. The second burden associated with working for 
crowdsourcing was the stigmatized identity of being a mobile doctor. Healthcare 
crowdsourcing is a rising industry. Along with its development is the rising of 
controversial topics such as “whether physicians can work online,” whether digital 
careers are “legal,” “whose responsibility it is if medical accidents happen online,” and 
“whether it is illegal for a physician to prescribe medicine online.” According to the 
interviewees, “most people, at least people around me don’t believe it [online healthcare]. 
They all think only going to a big hospital to meet a doctor face-to-face is reliable. It’s 
impossible to get disease cured online. Most people actually don’t accept this format of 
healthcare.” During my field study, some interviewees even immediately rejected my use 
of words “mobile doctor” when I asked them “in general, what do you think of a mobile 
doctor” by saying that “I’m not a mobile doctor.”      
In addition, it was not easy for an outsider (e.g., patients, or ordinary people) to 
tell the differences between different formats of mobile healthcare. Under the same label 
of mobile or internet healthcare, the negative spillover impact of some unethical cases 
from other mobile healthcare existed. An interviewee mentioned Wei Zexi Scandal, one 
unethical medical case which was well reported by the media at the time of data 
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collection. In this scandal, for profits, search engine Baidu posted misleading treatment 
information provided by Putian Medical Group, which led to the death of a 21-year-old 
cancer patient Wei Zexi. Such kind of unethical medical cases caused via internet, along 
with other negative information/news on certain particular healthcare platforms18, 
enhanced the stigmatized identity of a mobile doctor. As one physician explained,  
There is too much fake information. That Putian Medical Group, they posted fake 
advertisement, and they lied…a lot of disqualified doctors answered patients’ 
questions at A [a specific platform which was criticized in the media]. Sometime I 
read these questions. Their answers were not convincing. Apparently they 
deceived patients…Someone invented an internet bot to scramble for questions. In 
order to get more questions, some doctors downloaded that app, so that all 
questions went to them. Then they answered the questions casually and in a rush. 
Later patients stopped asking questions. Because they found that the answers 
were not reliable, they stopped asking questions. They no longer trusted you 
[mobile doctors as a group]. No matter how well other doctors answered, patients 
thought you [mobile doctors as a group] were liars. This is the old saying that 
one rat excrement ruined a whole pot of soup. (Physician #203, Female, 
Attending) 
This claim was also to some extent confirmed during my field study. At the pilot 
study stage of this dissertation, when I was looking for interview participants and 
                                                                            
18 Not the sample platform in Chapter 5. As mentioned in Chapter 5, there had been at 
least 204 mobile healthcare platforms in China till the end of 2016. Some platforms were 
criticized by the media for doctors’ unethical behavior and false medical information.   
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informally talking to many friends, especially those who were medical professionals such 
as physicians and nurses, most of them were surprised and asked me exactly the same 
question, “are you sure they are real doctors? Not liars?” After I explained to them the 
research setting and told them that it was easy to find the webpages of these real mobile 
doctors, to my surprise, all of them made the same comment, “they must be incapable 
doctors who have nothing to do in their hospitals. How come they have so much time to 
do this kind of thing19.” Such perception of a mobile doctor in other medical 
professionals’ eyes was most likely stereotyped and biased given that in the sample 
platform in Chapter 5, all mobile doctors received rigorous medical training in medical 
schools and at least 3.6% doctors (n= 145) were associate chief and above20.            
Technological Frustration. A third common burden mentioned by mobile 
doctors was the frustration caused by the immature technology in healthcare 
crowdsourcing. For example, because of “the lack of expertise,” patients cannot provide 
“accurate description of their symptoms.” They often “used phones to take a picture of 
MRI [Magnetic Resonance Imaging] results,” and the image was “not clear enough.” 
Physical examination, a “very important step” in medical science, cannot be fulfilled by 
online platforms. In some special psychological cases, such as the case about potential 
multiple personality disorder mentioned earlier in Section 4.2.3, the text-based online 
counselling also added difficulties for the psychologists to judge basic information of a 
                                                                            
19 . It contains the meaning of contempt in mandarin in this setting.  
20 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, in order to be promoted from resident, to attending, 
associate chief and chief, medical professionals need to achieve certain criteria set up by 
the government.  
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patient (e.g., biological gender, and whether a patient was serious or just making fun of a 
doctor via internet).    
One physician portrayed the future of healthcare crowdsourcing in his 
imagination.   
If we [physicians] can connect with patients who are thousands of kilometers 
away through, like science fiction movies, through something which can show 
your image in front of me, then I can see, touch, and hear. Like that, I believe at 
that time, mobile healthcare will be really advanced and awesome. Otherwise, for 
the so called clinic, physicians always need to touch patients, physical touch. 
Especially if you can’t see that patient, it’s impossible to give the medical 
diagnosis. The patients can’t replace you to examine themselves. Like 
auscultation, heart auscultation, patients can’t replace you to listen to the sounds 
from their own hearts. Even if they can listen to the sounds, they can’t understand 
the sounds. These are technological issues that mobile healthcare couldn’t solve 
now. (Physician #208, Male, Attending) 
6.2.2 Calling and the Meaning of Helping Patients  
Despite the extra burden of working for crowdsourcing, such as emotional 
exhaustion with low quality online patients, a stigmatized identity of a mobile doctor, and 
technological frustration, when asked about why you participated in online counselling, 
all mobile doctors provided the same major reason – “to help patients.”21  
                                                                            
21 Other additional idiosyncratic reasons include earning extra money, having fun, 
enjoying high technology, learning new things, becoming famous, attracting more online 
patients to visit doctors at the offline hospitals, and testing the effectiveness of medical 
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An occupational calling as a medical professional to help patients enabled mobile 
doctors to assume extra burden of working for crowdsourcing. This claim is consistent 
with the literature on career calling that calling is like a double edge sword which 
increases occupational identification, meaning, and satisfaction, yet at the same time 
increases the burdens of particular work such as personal sacrifice (e.g., Bunderson & 
Thompson, 2009; Dobrow, 2006; Wrzesniewski, McCauley, Rozin, & Schwartz, 1997; 
Hall & Chandler, 2005).  
The definition of calling is vague in literature (Bunderson & Thompson, 2009). 
For example, the classical (e.g., the protestant such as Martin Luther) and neoclassical 
(e.g., Bunderson & Thompson, 2009) definitions of calling focus on destiny that calling 
is the “place in the occupational division of labor in society that one feels destined to fill 
by virtue of particular gifts, talents, and/or idiosyncratic life opportunities.” (Bunderson 
& Thompson, 2009, p. 38). In contrast, the contemporary definition of occupational 
calling focuses more on personal meanings and subjective success that calling is “work 
that a person perceives as his purpose in life.” (Hall & Chandler, 2005, p. 160).    
In this study, interview data showed that, for mobile doctors, especially those with 
rich crowdsourcing experiences, they considered healthcare crowdsourcing as an 
essential format of healthcare, which may be together with or separated from traditional 
healthcare, to serve their occupational calling as a medical professional22. Different from 
                                                                            
diagnosis by asking patients to try certain therapy or receiving information on medical 
results from patients who had already tried different therapies from other doctors.     
22 Most interviewees considered mobile doctor as an extension of the offline doctor. The 
same occupational calling as a medical profession covered both traditional medical work 
and crowdsourcing (for details, see Section 6.2.3). 
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people in the neoclassical view of calling that they answer their calling because of their 
hardwired nature or passion toward either the subject in their occupation or the 
occupation itself (e.g., zookeepers have always loved animals and wanted to work with 
animals, see Bunderson & Thompson, 2009), mobile doctors in my setting seldom 
showed their inherent love and interest in patients or being a medical professional (except 
two pediatrics medical professionals). Instead, most of physicians (not all) commented on 
the occupation of a physician (offline) as “a not good occupation,” because “the workload 
is heavy,” “the salary is too low,” “social status is low,” “there are too many political 
regulations,” and “the job is dangerous. It’s very common to be physically attacked or 
hurt by patients.” Accordingly, some physicians showed seemingly paradoxical attitudes 
that on the one hand they followed the occupational calling as a medical professional, yet 
on the other hand, they mentioned that “I’m so regretted. If I can re-make a career choice, 
definitely I won’t choose to be a physician again.”       
Such paradox to some extent could be understood through the contemporary view 
of occupational calling (Hall & Chandler, 2005) that calling adds meaning to the work as 
a medical professional. With the same declaring of helping patients, mobile doctors had 
various personal meanings of this occupational calling, with some considered being a 
medical professional to help patients as a way to achieve a sense of fulfillment, some to 
carry out a moral duty, and others to follow a life destiny.      
A Sense of Fulfillment. Helping patients (both online and offline) added a sense 
of fulfillment to the work as a medical professional, “no matter the patent said thank you 
or not.” It was one of the most common meanings of helping patients mentioned by many 
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mobile doctors. The sense of fulfillment could come from serving others, such as 
“healing a patient,” “helping others,” and “serving the community.” It could also come 
from serving oneself, such as “solving a medical problem [through helping patients],” 
and pursing inherent “interests and hobbies.” This deep sense of fulfillment was reflected 
frequently in mobile doctors’ narratives. For example,   
You helped others. You helped your friends, your relatives, strangers, and 
patients. It gives you a very strong sense of fulfillment. I think most physicians 
would agree with me, though everyone complained about the life status, extremely 
busy. The pressure of being a physician in China is huge. The conflict between 
patients and doctors is very different from that in foreign countries. But in 
general, I believe most of the physicians, especially physicians at my level 
[associate chief], have this kind of sense [a sense of fulfillment]. (Physician #206, 
Male, Associate chief) 
The greatest fulfillment came from that you solved the [medical] problem. You 
improved your efficiency. Your surgeries became more and more beautiful 
[meaning successful]. (Physician #204, Male, Associate chief) 
I like the detective type of complicated diseases…When the patents came to you, 
they were seriously ill. But after your treatments, they could stand up, laugh and 
talk to you. You would feel very proud of being a physician…you want to figure 
out what is the disease. In our neurology department, we have a lot of 
complicated medical cases. No other departments are as complicated as ours. 
Neuro system is the most complicated thing in human body. You must figure out 
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what is the disease. If the disease is proved to be what you predict, you would be 
very happy. I like watching detective movies, detective novels, such as Sherlock 
Holmes. I like watching these things, so I think this part [complicated diseases] is 
very interesting. (Physician #203, Female, Attending) 
A Moral Duty. As a medical professional, many mobile doctors felt obligated to 
help patients (no matter how harshly some of them criticized about patients and 
healthcare, or felt frustrated or disappointed at the occupation). Such moral obligation 
was shaped by cultural institutions, such as the ritual of the Hippocratic Oath and/or 
Chinese ideological beliefs, or by the nature of medical care, the purpose of which was 
“to save life.” For example, as some interviewees mentioned, 
There’s an old Chinese saying, if you can’t be a good prime minister, then you 
should be a good doctor. It means that an ambitious person should either heal a 
country or heal a human being23. (Physician #208, Male, Attending doctor) 
Chinese culture promotes helping others. Like Confucianism, the main theme is to 
help each other and have compassion for others. It’s like Christianity in United 
States: to have compassion for others. We help patients on [crowdsourcing] 
platforms. Definitely it [the reason] is related to occupational ethics…Let me give 
you an example. If a young man fells down on the street in China, whatever kind 
of person, or a child fells down, most likely many people would help. But if an old 
                                                                            
23 This Chinese saying is originally from Confucianism. Every human being should have 
the mission to save the world and serve the human beings. The best way is to be a 
political leader, such as a prime minister. If it’s impossible, then the second-best option is 
to be a doctor.  
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lady fells down, many people would not help, because they are afraid that this old 
lady would sue them and falsely accuse them that it is them who push over her or 
hurt her, in order to extort money24. In many places in China, like train stations, 
or some airports, there is no medical emergency/first aid system. What would a 
person do if he passes out? Many people may stand there and watch. Just watch. 
No one dares to do anything. They don’t have medical knowledge. But if there is a 
doctor there. Every doctor takes the oath before becoming a doctor. What kind of 
doctor he wants to be. How to help others. He must have a kind heart. He must 
have noble virtues and ethics. All these things are included in the oath. When he 
sees a person passes out, he would help that person immediately. In China, only 
doctors have the medical knowledge and first aid knowledge. They get trained in 
the medical system. They must have this kind of attitude…Internet is similar too. 
[It requires] this kind of attitude. Internet provides a platform for doctors to help 
more people. (Physician #202, Male, Attending)        
A Life Destiny. Calling also contains the meaning of destiny which is beyond the 
control of an individual (e.g., a divine being like God, the inevitable events, or fate) 
(Bunderson & Thompson, 2009). Among mobile doctors, none of them mentioned a 
divine being. But many of them mentioned how they became a physician without 
knowing what a physician did through inevitable events or opportunities in their lives, 
such as the Chinese education system, the historical events in life (e.g., cultural 
                                                                            
24 This interviewee was talking about real stories/news which were popular in the media 
at the time of data collection.  
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revolution), or others’ decision for them (e.g., family members). Later partly because this 
career as a medical professional strictly followed a traditional path and had little chance 
to exit (for details, see Section 2.3), they accepted the reality that they were a physician. 
For example,  
Because of an accidental opportunity. When I was in high school, I never thought 
of being a doctor. I wanted to be a teacher, an English teacher. I was born in a 
village. We had the quota to enter the college [quota for education and medicine 
majors]. I thought because of the quota, I would have a larger chance to be 
accepted by a college. But my grade was not high enough. My classmate was 
accepted [into the education major]. I was forced to take the medicine major. 
(Psychologist #211, Male, Attending) 
I had no idea what physicians did when I chose my major. But my family helped 
me make the decision. They thought physician was a stable job. No matter your 
luck was good or bad, it would be always the same to diagnose a disease. In 
China, we enter medical school right after high school. It’s different from United 
States where students go to regular college before making the decision to go to 
medical school. For them, they would think carefully, including their own feelings 
about being a physician, and their life experiences. It’s much better than our 
situation. For me, I just went to medical school in a very confused state. Then I 
became a physician. (Physician #204, Male, Associate chief) 
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6.2.3 Answering Unfulfilled Calling in Traditional Work  
Though mobile doctors all shared the same reason that the calling as a medical 
professional to help patients motivated them to participate in healthcare crowdsourcing in 
general, different from those who worked for crowdsourcing out of workplace, those who 
utilized their scheduled work hours for crowdsourcing did so because of the pursue of 
unfulfilled calling in traditional work. Specifically, interview data revealed three major 
reasons that led to their different levels of time theft in workplace. One was the lack of 
patient-centered care in traditional hospitals which failed to fulfill some mobile doctors’ 
calling to help patients in their desired way. One was the lack of workplace equity which 
limited some mobile doctors’ chance to help patients in a rewarding way. The other was 
the lack of patients’ trust which motivated some mobile doctors to use crowdsourcing as 
a safer way to communicate with patients.        
The lack of patient-centered care. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4, hospitals, especially higher-level hospitals in China (e.g., tertiary hospitals, 
and secondary hospitals), had a large number of daily patient visits. Medical 
professionals’ time was usually full of heavy workload. The typical scene during site 
visits was that doctors on average spent less than 5 minutes on each patient because of the 
large amount of appointments. Accordingly, in the traditional work context, it was not 
easy for a medical professional to pay enough attention to a single patient, even if he/she 
wanted to do so. As one physician illustrated, 
I prefer to recommend the platform to my patients. They would be happy. Because 
in Chinese healthcare industry, the communication between patients and doctors 
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during outpatient or inpatient processes is very limited. I’m not saying that the 
frequency of communication is low. I’m saying that the time spent on 
communication is too short. Because there are extremely too many patients. 
Doctors’ job is extremely busy. So the communication time is very short. 
Sometimes in the outpatient department, a patient spent a lot time on waiting in 
the line. Finally when it was his turn, it had already took him half a day. Then the 
doctor talked to him. Maybe the doctor solved his problem in only 2 mins. So the 
communication was far less than enough. The patient actually had a lot of 
questions. He needed to further ask the doctor. But he couldn’t. That’s the 
problem. (Physician #202, Male, Attending)  
Under such reality, some mobile doctors questioned whether it was the right thing 
to “continue working in the hospital and treating patients like that.” Different from rigid 
traditional work, healthcare crowdsourcing provided a way for doctors to help patients in 
their desired way. For example, an interviewee who was a midwife in a secondary public 
hospital was thinking about quitting her job and operating an account on Wechat to 
educate new parents and answer their questions for free. She had been doing it for a while 
but was thinking about fully devoting to this mission of medical knowledge 
dissemination. She said, 
I want to do what I want to do. The things in hospital [hospital work] are too 
limited…What I want is not to go to work in hospital every day and do some 
meaningless work. Maybe not meaningless. I just feel those things are not perfect. 
There is something missing. I want to do some more meaningful things…I like 
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babies. I always thought I would enter an industry related to babies. The most 
attractive thing about being a midwife is the pleasure and surprise to welcome a 
new born life. Babies are so cute…though I can’t see babies through online 
counselling, I think I can help them. Babies can’t say much things. You need to 
observe them. But many new parents don’t know about it. Like a spokesperson for 
babies, I hope I can help babies, and let parents know them better, in a more 
meaningful way. Because my current job in the hospital is just to deliver the 
babies, then provide them some basic things. A lot of details and follow-up cares 
are missing. It’s absolutely impossible to give babies much help, or new parents 
much help. I think this is what I want to do. This description might be unpleasant, 
but what a hospital can provide for a baby is just “no pain, no illness, and no 
death from hunger.” That’s all. (Midwife #225, Female, Attending)               
Therefore, when the traditional work can’t fulfill mobile doctors’ calling to help 
patients in their desired way, they preferred to either use office hours to “do more 
meaningful work,” or quit the traditional work if possible. Based on these findings, I 
captured the relationship with a proposition. 
Proposition 1. Mobile doctors who feel their occupational callings are not fulfilled in 
traditional work because of the perceived lack of patient-centered care are more likely 
to utilize time theft for crowdsourcing.     
The lack of workplace equity. A second reason that led to mobile doctors’ 
feeling of unfulfilled calling in traditional work was the lack of workplace equity. Many 
mobile doctors described the hierarchy and structural differences among Chinese 
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physicians that “the social status of experts and professors in big hospitals is extremely 
high. It’s even much higher than doctors in the United States. It’s higher than what you 
can imagine. It’s unfair to consider Chinese doctors as one group. For example, for chief 
doctors, or some special positions, or special hospitals, doctors’ income is higher than 
their counterparts’ in the United States. I mean gray income. But for most of the doctors, 
it’s far far far less than that.” Because of the hierarchy in traditional work context, low 
status mobile doctors in general had more positive attitude toward healthcare 
crowdsourcing. They considered healthcare crowdsourcing as a way that they could 
“achieve a sense of fulfillment,” through “hard working” and “caring for patients,” 
because there was no so-called hierarchy on internet. For example, as some doctors 
illustrated, 
For example, in the hospital, you are lower than your chief doctor. But on 
internet, maybe your chief didn’t receive much red packets [a virtual gift from 
patients] in a day. I am a small resident doctor. But I can answer the questions 
better than my chief. For example, if I received a lot of red packets today, then I 
would feel, wow, I’m better than my chief. This kind of feeling can’t be found in 
the hospital. In the hospital, he is the expert, and I’m a very ordinary small 
doctor. But on internet, it’s hard to tell the differences between me and him. 
(Psychologist #209, Female, Resident)         
For me, why do I join internet? The most important reason is that I want to 
escape from this hell-like healthcare environment. This is the most important 
reason. Secondly, I want to fulfill the value of my life. Thirdly, I want to be 
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internet celebrity (). I want to be a successful urological physician. Because 
in reality, it’s very hard to be a successful urological physician. Because 
urological diseases like catching a cold. It’s impossible to be healed permanently. 
After a while, the disease will come back. Fourthly, I want to be a real doctor. A 
doctor who can selflessly devote to patients. Like doctors in western countries, I 
want to serve patients with all my heart. I only give you [patients] suggestions. I 
completely don’t have interest conflict with you. I can tell you the truth about 
your disease. (Physician #210, Male, Attending)     
Based on these findings, I propose that, 
Proposition 2. Mobile doctors who feel their occupational callings are not fulfilled in 
traditional work because of the perceived lack of workplace equity are more likely to 
utilize time theft for crowdsourcing.     
The lack of patients’ trust. Many mobile doctors reported that the lack of 
patients’ trust was a common issue in the healthcare industry in China. It was caused by 
different reasons. One was the patients’ perceived moral hazard of doctors (may be 
biased, according to some doctors’ claims). Specifically, patients believed that doctors 
would “over-utilize drugs” or “prescribe the more expensive drug between similar types 
of drugs” for “extra kickbacks.” In additional, because of the information asymmetry 
between doctors and patients, “even when it was a patient’s own problem that his disease 
became worse, he would blame us doctors for not doing a good job.” This situation was 
mentioned by many mobile doctors,  
 
 
 
151 
Patients don’t trust you. Or if the state of illness changed, they would think 
because you prescribed the wrong medicine. Then they would try to find fault in 
you, or ask for compensation, or when they were in a bad mood, they would piss 
off at you. Sometimes we met rogue, or drunkard. It was hard to talk to the 
drunkard. Yesterday I met a family member of a patient. He was drunk. He said 
the patient didn’t feel well. So I went to see the patient and figured out that the 
patient had a heart problem. So I prescribed some medicine. He said I carelessly 
prescribed the medicine. Isn’t it normal that doctors prescribe medicine for 
patients who don’t feel well? OK, you can refuse to take the medicine if you think 
I prescribed it carelessly. But if you didn’t take the medicine, what would you do 
to your family member who didn’t feel well? He was unreasonable. Like this kind 
of things. I think the most difficult part is to communicate with patients and their 
family. (Physician #203, Female, Attending) 
It is very common to be attached by patients. I was attached by patients before. A 
patient wrote some insulting words on the wall of my hospital. I called the police, 
watched the video from the monitor, and found out that it was that patient who did 
it. I couldn’t argue with him. He was a patient. There was nothing I could do. 
(Phycologist #201, Male, Attending) 
Under this situation, healthcare crowdsourcing served as a “safer” way for doctors 
to do medical work and help patients, because “in the real world, patients know who you 
are, which department you are working at, and your face. There are many doctors 
followed by patients.” while on platforms, patients were “remoted” and “almost 
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impossible to visit you in your local hospital.”   
Another situation of the lack of patients’ trust in traditional work was caused by 
certain types of illness that patients were hesitated to go to the hospital, in the afraid of 
illness being exposed. A typical example mentioned by interviewees was psychological 
illness. All the psychologists in my sample embraced healthcare crowdsourcing because 
of the privacy that platforms set up for the patients. It provided a “safer” way for patients 
to ask for doctors’ help. As some psychologists commented,  
The advantage of internet is that people don’t know each other. They don’t have 
too many concerns…for example, depression. It needs a huge courage for a 
patient to come out of his home and go to the hospital. But internet makes things 
different. (Psychologist #211, Male, Attending) 
Online counseling makes patients more open. When they were talking about some 
private things, like some psychological disorder, it was hard for them to speak it 
out face to face. Or it was hard for them to build the initial trust with the doctor, 
so they even didn’t want to enter the hospital in the very beginning. But this 
problem can be easily resolved on internet. Because they don’t need to fill any 
document. They don’t need to reveal their real name and contact information. 
They know me, but I don’t know who they are, or I can only see the words that 
they type. I even couldn’t hear their voice. In other words, they can only use 
words to express their feelings. For them, it [online counseling] is better than the 
real world. (Psychologist #209, Female, Resident) 
Therefore, I propose that,  
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Proposition 3. Mobile doctors who feel their occupational callings are not fulfilled in 
traditional work because of the perceived lack of patients’ trust are more likely to 
utilize time theft for crowdsourcing.     
6.3 Summary 
Following the findings in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter further explored why 
some mobile doctors chose to use office hours to work for crowdsourcing. The inductive 
analysis provided some preliminary findings, which await future empirical tests.  
Firstly, though healthcare crowdsourcing was promoted by many scholars and 
start-up company founders, and embraced by many mobile doctors who had rich 
experiences in crowdsourcing, it also brought extra burden and potentially had negative 
impacts on mobile doctors, which was not well-captured in crowdsourcing literature. 
Specifically, not every online patient had the right understanding of healthcare 
crowdsourcing and the appropriate behavior toward mobile doctors. The so called low 
quality online patient made mobile doctors feel emotional exhaustion and frustrated. 
Moreover, the misunderstanding from peer doctors and ordinary people through negative 
news about mobile healthcare also created a stigmatized identity of a mobile doctor, 
which added burden for mobile doctors to work for crowdsourcing. Furthermore, because 
of the technological limitations about healthcare crowdsourcing, such as the lack of 
means to provide accurate medical information through physical examination, and the 
limitations of text-based communication in medical diagnosis, mobile doctors also 
endured the technological frustration when doing crowdsourcing.        
Secondly, I examined why doctors worked for crowdsourcing and identified the 
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occupational calling as the major reason. Mobile doctors followed the calling as a 
medical professional to help patients. Such a calling added meanings to their work as a 
medical professional. It provided doctors a way to achieve a sense of fulfillment, carry 
out a moral duty, and/or follow a life destiny.  
Thirdly, I further examined why doctors used office hours to work for 
crowdsourcing. The findings revealed three potential reasons in traditional work. 
Specifically, mobile doctors who felt their occupational callings were not fulfilled in the 
traditional work because of (1) the perceived lack of patient-centered care, (2) the 
perceived lack of workplace equity, and (3) the perceived lack of patients’ trust were 
more likely to utilize time theft for crowdsourcing.    
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CHAPTER 7: OVERALL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Summary of the Dissertation  
Drawing on observations, interviews and longitudinal archival data, this 
dissertation uses three steps with a full-cycle research design to explore crowd workers’ 
use of time for crowdsourcing in traditional organizations. It provides a more complete 
understanding of how crowd workers who hold dual jobs in the same time frame (e.g., a 
full-time medical professional in an offline hospital and a part-time crowdsourcing 
contributor in a third-party platform, or bounded digital careers) respond to time conflict 
between crowdsourcing and traditional work, what factors in traditional work context are 
related to their different responses, and why they respond in a seemingly costly and 
deviant way of time theft. The findings reveal a critical time use strategy called time theft 
that mobile doctors proactively use office hours to do crowd tasks in the offline 
workplace. Such time theft behavior reflects the tensions between traditional work and 
crowdsourcing. It is related to offline job, organizational, and relational factors that 
mobile doctors face in the traditional work context, and can be explained by mobile 
doctors’ occupational calling as a medical professional to help patients.   
Specifically, in the first phase of this dissertation with the observation and 
interview data, the findings showed that Chinese physicians reported that time conflict 
between traditional work and crowdsourcing was the major challenge that they faced 
when they were doing crowd tasks. They used three different strategies to deal with such 
time conflict, with some avoiding doing crowdsourcing during office hours, some 
juggling crowdsourcing and traditional work by actively managing their fragmented time 
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such as lunch time and resting time, while others using their office hours to work for 
crowdsourcing (or stealing), which they called as “like being a thief.” (“”)  
Because time theft reflects the tension between crowdsourcing and traditional 
work, which is under-researched in the crowdsourcing literature, I further focused on this 
group of time thieves to explore how the traditional work context impacted 
crowdsourcing. Findings showed that mobile doctors who used office hours for 
crowdsourcing believed that crowdsourcing presented a brand-new type of healthcare 
work which had a bright future yet was inaccurately positioned by platforms which only 
recruited full-time medical professionals in traditional hospitals. Such positioning created 
a bounded digital career that mobile doctors were bounded by traditional work in time 
and space. One influence was hospitals’ boundary control. For example, hospitals 
regulated doctors’ use of time in traditional work by assigning them heavy workload, 
which prevented them from doing any other things in the hospitals, such as 
crowdsourcing. Hospitals monitored doctors’ use of time by using high technology to 
capture their workplace behavior or providing voice channels for patients or colleagues to 
report on doctors’ workplace deviance. Hospitals also punished doctors’ time theft 
behavior by imposing financial, social or career penalties. The other influence was 
mobile doctor social groups in local hospitals. Though mobile doctors formed different 
online and offline social groups when they participated in crowdsourcing, the one that 
potentially led them to go through the socialization process as a mobile doctor was the 
offline social group in their own hospitals. Mobile doctors’ level of devotion to 
crowdsourcing depended on how deeply they involved in the socialization process of this 
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group. Some groups went through the onboarding stage where a highly selective group 
was voluntarily formed by mobile doctors with similar values, backgrounds and interests, 
and socialized by offline interactions in the workplace. A few groups moved forward to 
the metamorphosis stage where the hospital leaders stepped in and integrated this 
informal social group into the hospital’s bureaucratic system. Other groups experienced 
the dissolution stage where groups were dissolved either by idiosyncratic reasons, or by 
the strict boundary control from the hospitals.                 
Moreover, in the second phase of this dissertation, I found quantitative empirical 
support for the qualitative reports from half-a-year daily crowdsourcing behavior in an 
independent sample of mobile doctors in a healthcare crowdsourcing platform, and 
further found different factors in a traditional work context which were related to the time 
use behavior of those who used work hours for crowdsourcing and who worked for 
crowdsourcing at any available time. Specifically, for mobile doctors who worked for 
crowdsourcing at any available time, the time they spent on crowdsourcing was mainly 
related to the size and stability of their mobile doctor social group. When the size of the 
group was relatively big and the group was relatively stable, doctors were more likely to 
spend more time on crowdsourcing. In contract, for those who used office hours for 
crowdsourcing, the odds of time theft was related to individual power to violate time 
norms, organizations’ boundary control, and the stability of a social group. Time theft 
behavior was most likely to be found in a traditional work context where the doctors had 
the highest individual power to violate time norms (chief), or a stable mobile doctor 
group (low churn). The impact of social group size on the odds of time theft was 
 
 
 
158 
strongest in private hospitals, compared to other lower level hospitals.    
Furthermore, in the third phase of this dissertation, by further analyzing interview 
data used in Study 1, I found that healthcare crowdsourcing added not only objective cost 
brought by the traditional work as reported in Study 1 (e.g., hospitals’ boundary control), 
but also subjective stress with crowd task itself, such as emotional exhaustion with the so 
called low quality online patients, a stigmatized identity of being a mobile doctor, and the 
technological frustration associated with crowdsourcing. Given the statements in Study 1 
that the financial benefits brought by healthcare crowdsourcing was limited (if not for 
free), in addition, I examined why many full-time doctors chose to work for such 
seemingly costly crowdsourcing. The findings showed that mobile doctors worked for 
crowdsourcing with the hope of answering occupational calling as a medical professional 
to help patients, through which they can add meanings to their current medical work, 
such as achieving a sense of fulfillment, carrying out a moral duty, and following a life 
destiny. Moreover, for those mobile doctors who used office hours for crowdsourcing, 
additional analysis showed that different from other types of mobile doctors, they were 
willing to take the burden and risk to work for crowdsourcing during the office hours in 
workplace because they perceived that their hospitals cannot fulfill their calling as a 
medical professional to help patients. Specifically, the perceived lack of patient-centered 
care in some hospitals prevented them from pursuing the occupational calling to provide 
meaningful and useful help for patients. Thus many of them turned to healthcare 
crowdsourcing, which provided them a more flexible way to pursue the calling according 
to their own desired way. Moreover, the perceived lack of workplace equity in some 
 
 
 
159 
hospitals prevented them from achieving a sense of fulfillment, especially when some of 
them believed that they either did their job as well as people with higher hierarchical 
position in their hospital (e.g., chief), or did better than them. Healthcare crowdsourcing, 
which was designed as a patient-centered system without hierarchy among doctors, 
motivated low status doctors to pursue the occupational calling in a rewarding way. 
Finally, the perceived lack of patients’ trust potentially created an unsafe situation for 
either doctors or some patients in certain hospitals. Healthcare crowdsourcing, which 
physically separated doctors from patients, provided a safer way for both patients and 
doctors to communicate with each other.   
Overall, these findings contribute to a better understanding of the shifting nature 
of work and careers in the digital economy by documenting and explaining mobile 
doctors’ participation in this new world of work. They contribute to two literatures: 
crowdsourcing and career management.   
7.2 Theoretical Contributions and Future Directions 
7.2.1 Understanding Crowdsourcing in Traditional Organizations 
My findings suggest that a systematic approach which includes both online 
crowdsourcing and offline contexts, such as job, organizational and relational contextual 
factors, is needed to understand participants’ behavior in crowdsourcing.  
First, characteristics of the offline job matter for crowdsourcing. When full-time 
employees in traditional organizations seek to work for crowdsourcing through third-
party platforms, they perform their crowd work and allocate their time differently than 
those who are either freelancers or part-time workers in paid crowdsourcing markets, 
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such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Prior research in the motivations of the latter group of 
crowd workers has described how they might be driven by either extrinsic motivations 
like financial incentives or intrinsic motivations such as task autonomy and skill variety 
(e.g., Kaufmann, et al., 2011; Rogstadius et al., 2011). I found that some of these 
common incentives (e.g., financial incentives) were largely missing in the healthcare 
crowdsourcing market. Many medical professionals (not all of them), who could only 
earn little money from crowdsourcing yet in the cost of violating time norms in hospitals 
and facing obstacles and burdens imposed by the primitive nature of the crowdsourcing 
system (e.g., emotional exhaustion with low quality online patients, a stigmatized identity 
of being a mobile doctor, and frustration with the premature technology), worked for 
crowdsourcing because they believed that such a new way of healthcare could create a 
new type of work, which was worth of their investment in time, and could potentially 
fulfill their unanswered occupational calling as a medical professional to help patients in 
a more flexible, rewarding and safer way than traditional work. Therefore, the 
motivations, attitudes and accordingly behavior of working for crowdsourcing by full-
time employees with traditional work may be more complicated than that for freelancers 
or part-time workers. Given the fact that more and more full-time professionals start to 
participate in various crowdsourcing platforms, such as social media marketing, academic 
writing, design, data analysis and IT, more studies on the interplay between online and 
offline work are needed.  
Moreover, crowd workers are described by the media as “workers on tap” (The 
Economist, 2015) because crowdsourcing is the on-demand economy that allocates any 
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available human power from the crowd to solve certain problems. This well-accepted 
notion typically treats the crowd as a homogeneous group because it is reasonable that if 
people are not available (e.g., lack of time, energy or competency), they would not 
voluntarily answer the open call of a crowd task. Following this assumption, current 
research mainly focuses on differentiating online job contexts rather than offline ones. 
For example, studies have demonstrated distinct motivations behind three major formats 
of crowd tasks - the citizen science type like Galaxy Zoo and OpenStreetMap 
(Budhathoki & Haythornthwaite, 2013; Raddick et al., 2013), the idea creation type such 
as Threadless.com (Boons, et al., 2015; Franke et al., 2013; Shao et al., 2012), and the 
Human Intelligence Tasks type like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and Taskcn.com (e.g., 
Kaufmann, et al., 2011; Chandler & Kapelner, 2013). Different from these studies, my 
findings revealed that after controlling for the online work (i.e., Q&A tasks on a 
healthcare crowdsourcing platform), medical professionals’ heterogeneous time use 
behavior was significantly impacted by their offline job characteristics like hierarchical 
levels, professions and specialties. Thus, future research on crowdsourcing should 
incorporate not only online job characteristics, but also offline ones, especially for those 
crowd workers who are part-time contributors. 
Second, the offline organizational context matters for crowdsourcing behavior. 
During their work for both crowdsourcing and traditional work, medical professionals 
constantly faced time conflict between these two, which was under researched by current 
crowdsourcing literature whose focus is on the online side (for a review, see Pedersen et 
al., 2013; Zhao & Zhu, 2014). I have aimed to enrich the crowdsourcing literature by 
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exploring the missing offline side of crowdsourcing through answering questions of what 
the conflict between the two types of work looks like, as well as how and why 
participants respond to such conflict. I found that traditional organizations imposed time 
boundary control on their employees, which constrained employees’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. Though organizations’ boundary control may be associated with doctors’ 
passive reactions of either avoiding doing crowdsourcing in the workplace or juggling 
crowdsourcing and traditional work by managing fragmented time, still many mobile 
doctors proactively used their work hours in workplace to work for crowdsourcing and 
creatively escaped from being caught or punished by traditional organizations. This time 
theft in the digital era as akin to time theft in factories (e.g., banana time) (Anteby, 2008), 
but much less easy to identify.  
Third, the offline relational context matters for crowdsourcing. The combination 
of voluntary crowdsourcing and rigid traditional work causes the formation of an offline 
mobile doctor social group, which is beyond online communities which are commonly 
documented in crowdsourcing literature (e.g., Preece, Nonnecke, & Andrews, 2004; 
Bayus, 2013; Yin, Gray, Suri & Vaughan, 2016; Gray, Suri, Ali & Kulkarni, 2016). My 
findings showed that though among mobile doctors, both online communities and offline 
communities existed, the group that potentially impacted mobile doctors’ participation in 
crowdsourcing most was the offline social group within the same hospital. How this 
social group was formed, interacted, maintained and dissolved mattered for group 
members’ behavior. Such dynamics of the social group was also impacted by hospitals’ 
boundary control. Specifically, in a relatively stable social group, doctors were more 
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likely to spend more time on crowdsourcing and use office hours for it. The interview 
data revealed that when hospitals’ boundary control was high, people may be more likely 
to stop working for crowdsourcing and exit the social group, which in turn reinforced 
other group members’ exiting behavior. Future research might consider a crowd worker 
social group and its interaction with the organizations’ boundary control as a function of 
crowd workers’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
7.2.2 Digital Careers, Boundary Management and Use of Time in Different Domains 
This research also reveals a few gaps in existing careers management literature. 
First, the impact of the digital revolution in the gig economy on individuals’ careers has 
drawn much attention in the changing nature of work, workplace and careers. However, 
little empirical research has explored how and why individuals behave under the interplay 
between online platforms and traditional organizations. In my dissertation, I explore these 
questions by studying medical professionals’ bounded digital careers in the Chinese 
healthcare crowdsourcing industry, also known as “mobile doctors.” My findings 
contribute to a better understanding of the shifting nature of work and careers in the 
digital economy by documenting and explaining mobile doctors’ participation in this new 
world of work. Specifically, I showcase a special type of digital careers called “bounded 
digital career”, which is defined as a digital career in which an individual is bounded 
spatially and temporally by an offline job. Bounded digital careers can be considered as a 
new form of contemporary careers in which careers unfold in both online and offline 
work settings and across physical and virtual interfaces. It is a combination of two 
extreme career configurations: a traditional career which is driven by an organization’s 
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bureaucratic system (Super, 1957) and a contemporary career which is driven by an 
individual’s values and interests (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Hall, 2004). Compared to a 
contemporary career such as boundaryless careers (Arthur, 1994), the bounded digital 
career requires mobile doctors in hospitals to follow the hospitals’ promotion ladder, 
conform to organizational norms, have or are required to have a high level of work and 
organizational commitment, and maintain a relatively stable job with predictable salary. 
However, compared to a traditional career (Super, 1957), the bounded digital career 
allows mobile doctors to have a secondary online career path beyond hospitals, taking 
responsibilities in deciding what to do and how to do their work. Such a tension between 
two seemly irreconcilable aspects of a single career makes bounded digital careers an 
especially interesting phenomenon to look at, which is fundamentally different from other 
contemporary careers in literature and wait for future exploration.  
  Second, the findings revealed a critical type of time use behavior which has not 
been well captured in the context of digital careers – time theft. It was caused by the rise 
of digital revolution which blurred work time and space, and many doctors in this study 
held the vision of time theft as working for “the future of work.” It was impacted by a 
combination of offline job characteristics, organizations’ boundary control and 
characteristics of an offline crowd worker group. Different from traditional cyberloafing 
that employees use internet to do personal stuffs or idle during work time (e.g., Lim, 
2002; Liberman et al., 2011) and such cyberloafing behavior is related by boredom, big 
five personality and self-control, rather than employment variables (e.g., tenure, 
organization level, and income) and demographic variables (For a meta-analysis, see 
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Mercado, Giordano, & Dilchert, 2017), the motivations and antecedents of time theft in 
crowdsourcing show more complexity. 
My findings supported and expanded both the utilitarian approach and social 
identity approach in career boundary management literature. When time conflict 
appeared and individuals faced the situation of allocating time in one domain in the cost 
of violating time norms in the other, they actively evaluated the costs and benefits that 
they might get from time violation behavior (e.g., Homans, 1976; Hechter, 1987; 
Yamagishi & Cook, 1993; Bendor & Swistak 2001; Piskorski & Gorbatai, 2017). At the 
same time, their time violation behavior was also impacted by the in-group that they 
identified with (e.g., Lobel, 1991; Ashforth, et al., 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1985). 
However, the findings also added complexity to these two approaches by detailing how 
these two mechanisms worked in different offline organizations and how they showed 
variations among different hierarchical levels of crowd workers. For example, it extended 
a social identity approach by suggesting that a mobile doctor social group was more 
likely to influence doctors in a passive way such that doctors tried to avoid potential 
penalties from offline organizations, rather than actively fight against outside threats 
which were usually described in social identity theory (e.g., Turner, 1987; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1985).  
However, these interpretations were based on anecdotal reports from mobile 
doctors in Study 1. The quantitative tests in Study 2 did not allow for investigation of the 
deep motivations behind mobile doctors’ daily behavior or the dynamic interactions 
within a social group. For example, it is possible that the interaction between hospitals’ 
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boundary control and a mobile doctor social group is iterative. Boundary control 
enhances the cohesiveness of a social group when group members face the shared threat, 
while the increased cohesiveness of a social group increases the possibility of exposure 
that hospitals may enhance boundary control. Therefore, future studies can continue to 
work on this line of inquiry to add more evidence on the application and development of 
current theories on career boundary management in the new setting of crowdsourcing. 
Some interesting directions could be how utilitarian functions look like for different 
crowd workers (e.g., different demographic backgrounds, different attitudes toward 
crowdsourcing), how social identity of a crowd worker is developed and evolves during 
the conflict between traditional work and crowdsourcing, how the social interaction 
between group members, or in-group and out-group members looks like in a crowd 
worker social group, and how such social interactions influence nascent crowd worker 
occupational identity.      
Third, the additional analysis on the interview data revealed some reasons behind 
mobile doctors’ seemingly irrational behavior of using office hours for crowdsourcing. 
The findings show that medical professionals assume the extra burden of working for 
crowdsourcing with the hope of answering unfulfilled occupational callings in traditional 
work and adding the meaning to their work. Such finding is consistent with what the 
literature on unanswered occupational callings indicated that people may apply job 
crafting techniques to answer the unanswered callings and increase the likelihood of 
experiencing enjoyment and meaning at work (Berg, Grant, & Johnson, 2010). Therefore, 
crowdsourcing to some extent could be considered as a job crafting technique in the gig 
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economy for crowd workers who are bounded in traditional work to pursue meanings in 
their careers.  
7.3 Practical Implications  
These findings have important implications for managing crowdsourcing in 
traditional organizations. 
(1) Identifying the down side of crowdsourcing and human resource management 
challenges associated with the changing flexible work environment. 
Though the down side of crowdsourcing started to be recognized in literature 
(e.g., Nagle, 2015), crowdsourcing in general is said to be advantageous because it can 
improve human capital efficiency by bringing in mass intelligence to solve all kinds of 
problems with affordable price, and transforming people with sufficient time into 
available manpower (e.g., Levine & Prietula, 2013; Huang, vir Singh, & Srinivasan, 
2014; Chua, Roth, & Lemoine, 2015; Khedhaouria & Jamal, 2015; Xu, Ribeiro-Soriano, 
& Gonzalez-Garcia, 2015; Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015). By identifying time theft, my 
study shows the flip side of crowdsourcing that it may steal time and human capital from 
traditional offline organizations, which presents human resource management challenges 
in the new digital era.  
However, given the close relationship between crowdsourcing and traditional 
work, such a flip side may go beyond workplace deviance documented in literature (e.g., 
Lim, 2002; Liberman et al., 2011), and point to a potential digital revolution for 
traditional work itself in future. For example, my findings showed that some doctors used 
office hours for crowdsourcing not for personal interests like financial gain, but because 
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compared to traditional medical work which was constrained by the location and 
schedule of a hospital, this new type of work provided a more convenient way to connect 
patients (especial those in long distance) and doctors, and better utilized doctors’ 
available time to serve more patients. Moreover, when the traditional work cannot fulfil 
doctors’ occupational calling as a medical professional to help patients, such as the lack 
of patient-centered care, workplace equity and patients’ trust, healthcare crowdsourcing 
served as an alternative way for doctors to answer unfulfilled calling in traditional work 
and add meanings to their work. Thus, traditional organizations can also leverage the 
advantages of crowdsourcing, adopt it as a complement of traditional work and might 
turn it for their good.  
(2) Managing crowdsourcing not just by outsourcing tasks to the crowd but potentially 
harnessing the power of the gig economy and allowing employees to partake, especially 
those with available time and energy.  
The impact of traditional organizations on crowdsourcing still lacks enough 
attention from both scholars and managers. My study shows that most managers in 
traditional hospitals haven’t fully recognized the existence of this relatively new 
individual business model, and the management is still relatively passive and reactive 
(e.g., preventing doctors from using phones in the workplace, or forbidding them doing 
so to avoid potential online medical accidents). Though lots of offline companies have 
already utilized the crowdsourcing model to gain competitive advantages from the crowd 
through distant search (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015), firms 
should also explore how offline organizations impact their own employees’ participation 
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in crowdsourcing. This study starts to indicate practical implications on redesigning time 
norms through crowdsourcing in firms to allow work to be more flexible, effective, and 
enjoyable.   
(3) Finding creative solutions to manage professionals’ new careers in the digital era.  
Mobile doctors represent professionals whose work and life are impacted by 
digital technology. Given the fact that more and more full-time professionals start to 
participate in various crowdsourcing platforms, such as social media marketing, academic 
writing, design, data analysis and IT, such new careers in the digital era require career 
management that is different from the traditional approach. My results reveal that the 
motivation behind doctors’ engagement in crowdsourcing went beyond traditional 
incentives provided by companies (e.g., money, promotion). They considered healthcare 
crowdsourcing as a better way to provide patients with accessible and affordable medical 
services and a more flexible, rewarding and safer way to fulfill their occupational 
callings, compared to current traditional work arrangements. The employees’ time theft 
to some extent can be understood as a result of the gap between adaptable individual 
needs due to digital revolution and the rigid traditional organizational structure. 
Therefore, organizations can leverage the advantages of crowdsourcing and adopt it as a 
job crafting technique to be a complement of traditional work. 
7.4 Generalizability  
7.4.1 Research Timing 
Although mobile healthcare is booming in China, it is a tough industry where 
innovations and changes are happening every day. As shown in Figure 1 in Chapter 2, 
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after a steep increase in 2014 and 2015, the year of 2016 saw a significant drop in the 
number of newly established mobile healthcare companies. The year 2016 was 
considered as the turning point of mobile healthcare by many practitioners and journalists 
because after a period of extreme growth and lots of merger and acquisition, every party 
(e.g., entrepreneurs, venture capital, government) became more mature than they were 
before, seeking for profitable and sustainable business models (e.g., Zhang, 2016; Lu, 
2016). It is also a time for medical professionals to reflect on their participation in mobile 
healthcare, such as why they participated in it, what they wanted to get from it, whether it 
was worth doing given their schedules in offline hospitals, and how to effectively manage 
their multiple jobs online and offline. Therefore, the inductive data were intentionally 
collected in early 2017 and the time frame for quantitative data collection was 
intentionally set up before the middle 2016. This dissertation was conducted at this right 
timing, in response to the numerous practical reports of issues on traditional and mobile 
healthcare in China, as well as academic calls for more studies on the changing nature of 
work and careers (Barley, et al., 2017).  
7.4.2 Generalizability 
Career is well recognized as contextualized and career studies cannot be 
conducted without considering the context (e.g., Savickas, et al., 2009; Young, Valach, & 
Collin, 1996; Dries, Pepermans & Carlier, 2008). The context of mobile healthcare in 
China has both unique and universal characteristics, making it a particularly interesting 
one to study.  
Mobile doctors’ careers, like many professionals’ careers, contain basic elements 
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of professional identity, knowledge, and work relationships. In terms of boundaries, like 
others, those medical professionals are living in a modern life with work, family, leisure 
and other non-work activities, which requires them to manage different domains within 
given time and energy. They also hold two or more jobs at the same time (e.g., offline 
work and crowd work). This characteristic makes their experiences considerably more 
generalizable to other careers which are influenced either by the digital revolution (e.g., 
part-time blog writer, part-time entrepreneur), or by the turbulent job market (e.g., 
contingent worker), or simply by the characteristics of some roles (e.g., board member, 
volunteers).   
However, those mobile doctors are also unique. One unique feature is caused by 
“Internet Plus” itself. Information technology is used to change and improve, rather than 
replace traditional healthcare industries. Unlike other crowd workers who might work as 
part-time in offline organizations, or may not even have an offline job (e.g., full-time Lift 
or Uber drivers), mobile doctors hold a full-time traditional job in offline medical 
institutions. Crowd work functions as a complement, rather than a replacement of 
traditional work.  
Second, different from other professional industries, healthcare is an industry 
where doctors are required to have high credentials and ethics code, gain high salary and 
reputation, work long hours, and may also have calling and social responsibility beyond 
self and their hospitals. Because the nature of medical work is a matter of life and death, 
hospitals also set up strict rules to avoid medical accidents. It makes the boundary control 
in hospitals stricter than other industries. 
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The third unique feature is caused by the Chinese healthcare system, where 
“graduates might spend their entire career in one organization, encased within a steep 
hierarchy with few other prospects.” (Burns, 2017, p. 195). The dual job holding in this 
setting is strictly constrained by offline work and an organization-driven career, making 
the dynamics, especially conflict behind traditional work and crowdsourcing more visible 
and interesting. 
In conclusion, this research identified previously underestimated flip side of 
crowdsourcing: the very nature that crowdsourcing initially is designed to mobilize 
available human resources through voluntary participation and flexible work arrangement 
later creates time conflict with traditional work that full-time employees proactively 
utilized office hours to work for crowdsourcing. This dissertation starts to reveal how and 
why crowd workers respond to time conflict. Specifically, I found that physicians 
respond to time conflict in a variety of ways, including time theft, an essential yet under-
researched construct in the crowdsourcing literature which reflects the tension between 
traditional work and crowdsourcing. Such time theft for crowdsourcing is related to the 
traditional work context, including hospitals’ boundary control and offline crowd worker 
social groups. Medical professionals assume the extra burden of working for 
crowdsourcing with the hope of answering unfulfilled occupational callings in traditional 
work and adding meaning to their work. Overall, this dissertation contributes to a better 
understanding of the shifting nature of work and careers in the digital economy. It 
provides insights for more interventions to manage work and careers in traditional 
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organizations in a digital era, which is important not only for organizational scholars, but 
also for managers. 
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APPENDIX  
Interview Protocol (Originally in Chinese) 
(1) Questions related to the crowdsourcing experiences 
• When did you start to answer questions online?  
o What happened at that time? 
• What motivates you to answer patients’ questions online?  
o What are the benefits of doing online counseling?  
• What are the challenges of doing online counseling?  
• What kind of questions do you usually choose to answer? Why?   
• Give me an example of … that you met during your online counseling.  
o The interesting case 
o The easy case 
o The difficult case 
o The impressive case 
• What do you think online patients would say about you?   
• Did you share your online experience with others?  
o If so, whom did you share with and why?  
§ How did they react to what you are doing online?   
o If not, why not?  
• Have you recommended other doctor friends to answer questions online? 
o If so, why? 
o If not, why not? 
• If you were to sum up what you do on the healthcare websites, how might 
you describe yourself? 
 
(2) Questions related to the work experience as a doctor in a hospital. 
• Please walk through a typical week you work in your hospitals.  
• If you were to sum up what you do as a doctor in a hospital, how might 
you describe yourself? 
• What are the most appealing parts of being a doctor in the hospital? 
• What are the least appealing parts of being a doctor in the hospital? 
 
(3) Questions asked about the relationship between their traditional work and crowd 
work, as well as their opinions about mobile healthcare in general 
• What are the differences between your online counseling work and 
traditional work? 
• What are the similarities between your online counseling work and 
traditional work? 
• What do you think of mobile healthcare? 
• Why did you decide to be a doctor?  
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• We talked about many aspects of mobile healthcare, but there might be 
other elements that would help me understand mobile doctors. If so, could 
you please describe them? 
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